Miller v. Wells , 235 Ga. 411, 416, 219 S.E.2d 751 (1975), disapproved on other grounds, Wheatley Grading Contractors, Inc. v. DFT Investments, Inc. , 244 Ga. 663, 261 S.E.2d 614 (1979). See also Goodyear v. Trust Co. Bank , 247 Ga. 281, 285 (2), 276 S.E.2d 30 (1981) (declining to recognize that lot owners in beach subdivision had a recreational easement in beach because the plats in question "do not indicate any intent on the part of the developer to create" such an easement); Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, Inc. , 254 Ga. 183, 184 (1), 327 S.E.2d 489 (1985) (explaining that in Goodyear , the crucial inquiry was to look at "the intent of the parties at the time of the conveyances to determine whether any recreational easement had been conveyed"); Smith v. Bruce , 241 Ga. 133, 143 (1), 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978) (focusing inquiry on the "intent of the subdivider to grant easements in this open area"); Walker , 236 Ga. at 332, 223 S.E.2d 675 ("It is well-established that where a developer sells lots according to a recorded plat, the grantees acquire an easement in any areas set apart for their use.").

We now adopt this rule for use in construing deeds that have as a boundary a railroad right-of-way. Pindar, Ga. Real Est. Law, § 13-10 (4th ed.); Johnson Co. v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659, 666-667 ( 18 S.E. 370) (1893); Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, 254 Ga. 183, 187 ( 327 S.E.2d 489) (1985). Pindar, at § 13-10; Johnson v. Arnold, 91 Ga. at 666-667.

This Court will not issue an advisory opinion. See Earl v. Mills, 278 Ga. 128, 133 (3) ( 598 SE2d 480) (2004); Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, 254 Ga. 183, 184 (2) ( 327 SE2d 489) (1985). This Court will likewise decline to respond to certified questions which are anticipatory in nature.

Therefore, the designation of the parcel as a "future street" is insufficient, as a matter of law, to serve as a grantor's express intent to reserve title in himself. See Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, 254 Ga. 183, 187 ( 327 S.E.2d 489) (1985).Lee v. Warren, 230 Ga. 165 ( 195 S.E.2d 909) (1973) (designation in plat of "proposed street").

Appellees have not conclusively negated the possibility that appellants could prove that the accretion in question occurred after the Agricultural Land Company sold the various lots. This case is apparently not distinguishable from Ashmore, as Rolleston v. Sea Island Co., 254 Ga. 183 ( 327 S.E.2d 489) (1985) was. Here, we find no express reservation of title to the roadway by the original vendor.

Thus, for Shearhouse to have retained any ownership interest in the Roadway, he would have had to expressly recite the reservation of such rights in the deeds of conveyance to the Hollands and the Robinsons. See Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, 254 Ga. 183, 187 (5) ( 327 SE2d 489) (1985); Houston v. Deal, 198 Ga. App. 335, 336 ( 401 SE2d 562) (1991). The foregoing rule was first enunciated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Johnson Co. v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659, 667 (1) ( 18 SE 370) (1893), and has been consistently applied for over a century, based upon the public policy goal of avoiding "the undesirable result of having long, narrow strips of land owned by people other than the adjacent landowner."

Hunt did not retain ownership of it or even an easement in it. Compare Rolleston v. Sea Island Prop., 254 Ga. 183, 187 (5) ( 327 S.E.2d 489) (1985), where the predecessor in title, by express language on the document of conveyance, reserved the title and right to control the roadway area. When Robertson conveyed her entire interest in the tract to Stuttson in 1990, she passed the fee simple title to that 420-foot portion of roadway to her grantee.

We reverse the summary judgment. This case is not controlled by Johnson Co. v. Arnold, but by Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, 254 Ga. 183, 187 ( 327 S.E.2d 489). All this land originally belonged to W. L. Houston.

An easement holder's failure to object to the erection of a permanent structure which prevents enjoyment of the easement may show intent to abandon. Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1009, 1102 (Me. 1989); see also, Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, Inc., 254 Ga. 183, CT Page 2138 327 S.E.2d 489, 492 cert. den., 474 U.S. 823, 106 S.CT 77, 88 L.Ed.2d 63 (1955). An attorney trial referee has broad discretion to try facts and pass upon the credibility of witnesses.