Opinion
No. 3-500 / 02-0941
Filed September 24, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forPolk County, Robert Wilson, Judge.
William Roland appeals the district court's decision affirming the Iowa Department of Human Services' denial of his request to expunge his name from the Child Abuse Registry. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
William Roland, Ankeny, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Wickman, Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On July 27, 1998, the Iowa Department of Human Services received a complaint alleging Roland fondled C.T., a six-year-old child, by touching her genitals. An August 12, 1998, child abuse report by department investigators concluded:
This is a FOUNDED/CONFIRMED and PLACED on the Child Abuse Registry report of SEXUAL ABUSE, Lascivious Acts with a Child, under the Iowa Code 709.8.
The report also stated:
[T]here is a preponderance of evidence for Lascivious Acts with a Child, the child being [C.T.], and the perpetrator being Bill Roland. This is also the same finding for charges against Bill Roland by the County Attorney's Office.
After receiving notice from the department that his name was placed on the Child Abuse Registry, Roland wrote to the department "to appeal [the] department's notification that [he was] now on the Child/Adult abuse registry." A May 14, 1999, letter from the Registry Liaison informed Roland of the statutory process to request correction or expungement of child abuse information from the Child Abuse Registry. Roland was also informed that his request for correction or expungement was denied because it was not timely filed.
Roland appealed the Registry Liaison's decision to the Liaison of Appeals' office. At the request of the Attorney General's office, Roland's appeal was dismissed to allow for department review of the report. In a proposed decision dated January 6, 2000, an administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered the department to review the August 12 child abuse report. On April 10, 2000, the department issued a final decision adopting the ALJ's proposed decision.
Roland petitioned for judicial review of the department's April 10, 2000, final decision. The district court determined Roland had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed Roland's petition for judicial review. Roland's case was remanded to the department for further proceedings.
On remand the department moved to dismiss Roland's request for correction or expungement citing the preclusive effect of Roland's guilty plea in parallel criminal proceedings to lascivious acts with a child in violation of Iowa Code section 708.9 (1999). Roland resisted the motion to dismiss, claiming errors in a "protective assessment summary" and that his attorney had not acted in his best interests. The ALJ's proposed decision disposing of the department's motion states:
[T]his matter has been decided by a Polk County District Court Judge who found that the appellant had committed lascivious acts with a child based upon his plea. This decision cannot be overturned at the administrative appeal level. Therefore, the child protective assessment summary and the appellant's name must remain on the Central Child Abuse Registry.
The director of the department subsequently adopted the ALJ's proposed decision as the department's final decision dismissing Roland's request for correction and expungement. In his petition for judicial review of the department's final decision, Roland claimed the ALJ exceeded her jurisdiction by basing her proposed decision on "information gathered outside of the evidentiary hearing process." Roland also claimed there is no "provision at law to declare issue preclusion based upon a subsequent ruling in a totally different venue" and that the ALJ "failed to form a reasoned conclusion regarding the matter of issue preclusion."
The trial court rejected Roland's claims and concluded that Roland's guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child precluded further litigation of related registry issues before the department. The court also rejected Roland's claim that he was denied due process of law by the department's refusal to proceed with an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his expungement request. Lastly, the court found the department's findings that Roland sexually abused C.T. were supported by substantial evidence. Roland's petition for judicial review was dismissed resulting in this appeal. Roland raises the following issues on appeal:
Issue 1
Did DHS and the administrative law judge and the District Court err when they ruled adversely in a contested matter, based solely on evidence outside of the administrative record?
Issue 2
Did the trial court err when it made a finding of child abuse based solely on substantial evidence in the record when the factual record was not properly before the court?II. Standard of Review.
The supreme court has described the applicable standard of review as follows:
In this administrative proceeding, our review is governed by Iowa Code section 17A.19(8). See Iowa Code § 235A.19(3) (stating that appeal from denial of a request for correction of information or findings of child abuse investigation shall be taken in accordance with Iowa Code chapter 17A). In reviewing the district court's decision in this case, we apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency's action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. IBP, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd., 604 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1999). In doing so, we may reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the agency action if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because of such action. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8). "[W]e accord limited deference to the agency's interpretation of law, including statutory interpretation." McCracken v. Iowa Dep't of Human Serv., 595 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Iowa 1999). The agency's findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. IBP, Inc., 604 N.W.2d at 311. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach a conclusion. Id.
