Opinion
No. 98C-07-012.
Date Submitted: December 30, 1999.
Date Decided: March 29, 2000.
DEFENDANT DAVIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT — DENIED
Bruce A. Rogers, Esquire, Eric Mooney, Esquire, 104 E. Pine Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, attorneys for Plaintiffs;
Arthur D. Kuhl, Esquire, Michael A. Pedicone, P.A., 200 W. 9th Street, Suite 700, P.O. Box 1395, Wilmington, DE 19899, attorney for Defendant Bethard Marcia Davis;
Ransford B. Palmer, Esquire, Executive Campus, 111 Continental Drive, Suite 101, Newark, DE 19713, attorney for Defendants Mamie Elizabeth Thomas and Justina M. Thomas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon a motion for summary judgment filed by one of several defendants in a negligence action resulting from a multi-vehicle collision. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant, Bethard Marcia Davis' motion is denied.
NATURE AND STATUS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
This personal injury action arose from an accident, involving three vehicles, at the intersection of Route 13 and Road 485 in Sussex County, south of Seaford, Delaware. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on July 26, 1996, the Plaintiff, Edward G. Rollins ("Rollins" or "plaintiff"), was traveling northbound on Route 13, a dual highway, toward Seaford. Defendant, Mamie Elizabeth Thomas ("Thomas"), was operating her vehicle southbound on Route 13, and entered the median at the crossover of the intersection with Road 485. After stopping for a short time at the crossover, Thomas allegedly entered Route 13 northbound, directly in the path of the plaintiff. Unable to avoid hitting her vehicle, Rollins struck Thomas.
Immediately behind Rollins was a vehicle operated by Defendant, Bethard Marcia Davis ("Davis"). As soon as Rollins' vehicle had bounced away from the collision with Thomas, Davis also struck Thomas' car. Plaintiff alleges that Davis' car rebounded and struck his vehicle. Rollins claims injuries stemming from both the first collision with Thomas and the second with Davis. As a result of those injuries, Rollins brought this action. His wife joins the suit, claiming loss of consortium.
Following discovery, Defendant Davis filed this motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that Davis was negligent in any way. Davis claims that no facts were established through discovery to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Davis was following too closely, not paying attention, disregarding the safety of others or conducting herself in any other negligent manner at the time of the accident. Further, the motion asserts that since the plaintiff cannot show any negligence on the part of Defendant Davis, Rollins is also unable to show that Davis had "any role in causing the accident." Defendant's Motion at 3. This failure, Davis contends, leads to the conclusion that a jury could not find that she was the proximate cause of the accident.
Rollins counters that there are material questions of fact whether Davis followed too closely in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4123 (c) or failed to maintain a proper lookout, and that the issues are for the jury to determine. In support of that contention, Rollins points to the deposition and arbitration testimony of Davis and the plaintiff's own complaint and arbitration testimony. Using this information, Rollins asserts, a jury could find Defendant Davis negligent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In acting on a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant the motion only when no material issue of fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate where, after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. Camac v. Hall, Del. Super., 698 A.2d 394 (1996). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of any issue of material fact. Moore v. Sizemore, Del. Supr., 405 A.2d 679 (1979). Should the moving party show the lack of any material factual dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present adequate evidence of the existence of such material issues. Adams v. Kline, Del Super., 239 A.2d 230 (1968). A material factual dispute exists where the parties disagree about the occurrence of a particular circumstance required to establish a theory of recovery or a legal defense. Merrill v. Crothall-American. Inc., Del. Supr., 606 A.2d 96 (1992). Where the non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, summary judgment may be granted if the movant establishes a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the non-moving party's case.Browning-Ferris v. Rochford Enterprises, Del. Super., 642 A.2d 820 (1993). However, summary judgment is not appropriate where it seems further inquiry into the facts is necessary to adequately apply the law to the circumstances of the case. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 180 A.2d 467 (1962).
DISCUSSION
Negligence issues generally are not fodder for the summary judgment cannon. Questions of proximate cause present especially elusive targets, and are typically left to the province of the jury. Id at 469. This is true because a jury, as the finder of fact, may make reasonable inferences from the facts to settle disputed issues. This is not appropriate to the role of a judge in examining a summary judgment motion.
Viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I find that issues of material fact as to whether Davis was following too closely or failed to maintain a proper look out remain viable questions in this case. See Lindengrass v. Anderson, Del. Super., C.A. No. 89A-AU-11, Ridgely, P.J. (May 29, 1991);Ebersole at 470. The plaintiff has adduced adequate evidence that a jury could determine that Davis negligently operated her vehicle. Testimony shows that Davis was unable to stop her vehicle in time to avoid the collision with Thomas. Further, Davis' own testimony indicates that she was not aware of any danger ahead until it was brought to her attention by a passenger in her vehicle. A reasonable inference could be made by a jury that this was negligence on Davis' part.
Defendant Davis' contention that, even were negligence established, the plaintiff cannot show that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident is similarly without merit in context of this motion for summary judgment. Whether or not Davis's negligence was the cause of the initial accident, as Davis has framed the matter, is not at issue. The question for the jury to determine is whether Davis was negligent and, if so, whether the negligence a proximate cause of any of Rollins' injuries. Again, there is adequate evidence for a jury to assess whether the collision between Rollins and Davis was a foreseeable consequence of Davis' negligence and whether she was the cause of any his injuries. Rollins testified that his arm was injured as a result of the second impact. This is ripe ground for expert medical testimony and a credibility determination by the jury. Id at 471.
As the Supreme Court noted in Ebersole:
This series of . . . collisions obviously took place within a matter of seconds or, even possibly, fractions of a second. Under the circumstances, we think the entire series may be likened to a chain reaction set off initially by a presently unresolved cause. The case is, therefore, one, we think, to be resolved as a whole by a jury unless, of course, at trial further evidence is produced which clearly absolves one or more of the defendants from any liability to the plaintiff.
Id at 471.
CONCLUSION
There remain reasonable questions of material fact as to whether Defendant Davis was following the plaintiff too closely or failed to maintain a proper lookout. Further, a reasonable jury could find Defendant Davis was the cause in fact and proximate cause of some of Rollins' injuries. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is denied.IT IS SO ORDERED.