¶ 29 Further, this Court has consistently ruled that Okla. Const. art. 2 § 6 operates as a mandate to the judiciary rather than a limitation on the Legislature. Lafalier v. Lead–Impacted Communities Relocation Assistance Trust , 2010 OK 48, ¶ 18, 237 P.3d 181 ; Rivas v. Parkland Manor , 2000 OK 68, ¶ 18, 12 P.3d 452 ; Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc. , 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030. “In other words, Section 6 was intended to guarantee that the judiciary would be open and available for the resolution of disputes, but not to guarantee that any particular set of events would result in court-awarded relief.” Rollings , 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030.

In Oklahoma, arbitration clauses are invalid unless expressly authorized by statute. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., 910 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1996). In full, section 802(A) provided,

[T]his Court has consistently ruled that Okla. Const. art. 2 § 6 operates as a mandate to the judiciary rather than a limitation on the Legislature. Lafalier v. Lead-Impacted Communities Relocation Assistance Trust , 2010 OK 48, ¶ 18, 237 P.3d 181 ; Rivas v. Parkland Manor , 2000 OK 68, ¶ 18, 12 P.3d 452 ; Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc. , 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030. "In other words, Section 6 was intended to guarantee that the judiciary would be open and available for the resolution of disputes, but not to guarantee that any particular set of events would result in court-awarded relief."

GRC claims that if section 1855(D) applies, this simply removes the arbitration agreements from the purview of the UAA, but does not invalidate the arbitration agreements. Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1996) (clarifying prior precedent that exclusion of arbitration agreement from the UAA requires the court to refer to common law). However, Oklahoma law is clear that the arbitration agreements between Mid-Continent and GRC are unenforceable.

However, the issue of whether such a waiver is proper in an arbitration clause has already been decided by this Court. See e.g. , Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus. Inc. , 1996 OK 6, ¶¶ 33-36, 910 P.2d 1030, 1036 (holding that jury waiver in arbitration agreement found not to violate Okla. Const. art. 23, § 8 or art. 2, § 6 (access to courts)). The fact that Sutton did not read the dispute resolution clause does not amount to him being prejudiced by the implications of the clause.

f Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. 1991); Nutting v. Associates in Obstetrics Gynecology, P.C., see note 57, infra; Bhansali v. Moncada, see note 59, infra; Behar v. Coren, see note 61, infra; Paley v. Maraj, see note 61, infra; Beauchamp v. Zimmerman, see note 62, infra; Kirkaldy v. Rim, see note 75, infra; King v. Dodge County Hosp. Auth., see note 60, infra; Saffian v. Simmons, see note 65, infra; Harris v. Neuburger, see note 58, infra; O'Hara v. Randall, see note 63, infra; In re Covenant Medical Ctr., see note 64, infra; Hodge v. Cheek, 64 Ohio App.3d 296, 581 N.E.2d 581 (1989), dismissed, 48 Ohio St.3d 708, 550 N.E.2d 479 (1990), impliedly overruled, Ohio Hosp. Ins. Co. v. Physicians Ins. Co., 1993 WL 548438 (Ohio App. 1993). The Association makes much of the fact that the Missouri Court in Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., this note, supra, upheld an affidavit of merit statute against a constitutional attack and that Mahoney was cited by this Court in Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 20, 910 P.2d 1030. We note that Rollings did not involve a merit of affidavit challenge.

Okla. Const. art 2, § 6, see note 1, supra.Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030 [Okla. Const. art 2, § 6, see note 1, supra, has most often been used to ensure, regardless of status, that equal access to courts is permitted.].

HMO is an abbreviation for health management organization.Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 17, 910 P.2d 1030. See also, 74 O.S.Supp. 1999 § 1303[ 74-1303](8); OAC 360:10-1-2 (1999).

[I] Recent cases that address themselves to theuniformity-of-procedure mandate. State ex rel. Macy v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Oklahoma, 1999 OK 53, ¶ 14, 986 P.2d 1130, 1139 (dealing with uniformity of procedure for county budget protests by county government and county taxpayers); Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, ¶¶ 2-14, 954 P.2d 1219, 1229B33 (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (addressing the statewide (territorial) uniformity mandate for rules of civil procedure and the interdiction of countywide (or local) rules affecting the powers and duties of county officers); Bank IV Oklahoma v. Southwestern Bank Trust Co., 1997 OK 31, ¶ 5-6, 935 P.2d 323, 327-29 (Opala, J., dissenting) (discussing the procedural uniformity mandate for a single regime of appellate practice in the 77 counties); Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 13, 910 P.2d 1030, 1040-41 (Opala, J., concurring in result) (discussing the uniformity of procedure for a single class of "contract litigants" — which includes those with or without a predispute arbitration agreement); Price v. Walters, 1996 OK 63, ¶ 9,918 P.2d 1370, 1383-86 (Opala, J., dissenting) (addressing the procedural symmetry of Oklahoma=s remedial regime for similarly situated litigants); Sparlin v. Jackson, 1996 OK 69, ¶ 8, 918 P.2d 740, 742-43 (dealing with the uniformity of procedure for appeals from the district court and from the Corporation Commission); Tony's Town Mister Quik, supra note 27 at 357-58 (dealing with the procedural symmetry of general rules of appellate practice and their across-the-board application to the review process of workers' compensation decisions); Meadows v. Pittsburg County Board of County Commissioners, 1995 OK 65, ¶ 4, 898 P.2d 741, 743-44 (addressing the procedural uniformity mandate for appeals in both public and private tort actions);

We have repeatedly held that this is a mandate to the judiciary rather than a limitation on the legislature's right to enact laws. Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1032; Wagoner County Election Bd v. Plunkett, 305 P.2d 525 (Okla1956). Section 6 is intended "to guarantee that the judiciary would be open and available for the resolution of disputes, but not to guarantee that any particular set of events would result in court-awarded relief."