The causes of action asserted against the defendants involve common factual and legal issues, and the interests of judicial economy and consistency of verdicts will be served by having a single trial (seeNaylor v. Knoll Farms of Suffolk County, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 726, 727, 818 N.Y.S.2d 460 ). Contrary to Finkelstein's contention, the medical records submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to its motion, which was made before the plaintiff served a bill of particulars and before discovery had commenced, sufficiently demonstrated that a common question exists as to whether certain injuries which the plaintiff allegedly sustained in the first automobile accident were exacerbated by the second automobile accident (seeLongo v. Fogg, 150 A.D.3d 724, 725, 55 N.Y.S.3d 61 ; Dolce v. Jones, 145 A.D.2d 594, 595, 536 N.Y.S.2d 134 ; Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 A.D.3d 506, 506–507, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311 ; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 A.D.2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629 ). Furthermore, Finkelstein failed to establish that a single trial would result in it suffering prejudice to a substantial right, or that any such prejudice could not be mitigated by the trial court with the appropriate jury instruction (seeSumi Chang Yeh v. Leonardo, 134 A.D.3d 695, 696, 20 N.Y.S.3d 561 ; Zili v. City of New York, 105 A.D.3d at 950, 963 N.Y.S.2d 684 ).
In view of the plaintiff's allegations in his bill of particulars that certain injuries which he sustained in the first automobile accident were exacerbated by the second automobile accident, in the interest of justice and judicial economy, and to avoid inconsistent verdicts, the two actions should be tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 A.D.3d 506, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311 ; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 A.D.3d 973, 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774 ; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 A.D.2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629 ; Gabran v. O & Y Liberty Plaza Co., 174 A.D.2d 708, 571 N.Y.S.2d 557 ). The respondents failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right if this action is tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 A.D.3d at 507, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311 ; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 A.D.3d at 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774 ).
Further, in opposition to the motion, the defendants Jonathan Bromberg, Scott Ames, and Mt. Sinai Hospital (hereinafter the respondents) failed to show prejudice to a substantial right. Therefore, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion to consolidate (see Mas–Edwards v. Ultimate Servs., Inc., 45 A.D.3d 540, 845 N.Y.S.2d 414 ; Moor v. Moor, 39 A.D.3d 507, 507–508, 835 N.Y.S.2d 593 ; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 A.D.2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629 ; Government Empls. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 251 A.D.2d 627, 675 N.Y.S.2d 878 ). The respondents' remaining contention is without merit.
The plaintiff was treated at the same hospital and later by the same doctors after both accidents. Under the circumstances presented here, in which no demonstrable prejudice to the plaintiff was shown, the interests of justice and judicial economy would best be served by consolidation of the actions ( see Romandetti v County of Orange, 289 AD2d 386; Donaldson v Jamaica Buses, 172 AD2d 800).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion to consolidate the two actions. The plaintiff supported her allegation with a physician's affirmation that the second automobile accident exacerbated the injuries sustained by her in the first automobile accident. Under the circumstances of this case, and in the absence of demonstrable prejudice to the defendants, consolidation will best serve the interests of justice and judicial economy ( see Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 AD2d 386; McIver v. Canning, 204 AD2d 698; Donaldson v. Jamaica Buses, 172 AD2d 800; Boyman v. Bryant, 133 AD2d 802).
A motion to consolidate or for a joint trial pursuant to CPLR 602 rests in the sound discretion of the trial court (Mattia v Food Emporium, Inc., 259 AD2d 527, 686 NYS2d 473 [2d Dept 1999]). Being that the two actions involve the subject property and common questions of law and fact exist, joining the actions for discovery and trial is warranted, as joinder would best serve the interests of justice and judicial economy (seeHandler v Handler, 198 AD2d 330, 605 NYS2d 888 [2d Dept 1993] [consolidation of constructive trust action and summary proceeding]; Romandetti v County of Orange, 289 AD2d 386, 734 NYS2d 629 [2d Dept 2001]; McIver v Canning, 204 AD2d 698, 612 NYS2d 248 [2d Dept 1994]). Joining these actions for discovery and trial rather than a consolidation is appropriate where, as here, the plaintiffs in both actions are different (Obuku v New York City Tr. Auth., 141 AD3d 708, 35 NYS3d 710 [2d Dept 2016]; Mas-Edwards v Ultimate Services, Inc., 45 AD3d 540 845 NYS2d 414 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Cola-Rugg Enterprises, Inc., v Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., 109 AD2d 726, 486 NYS2d 43 [2d Dept 1985]).
