Opinion
24A-CR-1297
08-30-2024
Willie Rogers, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
APPELLANT PRO SE Willie Rogers South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit Court The Honorable William R. Walz IV, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 44C01-2109-CM-388
APPELLANT PRO SE Willie Rogers South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Willie Rogers filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, attacking his prior conviction for invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition. Rogers appeals and claims that the trial court erred by denying his petition. Because the writ of error coram nobis has been superseded by our Post-Conviction Rules, we affirm.
Issue
[¶2] We find one issue to be dispositive: whether the trial court erred by denying Rogers' petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
Facts
[¶3] Following a 2023 jury trial in which he represented himself, Rogers was convicted of invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. Rogers appealed pro se and complained of allegedly false statements in the probable cause affidavit that led to his arrest. We determined that Rogers' argument was waived and rejected his argument to the extent that it could be discerned. Rogers v. State, No. 23A-CR-832, 2023 WL 4945103 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 3, 2023) (mem).
[¶4] On December 1, 2023, Rogers filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Rogers raised claims of fundamental error, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous admission of evidence, and insufficient evidence. The post-conviction court summarily denied Rogers' petition. Rogers appealed pro se the denial of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, this Court again affirmed, concluding that "all issues raised by Rogers in his petition for postconviction relief were known and available to him at trial and on direct appeal . . . . Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived." Rogers v. State, No. 23A-PC-3089, 2024 WL 1191611, at *2 (Ind.Ct.App. Mar. 20, 2024) (mem) (citations omitted).
[¶5] On the same day that we affirmed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, Rogers filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied the petition on May 9, 2024, and Rogers now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Rogers claims that the trial court erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. We disagree.
[¶7] A writ of error coram nobis is a writ "directed to a court for review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact." CORAM NOBIS, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Prior to the adoption of our Post-Conviction Rules, "a judgment of conviction could be collaterally attacked by a writ of error coram nobis." Perry v. State, 512 N.E.2d 841, 842 (Ind. 1987); see also Bell v. State, 473 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (referring to the writ of error coram nobis as a "former procedure[] for obtaining post-conviction relief").
[¶8] Indiana, however, adopted the Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies in 1969. These Rules provide a means for those who have been convicted of or sentenced for a crime to challenge the conviction or sentence on a variety of grounds. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a). Pertinent to our discussion is Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b); this rule provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them.P-C. R. 1(1)(b) (emphases added). Thus, in Bell, we held that Post-Conviction Rule 1 "supersedes all former procedures for obtaining post-conviction relief specifically including the writ of error coram nobis." 473 N.E.2d at 636; see also Davis v. State, 368 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 n.1 (Ind. 1977) (noting that our PostConviction Rules "supersede the common law writ of error coram nobis.").
[¶9] Because the writ of error coram nobis has been superseded, Rogers' petition for such a writ is unavailing. At best, Rogers' petition is merely an attempt to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. See Bell, 473 N.E.2d at 636 (holding that defendant's prior petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which had been filed before the adoption of the Post-Conviction Rules, was effectively an initial petition for post-conviction relief, and that his current post-conviction petition was, therefore, a successive petition for post-conviction relief).
[¶10] A petitioner who wishes to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief must first petition for authorization to do so from this Court. Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. 2008). Thus, even if we consider Rogers' petition as one for post-conviction relief, it is his second such petition, yet he has not sought or received the required permission from this Court to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying Rogers' petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
Conclusion
[¶11] The trial court properly denied Rogers' petition for a writ of error coram nobis because that writ has been superseded by our Post-Conviction Rules. And even if we consider Rogers' petition as one for post-conviction relief, it is a successive petition. Rogers, however, did not seek or receive permission from this Court to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Rogers' petition.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.