Opinion
# 2012-015-316 Claim No. 116997 Motion No. M-80812
03-20-2012
ROGERS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
PRS claim was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Case information
UID: 2012-015-316 Claimant(s): DEON ROGERS Claimant short name: ROGERS Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 116997 Motion number(s): M-80812 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: FRANCIS T. COLLINS Muscato & Shatkin, LLP Claimant's attorney: By: Marc Shatkin, Esquire Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: March 20, 2012 City: Saratoga Springs Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Defendant moves to dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).
Claimant, Deon Rogers, alleges he was wrongfully imprisoned for violating one or more of the conditions of an administratively imposed period of postrelease supervision (PRS). The claim sets forth that the claimant was sentenced to a five-year determinate term of imprisonment on or about February 9, 2001 with no period of PRS (defendant's Exhibit A, Claim ¶ 4) and that his maximum expiration date "should have been October 1, 2005" (defendant's Exhibit A, Claim ¶ 4). The claim asserts the defendant "maliciously, recklessly, negligently and/or intentionally and administratively, with absolutely no authority, sua sponte, imposed a five year period of post release supervision upon claimant" (defendant's Exhibit A, Claim ¶ 5) and the claimant was, as a result, allegedly confined from December 2005 through December 2006 for violating the terms of his administratively imposed period of postrelease supervision (defendant's Exhibit A, Claim ¶ 8). In his first cause of action claimant seeks damages for the period he was confined for parole violations. His second cause of action seeks damages for a "de facto confinement" during the time he was not incarcerated but required to report to parole officials (October 2005 through December 2005 and December 2006 through October 2008) (defendant's Exhibit A, Claim ¶ 11).
On a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) the court is required to "accept the facts as alleged in the [claim] as true, accord [claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see also Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]). Thus, the determination is made by reference to whether "the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88, quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). To establish a cause of action for false imprisonment a claimant must show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]), cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Accepting the facts alleged in the instant claim as true and according claimant's allegations the benefit of every favorable inference, he fails to state a cause of action.
The Court of Appeals held in both Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. (10 NY3d 358 [2008]) and People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) that only a sentencing judge may impose the PRS component of a sentence, thereby invalidating the longstanding practice of administratively imposing statutorily required periods of PRS. In the wake of these decisions numerous claims for false imprisonment arising from periods of confinement imposed for violations of a term of PRS not authorized or directed at sentencing were commenced in this Court with varying results (see e.g. Nazario v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 443 [2009], affd 75 AD3d 715 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010]; Mickens v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 191 [2009]; Donald v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 329 [2009], revd 73 AD3d 1465 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Eanes v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1297 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Orellanes v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1308 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]). The Court of Appeals resolved the divergent views in Donald v State of New York (supra), holding in two of the four appeals decided therein that the failure to allege (let alone establish sufficiently to oppose a motion for summary judgment) the fourth element of a cause of action for wrongful confinement, that the confinement was not privileged, was fatal:
" 'A detention, otherwise unlawful, is privileged where the confinement was by arrest under a valid process issued by a court having jurisdiction' . . . Neither Donald nor Eanes alleges any defect in the process by which he or she was arrested for violating PRS, or in the jurisdiction of the court that issued that process" (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d at 395, quoting Davis v City of Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 842 [1985]).
Here, too, claimant fails to allege any defect in the process by which he was arrested or in the jurisdiction of the entity which issued that process. As a result, the claim fails to state a cause of action for wrongful confinement.
The Court of Appeals in Donald also held the State was immune from liability for the alleged negligence of the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") (now known as the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision) in subjecting the claimants to unauthorized PRS terms. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that DOCS' actions in administratively imposing a term of PRS were discretionary because, as the Court explained:
"In each of these cases, DOCS was presented with a prisoner sentenced to a determinate prison term, for whom PRS was mandatory under state law. DOCS made the 'reasoned judgment' that it should interpret their sentences as including PRS, though the sentences rendered by the courts did not mention it. We held in Garner that that judgment was mistaken, but it clearly was just that - a mistake in judgment - not a ministerial error, like mistranscribing an entry or confusing the files of two different prisoners" (17 NY3d at 395).
Here, like the facts in Donald, the State is immune from liability for any alleged negligence of DOCS in imposing the PRS term as its conduct in doing so was the result of a discretionary mistake in judgment rather than ministerial negligence.
Nor does the fact that the sentencing Court retained the discretionary authority to impose a shorter period of PRS require a different result. At the time claimant was sentenced, Penal Law § 70.45 (former [2]) stated "[t]he period of post-release supervision for a determinate sentence shall be five years . . . provided, however, that when a determinate sentence is imposed pursuant to section 70.02 of this article, the court, at the time of sentence, may specify a shorter period of post-release supervision of not less than two and one-half years upon a conviction for a class B or class C violent felony offense." In Donald v State of New York (supra) the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held with respect to this same provision that at the time of claimant's sentencing the maximum period of PRS "was imposed automatically if the court was silent with respect to postrelease supervision" (73 AD3d at 1466-1467). The Appellate Division decision in Donald was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As the Court of Appeals made clear, DOCS' conduct in interpreting the sentence as including a term of PRS was an act of reasoned judgment for which the State is immune from liability. "Making judgments as to the scope of its own authority in interpreting the directions it has received from the court system is a normal and legitimate part of DOCS's function . . . Because DOCS was exercising - albeit mistakenly - the discretion given it by law, its acts cannot be a basis for State liability" (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d at 396). Whether the PRS term imposed by DOCS was a term statutorily mandated by the Penal Law, or one resulting from the failure of the sentencing court to authorize a lesser period where a variable PRS term was available, as is the case here, the result is the same. The State is immune from liability. Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion is granted and the claim is dismissed.
March 20, 2012
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court considered the following papers:
1. Notice of motion dated December 20, 2011;
2. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich dated December 20, 2011 with exhibit;
3. Affirmation of Marc Shatkin dated December 29, 2011;
4. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich dated January 11, 2012 with exhibit.