Based upon the above, consolidation is warranted (see CPLR 602; Scotto v. Kodsi, 102 AD3d 947, 958 NYS2d 740 [2d Dept 2013]; Best Price Jewelers. Com Inc. v. Internet Data Storage & Systems, Inc., 51 AD3d 839, 840, 857 NYS2d 731 [2d Dept 2008]; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 A.D.2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629 [2d Dept. 2001]; McIver v. Canning, 204 A.D.2d 698, 612 N.Y.S.2d 248 [2d Dept. 1994]).
Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion to consolidate or for a joint trial pursuant to CPLR 602(a) should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion (see Brown v. Cope Bestway Express, Inc., 99 A.D.3d 746, 952 N.Y.S.2d 220 ; Alizio v. Perpignano, 78 A.D.3d 1087, 1088, 912 N.Y.S.2d 132 ; Mas–Edwards v. Ultimate Servs., Inc., 45 A.D.3d 540, 845 N.Y.S.2d 414 ).In view of the plaintiff's allegations in his bill of particulars that certain injuries which he sustained in the first automobile accident were exacerbated by the second automobile accident, in the interest of justice and judicial economy, and to avoid inconsistent verdicts, the two actions should be tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 A.D.3d 506, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311 ; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 A.D.3d 973, 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774 ; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 A.D.2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629 ; Gabran v. O & Y Liberty Plaza Co., 174 A.D.2d 708, 571 N.Y.S.2d 557 ). The respondents failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right if this action is tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 A.D.3d at 507, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311 ; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 A.D.3d at 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774 ).
Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion to consolidate or for a joint trial pursuant to CPLR 602(a) should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion (see Brown v. Cope Bestway Express, Inc., 99 AD3d 746, 952 N.Y.S.2d 220; Alizio v. Perpignano, 78 AD3d 1087, 1088, 912 N.Y.S.2d 132; Mas—Edwards v. Ultimate Servs., Inc., 45 AD3d 540, 845 N.Y.S.2d 414).In view of the plaintiff's allegations in his bill of particulars that certain injuries which he sustained in the first automobile accident were exacerbated by the second automobile accident, in the interest of justice and judicial economy, and to avoid inconsistent verdicts, the two actions should be tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 AD3d 506, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 AD3d 973, 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774; Romandetti v. County of Orange, 289 AD2d 386, 734 N.Y.S.2d 629; Gabran v. O & Y Liberty Plaza Co., 174 AD2d 708, 571 N.Y.S.2d 557). The respondents failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right if this action is tried jointly (see Cieza v. 20th Ave. Realty, Inc., 109 AD3d at 507, 970 N.Y.S.2d 311; Mackey v. County of Suffolk, 67 AD3d at 974, 888 N.Y.S.2d 774).
After a careful reading of the submission herein, it is the judgment of the Court that, in view of the plaintiffs contention that the second collision aggravated the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in the first collision, consolidation would best serve the interests of justice and judicial economy ( Romandetti v County of Orange, 289 AD2d 386, 734 NYS2d 629 [2nd Dept. 2001]). The potential delay in the trial of one action pending completion of discovery in a second related action will not cause prejudice sufficient to justify denial of the motion to consolidate ( Alsol Enterprises, Ltd. v Premier Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 11 AD3d 494, 783 NYS2d 620 [2nd Dept. 2001]; Francen v Maniscalco, 256 AD2d 305, 681 N.Y.S.2d 310 [2nd Dept. 1981]).