Mauk v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 617 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 2000). Generally, rulings on the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Iowa 2002).
III. The Merits.
The statutory process resulting in placement of Roland's name on the child abuse registry works as follows. Upon receipt of a complaint alleging child abuse, the department is required to commence an assessment. Iowa Code § 232.71B. Under department rules, three criteria must be met before a child abuse report is accepted for assessment by the department: (1) the victim is a child, (2) the perpetrator is a caretaker and (3) the incident meets the definition of child abuse found in Iowa Code section 232.68. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-175.21-.22 (1998). The names of the child, the alleged perpetrator, report data, and disposition data are required to be placed in the registry if the department determines the perpetrator's acts fit the definition of child abuse under Iowa Code section 232.68(2). Iowa Code section 232.68(2) provides in part:
2. "Child abuse" or "abuse" means:
c. The commission of a sexual offense with or to a child pursuant to chapter 709 . . . as a result of the acts or omissions of the person responsible for the care of the child. . . .
Iowa Code section 232.68(7)(d) defines a person responsible for the care of the child as "any person providing care for a child, but with whom the child does not reside, without reference to the duration of the care." The department is also required to notify the subject of a child abuse report if the results of its assessment and the subject's rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 235A.19 to correct the report or disposition data referring to the subject require such a result. SeeIowa Code § 232.71B(11)(g).
Iowa Code section 235A.19(2)(a) provides:
A subject of a child abuse report may file with the department within six months of the date of the notice of the results of an assessment performed in accordance with section 232.71B, a written statement to the effect that report data and disposition data referring to the subject is in whole or in part erroneous, and may request a correction of that data or of the findings of the assessment report. The department shall provide the subject with an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to chapter 17A to correct the data or the findings, unless the department corrects the data or findings as requested. The department may defer the hearing until the conclusion of a pending juvenile or district court case relating to the data or findings.
As noted earlier, the department determined Roland was not entitled to a section 235A.19(2)(a) hearing because his guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child precluded further litigation of any registry issues. The gist of Roland's arguments is that the doctrine of issue preclusion is inapplicable in this context. Even if the doctrine applies, Roland argues the department erred both procedurally and substantively in its application.
Issue preclusion is an affirmative defense that must be pled and supported by the party relying on the doctrine. Fischer, 654 N.W.2d at 549-50; Johnson v. Ward, 265 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa 1978). Because it is an affirmative defense, the doctrine should not be raised by a motion to dismiss unless the nature of the prior adjudication appears on the face of the petition or arises from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Johnson, 265 N.W.2d at 749(citing Bickford v. American Interinsurance Exch., 224 N.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Iowa 1974)).
The primary purpose of issue preclusion is to protect litigants from the "vexation of relitigating identical issues with identical parties or those persons with a sufficient connective interest to the prior litigation" with an additional benefit of promoting judicial economy. State ex rel. Casas v. Fellmer, 521 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). Further litigation of an issue is precluded when four conditions exist: (1) the issue concluded must be identical in the two actions; (2) the issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the judgment. Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1980).
Issue preclusion is applicable when the parties to each action are the same. Dettmann v. Kruckenberg, 613 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Iowa 2000). It is also available defensively when the party against whom it is invoked was so connected with the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue and be properly bound by its resolution. Id.
The second prerequisite for application of the doctrine is satisfied by a validly entered and accepted guilty plea, even though the factual issues underlying the plea were not litigated. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winker, 319 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1982). In Dettmann, 613 N.W.2d at 244, the supreme court held:
The rule is well established in Iowa that a validly entered and accepted guilty plea precludes a criminal defendant from relitigating essential elements of the criminal offense in a later civil case arising out of the same transaction or incident.
The Dettmann court quoted with approval the following policy statement by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court supporting the preclusive effect of a guilty plea in subsequent civil litigation:
In the context we face here-a civil action following a criminal prosecution- application of issue preclusion will not relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, but it will conserve scarce judicial resources, prevent people from profiting from their criminal conduct and,perhaps most importantly, prevent the diminution of public confidence in our judicial system that would result if civil juries repeatedly found by a preponderance of the evidence that a convicted criminal defendant had not done something that a criminal jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had done.
Dettmann, 613 N.W.2d at 248 (quoting Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1359-60 (Mass. 1985)) (emphasis in original). While the preclusive effect of a guilty plea in a related civil case is well-established, we find no similar or controlling authority in the context of parallel criminal and administrative proceedings. The supreme court has, however, at least by implication held that the doctrine of issue preclusion may apply in this context. SeeHeidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Iowa 1985).
The application of the doctrine is not without exception even if the prerequisites to its application are established. Id.at 668 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 28(3)-(4) (1982)). Section 28(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides: "A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them." In Heidemann, the court determined the foregoing exception applied because of the difference in jurisdiction between license revocation proceedings before the Department of Transportation and related criminal prosecution in the district court. Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 668. The court stated:
We conclude that under Iowa's statutory scheme the department [DOT] was free to make an independent determination whether the deputy sheriff followed proper procedures in requesting that Heidemann submit to chemical testing, regardless what ruling on that question had been entered in parallel criminal proceedings.
Id. As a result, the court affirmed the hearing officer's refusal to give preclusive effect to the district court's ruling sustaining the motion to suppress in a criminal prosecution arising out of the same incident. Id.
Whether and to what extent any section 28 exceptions to the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion are implicated in registry proceedings before the department are issues yet to be addressed by rule, statute, or supreme court opinion. In any event, our consideration of those issues requires an unfairly broad interpretation of the issues Roland raises on appeal. In the absence of Roland's reference to any remotely related authority implicating section 28 exceptions, we decline to consider their application here. See, e.g.,Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(1)(c); see also State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999) (stating we will not assume a partisan role and undertake the task of a party's research and advocacy) (citation omitted).
We, for the policy reasons cited in Dettmann, conclude that a validly entered and accepted guilty plea to a qualifying sex offense may be given preclusive effect in parallel or subsequent registry proceedings before the department. In addition to preserving the integrity of a defendant's guilty plea and resulting judgment of conviction, precluding further litigation of the factual basis underlying a defendant's plea, also minimizes an abused victim's exposure to further imposition and trauma incident to contested case proceedings. SeeIowa Code §§ 17A.12-.13 (specifying party's right to discovery, introduction of evidence, and to subpoena witnesses including the victim). Because the department has the burden to plead and prove the conditions precedent to defense of issue preclusion, Roland's claims concerning consideration of evidence of and from proceedings outside of the department's record must also be rejected.
Although we have determined that the doctrine of issue preclusion may be raised defensively in this context, we nevertheless find sufficient merit in Roland's remaining claims to reverse the district court and remand to the agency for further proceedings. As indicated earlier, the ALJ's dispositive ruling was in response to the department's pre-evidentiary hearing motion to dismiss. Our review of the department's procedural rules fails to disclose any express authorization for filing a motion to dismiss and resulting summary disposition of a request for correction or expungement prior to a statutorily required evidentiary hearing. Even if the ALJ had express or implied authority to consider and rule on such a motion, the ALJ's consideration should have been limited to the content of Roland's 235A.19(2)(a) written request for relief and those matters of which the court could take judicial notice. See Johnson, 265 N.W.2d at 749. Moreover, the conclusory language of the ALJ's ruling is insufficient to permit us to determine whether that ruling was limited to consideration of Roland's written statement requesting correction or expungement or the extent of any facts judicially noticed by the ALJ. We are accordingly unable to determine whether the ALJ properly considered the department's motion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in summarily dismissing Roland's request. See, e.g., Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass'n. v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exm'rs., 625 N.W.2d 687, 694 (Iowa 2001).
Lastly, we note that the preclusive effect of Roland's guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child is limited to the elements of that offense. Dettmann, 613 N.W.2d at 244. A simple comparison of the elements of that offense with the section 232.68(2) definition of child abuse triggering registry notification indicates that Roland's plea is preclusive of some, but not all, of the dispositive issues concerning his request for correction or expungement. Specifically, Roland did not have to be the person responsible for C.T.'s care to commit lascivious acts with a child.
We have carefully considered all of the parties' remaining issues and arguments raised on appeal and conclude they are without merit or controlled by the foregoing. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand Roland's case to the department for further consideration in conformity with our opinion.