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Rogers v. U.S.

877 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
Rogers v. U.S.

3 Citing cases

  1. Short v. U.S.

    50 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that certain federal statutes providing for the payment of interest on tribal trust funds held by the United States, "in conjunction with the government's fiduciary duty to Native American tribes, give the plaintiffs a substantive right to damages, including interest" for breach of that duty

    Peoria Tribe, 390 U.S. at 472, 88 S.Ct. at 1139 (quoting United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U.S. 180, 193, 15 S.Ct. 64, 69, 39 L.Ed. 114 (1894)). Rogers v. United States, 877 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1989), upon which the government relies for much of its argument against an award of prejudgment interest, is thus a far different case. The funds at issue in Rogers were disbursed from an Indian Claims Commission judgment fund created to compensate the claimants for a taking.

  2. Loudner v. U.S.

    905 F. Supp. 747 (D.S.D. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    For example, in Rogers v. United States, the BIA sent "letters to . . . newspapers, television stations, and radio stations . . . enclosing a public service announcement . . . Letters were also sent to 97 different organized Indian groups in 24 states and the District of Columbia." 877 F.2d 1550, 1553-54 (9th Cir. 1989). The evidence in Rogers was fresher, the suit having been first brought in the early 1980's.

  3. Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States

    843 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 8 times
    Stating that "a single reference to an incorrect legal standard does not undermine a final decision, only its application does" and holding that, despite referencing an incorrect legal standard, the court under review did not err because it "repeatedly applied the correct ... standard"

    However, the Government cites no affirmative evidence in support of its argument, and speculation does not demonstrate reversible error. See Rogers v. United States , 877 F.2d 1550, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that speculation cannot demonstrate an abuse of discretion). As a result, the CIT's lone recitation of the "slightly more" and "clearly" standards, when viewed against the remainder of the CIT's analysis, did not constitute an abuse of its discretion.