Opinion
No. 239, 1998.
Submitted: December 10, 1998.
Decided: December 18, 1998. Revised: January 27, 1999.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices.
ORDER
This 18th day of December, 1998, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
Sally Rogers appeals from a decision of the Family Court setting Ray Williamson's child support obligations for their son Colin Rogers Williamson. The Family Court's decision proceeded from a de novo review of a Master's determination of child support in this matter.
Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of the parties to this appeal. Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).
During trial, Williamson, the owner and operator of a hair salon in Newark, Delaware, offered a 1997 tax organizer into evidence. His counsel described this as a "compilation of 1997 tax returns that have not been done yet." The trial court admitted this into evidence, acknowledging that it was not yet completed or signed but that "[t]he Court will know what weight to give it." According to the trial court, this tax organizer showed Williamson's income in 1997 to be $45,222.
Rogers' strategy at trial was to show that Williamson lived well beyond his stated means and that he must therefore be lying about his income. She referenced several of Williamson's specific expenses as well as alleged irregularities in cash deposits from his business in an attempt to prove this theory.
In its decision, the trial court relied exclusively on the tax organizer (mistakenly referring to it as Williamson's 1997 tax return) as the best evidence of Williamson's income. The trial court disregarded Rogers' "elaborate attempt" to prove that Williamson had additional income not reflected in the tax organizer, claiming that the evidence was "not sufficient to prove an exact amount" and that therefore the trial court declined to speculate.
Assuming the trial court applied the correct law, this Court reviews child support determinations for abuse of discretion.
See Snyder v. Snyder, Del. Supr., 667 A.2d 1320, 1995 WL 478366, Berger, J. (Aug. 24, 1995) (Order), citing Jones v. Lang, Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 185, 186 (1991).
Neither party disputes that the trial court was correct in using the Melson Formula to determine relative support obligations between the parties. This appeal concerns only the trial court's findings of fact. This Court "will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires their overturn." But this Court may reverse the trial court's findings that are not supported by the record and are not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.
Solis v. Tea, Del. Supr., 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1983).
See Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.V.W., Jr.), Del. Supr., 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1979).
According to the Delaware statutes, the trial court must consider, among other items, the "health, relative economic condition, financial circumstance, income, including the wages and earning capacity of the parties." Our courts have not articulated a clear standard for what sort of evidence suffices to prove these factors, but at least one court has allowed a determination of income based on income tax materials that had not yet been filed.
In re the Marriage of Silverstein, Del. Fam., 1997 WL 905948 (Oct. 23, 1997) (Ltr. Op. and Order).
In its decision, the trial court determined Williamson's income by using the figures in the 1997 tax organizer and subtracting the loss from his rental properties. Considering the other available evidence, use of this document alone does not qualify as being the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. For example, the record contained Williamson's 1996 tax return. On that form, Williamson claims $29,324 net profit from his business. At trial, under examination by Rogers' counsel, Williamson admitted to approximately $21,000 in personal charges that he made on his business credit cards. If this income is reported in the 1996 tax return, it is not readily discernable. In any event, the trial court gives no indication that it relied on this evidence. If it had considered the information, it might have approached the 1997 tax organizer with a little more caution.
Williamson jointly owns some of the properties with his estranged wife Patricia. Calculations of rental income and expenses for these properties include only his half of these figures.
Rogers further questioned whether Williamson was able to pay for the wedding of one daughter, the college of another, fly every three weeks to Florida to visit his son (not to mention car rentals and parking), and own five properties and two boats, all on about $44,000 a year. But this is merely innuendo and the trial court is correct in stating that Rogers failed to prove how all of these factors translate into a specific income figure.
Beyond the issues of Williamson's income, the trial court seemed to ignore other important factors in its determination of support obligations. For example, the trial court disregarded support obligations borne by both parties to their other minor children. Rogers has another child by another father for whom she provides full support. Williamson has a $400 per month support obligation for his child in Florida.
Finally, the trial court's support order is confusing at best. In the support order, Williamson's total monthly payment is $475, comprised of $443 current and $32 arrears. In the attached disposition, the trial court states that Williamson's monthly child support obligation is $465 plus arrears of $35 per month. Also, in the support order, the trial court states that medical expenses shall be split 50/50 after the first $350 per year. The attached disposition pegs this ratio at 60/40.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Family Court for further proceedings to determine the correct child support obligation.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. NORMAN VEASEY, Chief Justice