There are cases holding that, where a judge was previously employed or consulted as an attorney, or was associated with an attorney who was consulted or employed, in a matter arising out of the same underlying factual circumstances and involving the same parties as a present case, the judge must recuse himself. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733-734 (9th Cir. 1991); Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122, 128 (La.Ct.App. 1981). But see Lofton v. State, 57 Ark. App. 226, 231-232 (1997) (fact that judge's term as elected prosecutor coincided with the pendency of investigation does not automatically require his recusal in a case arising from that investigation).
None have involved disciplinary violations based solely on a judge's failure to self-recuse. See, e.g., State v. Lemelle, 353 So.2d 1312, 1314 (La. 1977) (reversing a criminal conviction and remanding for a new trial on the basis that the trial judge should have recused himself); State v. LeBlanc, 367 So.2d 335, 341 (La. 1979) (reversing conviction, remanding for new trial based on judge's failure to recuse); State v. Krinke, 534 So.2d 431 (La. 1988) (reversing lower courts in a criminal case and granting a motion to recuse); Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981) (reversing a district judge's denial of a motion to recuse another judge in a civil case), writ denied, 404 So.2d 265 (La. 1981). Misconduct and judicial discipline, on the other hand, is entirely different.
Decisions on the issue are split, largely reflecting the precise wording of the statute or rule in question. See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich. App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (judge, a former prosecutor, need not be disqualified unless he personally participated in the former proceeding because rule required disqualification only if the judge "cannot impartially hear a case"); compare Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122 (La.App. 1981) (recusal was required under similar circumstances where the rule was interpreted to require disqualification when the appearance of partiality was present even though there was no partiality in fact). See also Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 550 (1982), specifically subsection 4, at 558 et seq.
Although La.C.Cr.P. art. 671 has included bias and prejudice as a ground for recusation in criminal cases from the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1966, La.C.C.P. art. 151 did not include those grounds until a 1987 amendment. Prior to that time impartiality, bias, and prejudice were not statutory grounds for recusation in a civil matter.Love v. Baden, 478 So.2d 1008 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1985); Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1981), writ denied 404 So.2d 265 (La. 1981). 1966 La. Acts, No. 310.
32 which provides that recusal of a referee is governed by the grounds for recusal of a judge listed in LSA-C.C.P. art. 151. Those grounds include, inter alia, the performance of a "judicial act" in the cause in another court and bias, prejudice, or interest in the cause or toward one of the parties or one of the parties' attorneys. In order to have an interest in the cause, the facts must indicate that there would be some personal advantage in deciding the case for or against one of the parties. Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122, 126 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 404 So.2d 265 (1981). The facts at bar do not remotely suggest that such is the situation here.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Recuse. The grounds for recusal set out in La.C.C.P. Art. 151 are the sole and exclusive grounds for recusal. Love v. Baden, 478 So.2d 1008, 1011 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985); Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122, 125 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1981), writ den., 404 So.2d 265 (La. 1981). La.C.C.P. Art. 151, as it read at the time of the hearing on the Motion to Recuse, stated in part:
1980), aff'd, 475 A.2d 1087 (1984), overruled in part, State v. Powell, 442 A.2d 939, 944 (Conn. 1982); Toole v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 275 S.E.2d 97, 99 (Ga.App. 1980); Finch v. Wallberg Dredging Company, 322 P.2d 701, 703 (Idaho, 1958); People v. Drysdale, 366 N.E.2d 394, 397 (Ill.App. 1977); State v. Tippecanoe County Court, 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Ind. 1982); Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122, 126-27 (La.App. 1981); Gillett v. Gillett, 257 N.W. 719, 720 (Mich. 1934); Butler Bros. Development Co. v. Butler, 108 P.2d 1041, 1052 (Mont.
Bias, prejudice, and impartiality are not statutory grounds for recusation in a civil case. Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1981), writ denied, 404 So.2d 265 (La. 1981). There must be a statutory ground for recusing a judge.
On June 25, 1981 we reversed the judgment denying recusal and ordered the recusal of Judge Stephens. Rollo v. Dison, 402 So.2d 122 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1981). Appellants argue that after the filing of the motion to recuse, Judge Stephens had no authority to act in the case until that motion was finally disposed of by this court on June 25, 1981, citing as authority for this position Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Art. 153.