”) The term “prevailingparty” as used in Or.Rev.Stat. § 653.055(4) is further defined in Oregon law: “the prevailing party is the party who receives a favorable judgment or arbitration award on the claim.” Or.Rev.Stat. § 20.077(2); Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or.App. 580, 584–585, 213 P.3d 583 (2009) (referring to Or.Rev.Stat. § 20.077(1) and (2) to determine whether defendant employer was the prevailing party on plaintiff employee's claims falling within the ambit of Or.Rev.Stat. § 653.055). .Section 653.055 references a span of sections within Chapter 653, Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 653.010 to 653.
On appellant's petition for reconsideration filed July 27, 2009. Opinion filed July 15, 2009. 229 Or App 580, 213 P3d 583 (2009). J. Dana Pinney and Bailey, Pinney Associates, LLC, for petition.
To determine which party prevailed on each claim, whether an award of attorney's fees is warranted, and if so, how much of an award is reasonable, the Court turns to Oregon law. Oregon courts have articulated the principles that guide determination of when and how to award attorney's fees under the "Prevailing party" statute, four of which are particularly germane to the instant situation. The first such principle is that, under ORS § 20.077, claims grounded in a statute, rather than a contract, do not give rise to an award of attorney's fees. CMS Sheep Co., Inc. v. Russell, 179 Or. App. 172, 177-78, 39 P.3d 262, 264-65 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); but see Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or. App. 580, 584-87, 213 P.3d 583, 585-87 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (awarding fees and costs under a statute where the statutory section specifically authorized an award of fees). Therefore, no attorney's fees may be awarded to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party on the stay violation claim.
In that latter situation, the plaintiff may recover the fees reasonably incurred in association with the claims on which she prevailed, including time spent on the other claims if "there are common issues among the claims such that 'it would have taken roughly the same amount of time to litigate a case in which the successful claim was the sole claim as it took to litigate the case in which it was one among several claims[.]'" Rogers v. RGIS, LLP,229 Or App 580, 587 n 7, 213 P3d 583, adh'd to as modified on recons,232 Or App 433, 222 P3d 710 (2009), rev den, 348 Or 291 (2010) (quoting Freedland, 162 Or App at 379). In such a case, the issue is not whether the plaintiff may be entitled to recover fees associated with the unsuccessful claims—she may--but whether the amount of those fees is reasonable. Cf.Bennett v. Baugh,164 Or App 243, 247-48, 990 P2d 917 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (stating principle in relation to prevailing defendants' work on both successful and unsuccessful affirmative defenses).
In that latter situation, the plaintiff may recover the fees reasonably incurred in association with the claims on which she prevailed, including time spent on the other claims if "there are common issues among the claims such that `it would have taken roughly the same amount of time to litigate a case in which the successful claim was the sole claim as it took to litigate the case in which it was one among several claims[.]'" Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 or. App. 580, 587 n 7, 213 P.3d 583, adh'd to as modified on recons, 232 or. App. 433, 222 P.3d 710 (2009), rev den, 348 Or 291 (2010) (quoting Freedland, 162 or. App. at 379). In such a case, the issue is not whether the plaintiff may be entitled to recover fees associated with the unsuccessful claims — she may — but whether the amount of those fees is reasonable. Cf. Bennett v. Baugh, 164 or. App. 243, 247-48, 990 P.2d 917 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (stating principle in relation to prevailing defendants' work on both successful and unsuccessful affirmative defenses).
In that latter situation, the plaintiff may recover the fees reasonably incurred in association with the claims on which she prevailed, including time spent on the other claims if “there are common issues among the claims such that ‘it would have taken roughly the same amount of time to litigate a case in which the successful claim was the sole claim as it took to litigate the case in which it was one among several claims[.]’ ” Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or.App. 580, 587 n. 7, 213 P.3d 583, adh'd to as modified on recons., 232 Or.App. 433, 222 P.3d 710 (2009), rev. den., 348 Or. 291, 231 P.3d 795 (2010) (quoting Freedland, 162 Or.App. at 379, 986 P.2d 630). In such a case, the issue is not whether the plaintiff may be entitled to recover fees associated with the unsuccessful claims—she may—but whether the amount of those fees is reasonable. Cf. Bennett v. Baugh, 164 Or.App. 243, 247–48, 990 P.2d 917 (1999), rev. den.,
Plaintiffs assert the 6,140.5 hours sought pertain only to the WBF fund, late final paycheck claims, or “addressed issues common to all claims.” Id. See,Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or.App. 580, 587 (2009)(when “a case involves multiple claims and more than one party prevails, a party seeking fees must submit a sufficiently detailed statement to permit the trial court to apportion the fees on a claim-by-claim basis”); Don't Shoot Portland v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-CV-00917-HZ, 2023 WL 6213352, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2023)(“It is the fee claimant's burden to demonstrate that the number of hours spent on the case were ‘reasonably expended' on the litigation and that counsel made a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary[.]”)(quotation omitted)
The court previously determined Brooks initiated this lawsuit in good faith and now expressly finds Caswell Sculpture's counterclaim was not objectively unreasonable in light of the relatively unique claim alleged and the absence of clear precedent. Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or. App. 580, 189-90 (2009)("Also, pursuant to ORS 20.075, in deciding whether to award fees, the trial court properly considered the fact that it believed plaintiff's rest and meal break claims to be reasonable, especially in light of the fact that the law was unsettled at the time.")(footnote omitted).
A party seeking attorney fees pursuant to ORS § 652.200(2) must file with the court "a signed and detailed statement of the amount of attorney fees or costs and disbursements, together with proof of service" on the adverse party. Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or. App. 580, 213 P.3d 583, 586-87 (2009) (citing, ORCP 68 C(1), C(4)(a)(1)). Hunter has filed the required statement, showing the hours expended and hourly rates charged by each of his two co-counsel and their legal assistants, totaling $12,790.00. The court finds the hours expended and hourly rates to be reasonable. Hunter also seeks to recover $395 in costs, consisting of the $350 Complaint filing fee and $45 service fee.
Where, as here, a party seeks multiple claims authorizing an award of fees but does not prevail on all of those claims, fees may only be awarded for the time reasonably necessary to prevail on the prevailing claim(s). Rogers v. RGIS, LLP, 229 Or.App. 580, 587, 213 P.3d 583, 587 (2009) (internal citation omitted). Thus, the party seeking fees "must submit a sufficiently detailed statement to permit the trial court to apportion the fees on a claim-by-claim basis, as the court deems necessary."