Opinion
No. 3:99-CV-2249-G
December 1, 2000
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court are two motions: (1) the defendant's motion to reconsider and to alter or amend the court's memorandum order granting plaintiffs' summary judgment motion ("motion to reconsider"); and (2) the plaintiffs' emergency motion regarding due process hearing ("emergency motion"). For the reasons discussed below, each motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have already been set out, in large part, in Willard R. Rollins v. City of Dallas, Texas, 1999 WL 1267229 (N.D. Tex. 1999). Nevertheless, the court will summarize the salient facts for the purpose of resolving these motions. Succinctly stated, Willard R. Rollins ("Rollins") was demoted to captain from his position of Executive Assistant Chief of the Dallas Police Department in September of 1999. Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to Preliminary Injunction ("Plaintiffs' Findings") ¶ 1; Defendant City of Dallas' Responses to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to Preliminary Injunction ("Defendant's Findings") ¶ 1. This demotion resulted from Chief Ben Click's determination that Rollins had inappropriately handled a citizen's complaint that Rollins struck her car while exiting a parking space. Plaintiffs' Findings ¶ 11; Defendant's Findings ¶ 11. Rollins and the City filed cross motions for summary judgment. This court granted Rollins motion for summary judgment on the grounds that he was deprived of a property interest without due process of law. Memorandum Order ("Memorandum Order") filed August 18, 2000 at 21. In that same order, this court remanded the matter to the City to afford Rollins a post-demotion hearing in conformity with the requirements of due process. Id. at 22. The City filed its motion to reconsider on August 31, 2000.
The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on Rollins' claim of deprivation of a liberty interest, but denied the city's motion for summary judgment on all of Rollins' other claims. Memorandum Order filed August 18, 2000 at 22.
Following the breakdown of settlement negotiations, the City sent Rollins a letter setting the date for the due process hearing for November 2, 2000. Letter dated October 12, 2000 ("October 12 letter"), included as Exhibit C in the Appendix to Rollins' Emergency Motion Regarding Due Process Hearing ("Emergency Motion"). The October 12 letter provided that the hearing was to be held before Assistant City Manager Ramon F. Miguez, P.E., and set out a schedule for the issuance of witness subpoenas and the exchange of witness lists and exhibits. Id. On October 13, 2000, Rollins filed this emergency motion challenging the format of the due process hearing.
Both parties have since agreed to a continuance of the due process hearing pending a decision on Rollins' emergency motion. Letter to Ramon F. Miguez dated October 27, 2000.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Reconsider or Alter or Amend Memorandum Order
The City's motion to reconsider asks the court to revisit the conclusion in the August 18, 2000, memorandum order that Rollins, as a result of his demotion, was deprived of a property interest without due process of law. As it did in the original motion for summary judgment, the City insists that the City Personnel Rules and Charter do not create a property interest and that no process was constitutionally due Rollins before he was demoted from his position as Executive Assistant Chief. See generally Motion to Reconsider. The court rejected this argument once and sees no reason to alter its conclusion now. Although the issue is not free from doubt, the court is not persuaded that its earlier analysis was in error.
The City contends that Section 34-11(d) of the Personnel Rules applies only if the position in question is one giving rise to a property interest. Motion to Reconsider at 3. See also Defendant City of Dallas' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7 ("Summary Judgment Brief"). The City also argues that Chapter XII, section 11(a) of the Charter, which excludes assistant department heads from an appeal to the Trial Board, mandates a finding that Rollins had no property right in his position. Motion to Reconsider at 4. See also Summary Judgment Brief at 6.
B. Emergency Motion Regarding Due Process Hearing
In his emergency motion, Rollins argues that the hearing offered by the City is constitutionally inadequate because (a) it is not public; (b) the designated factfinder is not impartial; and (c) the City has not determined or allocated the burden of proof. Emergency Motion at 2. See also Brief in Support of Emergency Motion Regarding Due Process Hearing at 5-6. Rollins first asks this court to declare the City's proposed hearing a sham and to proceed to trial on damages for violation of his procedural due process rights. Emergency Motion at 2. Alternatively, Rollins asks the court to prospectively tell the City how, when, and before whom it must hold the due process hearing.
Although the City has not raised the justiciability of this issue, it seems to the court that the matter is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The basic rationale for the ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative polices, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). No matter how sincerely Rollins believes that the outcome of his hearing is foreordained, the fact remains that the hearing has not yet been held and Mr. Miguez has not yet issued a decision. A constitutional violation is not concretely felt within the meaning of Abbot Laboratories merely because it is anticipated.
This court finds support for this conclusion in Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983), and Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974) (hereinafter " Ad Hoc Committee"). In Cross, African-American plaintiffs brought an action under the civil rights statutes for wrongful deprivation of land belonging to an ancestor. Cross, 713 F.2d at 155. Before they had even filed a claim in state court, the plaintiffs sought a federal injunction to prohibit enforcement by state judges in Louisiana of that state's prescriptive statutes. Id. at 159. The court held that the plaintiffs' dispute with the state judges was hypothetical and had not ripened into a justiciable controversy. Id. ("The plaintiffs, however, have never filed their claim in state court; hence, we have no way of knowing whether the state court judges would in fact apply the state prescriptive statutes as the plaintiffs' fear."). In Ad Hoc Committee, an association of attorneys and others brought suit to effect a reorganization of the state's judicial system. Ad Hoc Committee, 488 F.2d at 1243. The plaintiffs argued that the failure of the state to provide adequate court facilities denied civil litigants due process and equal protection under the law. Id. Holding that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because the issue was not justiciable, the First Circuit noted that the federal courts nonetheless remain open to, and can entertain, individual claims of actual violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 1246.
In both Cross and Ad Hoc Committee, the judiciary was asked to remedy a constitutional violation that had not yet occurred. In each case, the court declined to act unless and until there was an actual deprivation of rights. The unwillingness of a court to act absent an actual violation of rights has a number of policy bases. These are: (1) to avoid premature interruption of administrative proceedings; (2) to promote judicial economy; (3) to sustain respect for the administrative process; and (4) to protect the autonomy of administrative agencies. See In re Contimental Airlines Corporation, 50 B.R. 342, 363 (S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1986).
In the instant case, a ruling by this court on the constitutional adequacy of a hearing that has not yet occurred would implicate several of these policies. First, such an action would deny the City "an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise." Id. at 363 (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)). Second, a pre-hearing ruling would still leave open the possibility of post-hearing challenges, thus requiring this court to address the same question twice.
By this emergency motion, Rollins asks the court to interrupt the administrative process to remedy a constitutional violation that has not yet occurred, and indeed, may never occur. Because the adequacy of the City's due process hearing for Rollins is not yet ripe for judicial decision, the court declines the invitation to act.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City's motion to reconsider and to alter or amend the court's memorandum order granting plaintiff's summary judgment motion is DENIED. Rollins' emergency motion regarding due process hearing is also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.