Opinion
No. 2187 C.D. 2014
07-07-2015
Trent Rollins, Appellant v. Sgt. O'Donnell, D. Bunner, Hearing Examiner, John Kerestes, Superintendent, Pa. Department of Corrections
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
Trent Rollins, pro se, appeals an order of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) dismissing his complaint against the Department of Corrections (Department) and several of its employees. Rollins contends that the trial court erred in holding that his complaint was frivolous under Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
These employees are Sergeant O'Donnell, Hearing Examiner Bunner, and Superintendent John Kerestes.
The events giving rise to Rollins' complaint occurred while he was an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (SCI-Mahanoy). On April 1, 2013, Sergeant O'Donnell issued a misconduct citation to Rollins alleging that he overheard Rollins state, "'How about those DA's (District Attorneys) in Texas. They all need to get it for their long ass sentences put out' (referring to the DA's in Texas that were murdered recently)." Certified Record, Misconduct Report, April 1, 2013. According to Sergeant O'Donnell, when he told Rollins that his language was inappropriate, Rollins reportedly replied, "I wasn't fucking talking to you." Id. The misconduct citation charged Rollins with threatening another person and using abusive language.
Pursuant to Department regulations, Rollins appeared before Hearing Examiner Bunner to challenge the citation. Specifically, Rollins claimed that Sergeant O'Donnell fabricated Rollins' response in order to punish Rollins for disrespecting the District Attorneys. Hearing Examiner Bunner found Rollins guilty of both threatening another person and using abusive language and imposed a sanction of 30 days in disciplinary custody. Rollins appealed Hearing Examiner Bunner's decision to the Program Review Committee, where it was upheld. Rollins made a final appeal to the Chief Hearing Examiner, who dismissed the charge of threatening another person but upheld the charge of using abusive language. The 30-day disciplinary custody sanction remained undisturbed.
After receiving the Chief Hearing Examiner's decision, Rollins filed a complaint with the trial court on July 15, 2014. In his complaint, Rollins pleaded one count of retaliation against Sergeant O'Donnell; one count of civil conspiracy against Sergeant O'Donnell and Hearing Examiner Bunner; one count of failure to protect against Superintendent Kerestes; and one count of permitting an unlawful policy, custom, pattern, or practice to exist at SCI-Mahanoy against the Department. Rollins requested $40,000 in damages for each count. Rollins also petitioned the trial court to proceed in forma pauperis. On July 17, 2014, the trial court denied Rollins' petition to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismissed his complaint as frivolous pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j). Rollins now appeals to this Court.
This Court's scope of review is plenary when considering questions of law. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1995). --------
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit the courts to dismiss, sua sponte, frivolous complaints. The applicable rule states:
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). A "frivolous action is one that lacks an arguable basis either in fact or law." Thomas v. Holtz, 707 A.2d 569, 570 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Rollins contends that the trial court erred in its application of this rule.
Rollins argues that he pleaded sufficient facts in his complaint to state viable claims for retaliation, conspiracy, failure to protect, and permitting an unlawful policy, custom, pattern or practice to exist at SCI-Mahanoy. The Department counters that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Rollins' claims. The Department also asserts that Rollins did not plead sufficient facts to support a claim for retaliation. We agree with both of the Department's positions.
Prisoners may challenge the Department's disciplinary sanctions in a trial court's original jurisdiction where their claims present "substantial constitutional issues." Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168, 172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). A substantial constitutional right is a "personal or property interest ... not limited by [the Department's] regulations" that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Lawson v. Department of Corrections, 539 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)). Our courts have offered the following rationale for this rule:
[I]nternal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and executive branches, and ... prison officials must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain security free from judicial interference.... Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a defendant is accorded the full spectrum of rights and protections guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, and which is necessarily within the ambit of the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing inmate grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of internal prison administration and the 'full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not necessary in a prison disciplinary proceeding.'Brown v. Department of Corrections, 913 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358-59 (citations omitted)).
Of the four counts included in Rollins' complaint, three bear no relationship to substantial constitutional rights. Specifically, Rollins' counts of conspiracy, failure to protect, and allowing an unlawful policy, custom, pattern, or practice to exist at SCI-Mahanoy are not premised upon a constitutional guarantee. Rather, Rollins cites statutory and case law in support of those claims. In short, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider them.
On the other hand, Rollins' complaint asserts that Sargeant O'Donnell's alleged retaliation violated his First Amendment right to free speech. On this constitutional claim, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. However, to succeed in a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the retaliation against that conduct resulted in adverse action; (3) the protected conduct was a substantial and motivating factor for the retaliation; and (4) the retaliatory action did not further a legitimate penological goal.Richardson v. Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Furthermore,
[a] claim of retaliation is insufficiently pled where the prisoner merely alleges that he was charged and found guilty of misconduct. Otherwise, under the guise of claiming retaliation, we would turn a case filed in our original jurisdiction into a thinly disguised impermissible appeal of the decision on the misconduct conviction.Id. (quoting Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1171 n. 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)).
Richardson is instructive and on point. There, an inmate filed suit against the Department asserting that he had been falsely charged with filing a fraudulent tax return, which resulted in a sanction of 45 days in the restrictive housing unit. The inmate accused the Department of fabricating the charges against him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to communicate with the IRS. The Department filed preliminary objections arguing that the inmate's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it alleged no facts demonstrating that the Department's charge was falsified. The trial court sustained the Department's preliminary objections.
On appeal, this Court affirmed. We explained that "[a]lthough [the inmate] asserts that the misconduct charges were fabricated, his complaint does not contain any factual averments that could sustain the inference that the [Department] purposefully falsified his misconduct charges because he was communicating with the IRS." Id. at 358. Stated another way, because the inmate's complaint lacked factual support for its legal claim, it did not state a claim for retaliation.
Similarly, here, Rollins has not pleaded sufficient facts to support his claim that Sergeant O'Donnell retaliated against him. The entirety of Rollins' factual averments of retaliation were as follows:
Defendant Sergeant O'Donnell retaliated against [Rollins] by falsely accusing him of threatening another person which ultimately led to restrictive custody, loss of recommendation for parole, and parole denial for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech.Complaint at 2-3. Asserting that O'Donnell retaliated against Rollins is a legal conclusion, not a factual averment. Nevertheless, Rollins asserts that "[t]he word 'retaliation' in the complaint sufficiently implies a causal link between his complaints and the misconduct charge filed against him." Rollins' Brief at 9. This is not the legal standard established in Richardson. Rollins had to plead specific facts to support his claim for retaliation, not merely label his cause of action as retaliation. As such, Rollins did not plead a viable claim for retaliation.
In summary, the trial court did not err in dismissing Rollins' complaint as frivolous under Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j) because the court either lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Rollins' claims or the claims were insufficiently pled. Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of July, 2015 the order of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas dated July 17, 2014, in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge