Opinion
Civil Action 22-188J
12-05-2023
ANIBAL ROMAN, Plaintiff, v. DR. SCOTT PRINCE, DR. JAWAD SALAMEH, and LAUREL HARRY, Defendants.
Re: ECF Nos. 50 and 56
J. Nicholas Ranjan, District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Anibal Roman (“Plaintiff'), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands (“SCI-Laurel Highlands”), brings this action arising out of allegations that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) based on their failure to place him on the kidney transplant list. ECF No. 48.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Laurel Harry (“Harry”). ECF No. 50. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant Harry's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 56, which the Court construes as Plaintiffs response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part, and that the Motion to Strike be denied as moot.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs claims originate from his incarceration at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas (“SCI-Dallas”). Plaintiff has sued Harry, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and contract medical personnel Doctors Prince and Salameh. ECF No. 48 ¶¶ 4-6.
In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his civil rights have been violated because he was not added to the kidney transplant list. Plaintiff alleges that he received a donor kidney in 2000, prior to his incarceration. Id. ¶ 12. In 2021, Defendants Prince and Salameh told Plaintiff that his blood work revealed that “his kidney transplant is failing,” and that he would soon be on dialysis. Id. ¶ 14.
On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Doctors Prince and Salameh for a medical visit. Id. ¶ 15. In response to his request to be placed on the kidney transplant list, both physicians said “no,” stating that neither of them had seen an inmate receive a transplant, and that “the [DOC] will not allow transplant due to [the] status of being an inmate ....” Id. ¶ 16. They explained that if Plaintiff was allowed to receive a transplant, it would mean that other inmates could receive transplants too. Id., On December 21, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by an outside physician “who conducted the fistula surgery on Roman's left arm so Roman can receive life saving dialysis treatment.” Id. ¶ 17.
On February 26, 2022, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Prince and a physician's assistant for a sick call visit. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff asked to be provided with his blood type and other information so that he could find a kidney donor match, explaining that his friends and family would be willing to donate a kidney. Dr. Prince refused and said that it was up to Dr. Salameh and the DOC. Id. ¶ 34.
Doctors Salameh and Prince again denied a similar request during Plaintiffs medical visit on March 7,2022, with Dr. Salameh explaining that it would be hard to approve a kidney transplant because of the cost compared to dialysis. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
Plaintiff alleges that his kidney failed in March 2022, at which time he was transferred from SCI-Dallas to SCI-Laurel Highlands to receive dialysis. Id. ¶ 38.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights and Title II of the ADA. Id. ¶¶ 39,42. He seeks injunctive, compensatory, and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 44-47. Harry is sued in her official and individual capacities. Id. ¶ 4.
2. Procedural History
Plaintiff began this action on October 11, 2022, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), together with a proposed Complaint. ECF No. 1. This case was transferred to this Court on October 21, 2022. ECF No. 8. The Court granted the IFP Motion on October 24, 2022, and Plaintiff s original Complaint was filed on the same date. ECF Nos. 10 and 11.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 25, 2022, in which he brought claims under the ADA and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Doctors Prince and Salameh, the DOC, then-acting Secretary of the DOC, George Little (“Little”), and Kevin Ransom, Superintendent at SCI-Dallas. ECF No. 23. Defendants Prince and Salameh filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. ECF No. 28.
The DOC, Little, and Ransom moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims. ECF Nos. 25 and 39. Plaintiff then voluntarily moved to dismiss his claims against the DOC. ECF No. 43. Upon consideration, the undersigned submitted a Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 44, recommending that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. United States District Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan adopted the R&R and granted Plaintiff leave to amend as to his dismissed claims. ECF No. 47.
On August 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint against Defendants Prince, Salameh, and Harry. ECF No. 48. Defendants Prince and Salameh answered the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 48.
On August 9, 2023, Defendant Harry filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 50 and 51. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss, which the Court construes as a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 56. Harry filed a response to the Motion to Strike. ECF No. 60.
The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202,205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”).
Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Department of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
However, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility: “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim .. . they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a Pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. ADA Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendants under Title II of the ADA. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that he “is a qualified individual with a disability, who was precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 28889 (3d Cir. 2019).
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs ADA claim on these grounds.
Upon review, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to a certain medical treatment, a kidney transplant, for his kidney disease. But “the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination, ‘not inadequate treatment for the disability.'” Kokinda v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 663 Fed.Appx. 156,159 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016)) (citations omitted); see also Dukes v. Wood, No. 21-857, 2022 WL 446380, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) (“[T]he failure to provide medical treatment to a disabled prisoner while perhaps raising Eighth Amendment concerns in certain circumstances, does not constitute an ADA violation”) (quoting Rashad v. Doughty, 4 App'x 558,560 (10th Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff claims that he was denied adequate medical treatment for his kidney disease. He does not allege that he was discriminated against because of his disability, and he does not otherwise allege that the Corrections Defendants acted with a discriminatory motive in creating or enforcing the policy at issue. For these reasons, he fails to state a plausible claim under the ADA.ECF No. 44 at 6-7.
As Harry points out, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not cure these deficiencies.Plaintiff now alleges that he suffered discrimination because he was an inmate, ECF No. 48 ¶ 39, but he does not plead facts showing that he was subject to discrimination by reason of a disability. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADA claim should be dismissed.
Plaintiff does not oppose Harry's Motion to Dismiss as to his ADA claim. ECF No. 56.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
Harry also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim based on her alleged lack of personal involvement and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. ECF No. 51 at 4-6, 7-9. However, Plaintiff asserts-and Harry concedes in reply-that these issues have already been resolved in his favor at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. ECF Nos. 56 and 60. Because it appears that Harry has withdrawn her arguments in support of dismissal, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied in all other respects.
D. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Harry's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 50. The Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs ADA claim, and it should be denied in all other respects. Because the Court construes Plaintiff s Motion to Strike as his response to the Motion to Dismiss and considers it accordingly, the Motion to Strike, ECF No. 56, should be denied as moot.
Because Plaintiff already has been granted leave to amend his ADA claim and does not oppose the dismissal of this claim, leave to amend should not be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge.