Strawberry Vegetable Auction, Inc. v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 143 So. 665 (La. Ct. App. 1932), relied on by Conrail, is distinguishable, as the consignee in that case had diverted the goods from their original destination. See, e.g., Ninth St. East, Ltd. v. Harrison, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 602 (1968); Newth-Morris Box Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 197 Md. 119, 127 (1950); Grover v. Hines, 66 Mont. 230, 234 (1923); Robb v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 78 Pa. Super. 1, 6 (1921); Rogers Walla Walla, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Frozen Exp., Inc., 23 Wn. App. 540, 543-544 (1979); L. Blustein Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 95 W. Va. 643, 645 (1924). See generally Bugan, When Does Title Pass From Shipper to Consignee and Who Has Risk of Loss or Damage in Transportation; Ch. XXII, Who Has the Remedy or Right of Action Against the Carrier for Loss or Damage in Transit, especially 376 (2d ed. 1951); Sorkin, How to Recover for Loss or Damage to Goods in Transit § 2.25[4] (1981); 13 C.J.S., Carriers § 249(c)(1) (1939).
Importantly, Division 3 of the Washington Court of Appeals relied upon Section 2-401 in determining who had title for the very purpose of determining who could bring suit for negligent transportation. See Rogers Walla Walla, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Frozen Express, Inc., 23 Wash. App. 540, 543 (1979); see also RCW 62A.2-401 (Washington Comment: "The Washington court has resolved still other problems by first locating title."). As such, Washington courts have relied on the UCC passage of title provision for determining ownership for purposes of standing in a tort case.
As put by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354 (1981): Rogers Walla Walla, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Frozen Express, Inc., 23 Wn. App. 540, 596 P.2d 669, 673 (1979); cf. National Bank of Alaska v. J.B.L. K. of Alaska, Inc., 546 P.2d 579, 591 (Alaska 1976) (holding prejudgment interest to be awarded even where claims unliquidated); State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1970) ("All damages then, whether liquidated or unliquidated, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, should carry interest from the time the cause of action accrues, unless for some reason peculiar to an individual case such an award of interest would do an injustice.") Interest is generally owing by the debtor from the date the debt is due or from the date the debtor refuses to pay. Brownie's Army Navy Store, Inc. v. E.J. Burke, Jr., Inc., 72 A.D.2d 171, 424 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803 (N.Y.App. Div. 198 0).