Summary
dismissing Title VII claim as time-barred where plaintiff, a former MWRD employee, was suspended in July 1998 pending termination and terminated by the Board in November 2000, but did not file an EEOC charge until January 2001
Summary of this case from Escobedo v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi.Opinion
01 C 2271
December 17, 2001
Judith Marie Rodgers was a Foreman at the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District until her termination in November 2000. She alleges that she was fired in retaliation for complaints of racial discrimination, and sues under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She may have had a colorable claim, but she sues too late.
Plaintiff has voluntarily dropped Count II, her § 1981 claim.
On December 4, 1996, plaintiff complained to her supervisors and an EEOC officer about racial discrimination in the laborers' office. On February 7, 1997 she received poor performance evaluations. Plaintiff continued to complain about discrimination, and on October 14, 1997, she was suspended, purportedly for insubordination. About five months later, plaintiff received a second poor performance evaluation. In June 1998 she complained about discrimination again, and on July 30, 1998 she was suspended pending termination. The District filed termination charges in August 1998. The termination was not effective until November 22, 2000, when the Civil Service Board reviewed and granted the termination request.
In Illinois, a Title VII complainant must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Failure to do so renders the charge untimely. As for the § 1983 claim, a two-year statute of limitations applies. The charge of discrimination in this case was filed on January 12, 2001, and the lawsuit was filed on April 3, 2001. Consequently, the only allegedly discriminatory act occurring within the Title VII 300-day statute of limitations or the two-year § 1983 statute of limitations is the Civil Service Board's November 22, 2000 termination decision.
I find that the November 2000 decision does not save plaintiffs claims from being time-barred. Plaintiff knew in August 1998 that she was suspended indefinitely and without pay, pending final termination by the Civil Service Board. In November 2000, the Civil Service Board approved an employment decision that was made, and for all practical purposes, executed, in 1998. "The pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations period." See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980).
Even absent the statute of limitations issue, there would be a timing problem. The subject of the lawsuit is retaliation, which requires a discriminatory act to follow fairly closely on the heels of a protected expression. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1998). In this case, the most recent complaint about discrimination occurred in June 1998, and the indefinite suspension followed shortly thereafter. Protected speech, adverse act, and causation were all alleged; plaintiff would easily have survived a motion to dismiss if she had filed her charge within 300 days of August 1998 (or within two years for the § 1983 claim). A gap of two and a half years between the speech and the adverse consequence, however, cannot satisfy the causation element of either claim. Id.
It is argued that plaintiffs pre-2000 claims are not time-barred because they constitute a continuing violation. The continuing violation theory allows a plaintiff to reach back to get relief for an act of discrimination that occurred outside the statute of limitations by linking it as one continuous act with a discriminatory act that took place within the limitations period. See Miller v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 2000). The continuing violation doctrine applies only if it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue about the suspension before the statute ran on the conduct. See Filipovic v. KR Exp. Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999). Such is clearly not the case here. Plaintiff did file a lawsuit within the statutory period, but the case was dismissed for failure to serve defendants. Plaintiff then waited one year to re-file, but her case expired in the interim.
The motion to dismiss [8] [24] is granted, terminating the case.