Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-07-006-FSS.
Submitted: January 23, 2002.
Decided: April 30, 2002.
ORDER
Upon Appeal From the Industrial Accident Board — AFFIRMED.
This is an appeal from the Industrial Accident Board. Appellant pro se, Joyce Rogers, was an employee of Appellee, Lear Corporation, from September 1997 to May 2000. She suffered, and was compensated for, several injuries during employment at Lear. At the hearing before the Board in this case, Rogers claimed that she suffered a neck injury and that her pre-existing injuries were aggravated by her work at Lear. She also claimed that her job at Lear caused her "stress," because Lear required her to work outside of doctors' restrictions. The Board denied benefits. In effect, Rogers questions whether the Board's decision is supported by sufficient evidence.
I.
Rogers filed two petitions with the Board. The first petition alleged that "continual bending and lifting on the job" caused a new neck injury and "aggravated pre-existing, work-related" hand, knee and back injuries. She claimed that the injuries "rendered her physically incapable of working from November 1999 to February 2000" and ongoing from "May 2000." Rogers' second petition alleged that "stress of Lear assigning her work without regard to the restrictions ordered by doctors rendered her physically incapable of working from May 16, 2000."
At the Board's hearing, Dr. Frank Falco, a pain specialist and Rogers' treating physician, stated that in June 1999, he diagnosed Rogers with carpel tunnel syndrome, a right knee cartilage tear and thoracic disc herniation. He totally disabled her from May 12, 1999 to August 31, 1999. Falco also testified that in September 1999, he released Rogers to work in the "Sure-bond" area without restrictions. He stated that Dr. Phillips, another treating doctor, issued a return to work slip that Rogers was medically approved for Sure-bond duty without restrictions, to minimize injury. Dr. Falco also read from Dr. Jerry Case's deposition regarding Rogers' August 1999 injury. Case is an orthopedic surgeon. Quoting from Case's deposition:
[s]he was capable of full-time light duty work avoiding repeated bending and twisting, no running squatting and climbing. She would have to avoid repetitive flexion and extension activities of the right wrist.
Question, "And the last restrictions were the result of the wrist problem?
Answer, "Yes."
Question, "And the first set of restrictions were the result of both the knee and upper back?"
Answer, "Yes."
Falco agreed with Case's restrictions.
Dr. Falco further stated that he placed Rogers on total disability from May 16-18, 2000. He stated that he saw Rogers on May 23, 2000 and she appeared to be in "extreme stress." Falco testified that Rogers told him that her stress resulted from her job restrictions and an "exacerbation of symptoms." He stated that he did not psychiatrically evaluate Rogers. Finally, he testified that, in August 2000, he placed work restrictions on Rogers:
no lifting over ten pounds, no climbing ladders, no overhead work, no squatting, crawling, kneeling, stooping, no repetitive bending, twisting, no pushing or pulling more than ten pounds. If these restrictions are not available then do not work.
He did not mention the specific injury addressed by the restrictions.
Dr. Lynne Hagelin, Rogers' treating psychiatrist, also testified for Rogers, opining that Rogers showed anxiety from work-related issues. Hagelin agreed that generally one would be "stressed by being put on full duty in a job when the person's doctor placed them on restricted duty." She admitted, however, that she had no first-hand knowledge of Rogers' actual job situation or her doctors' restrictions. Hagelin also stated that Rogers' "state of mind . . . in my office . . . has made it very difficult to be certain exactly what's going on."
Dr. Jerry Case, an orthopedic surgeon, mentioned above, testified for Lear. He saw Rogers on several occasions between November 1998 and May 2001, and reviewed her medical records. Case denied that Rogers was totally disabled, and that her neck injury was work-related. Instead, he attributed the neck pain to a car accident that occurred in July 2000. Case found that Rogers "was not symptomatic as far as the carpal tunnel syndrome." And, his examination of Rogers' knees was "normal."
Dr. Louis Leaff, a psychiatrist, also testified for Lear. He stated that he examined Rogers five times and reviewed her records. Leaff diagnosed Rogers:
with a personality disorder with paranoia and by social [?] . . . . My feeling is that the anxiety and the depression that she suffers are the result of a limited personality resource and possibly substance abuse. And that there's secondary phenomena.
Leaff explained "secondary phenomena" as:
[i]t means that her personality is such that it's limited in its ability to adapt to an environment. When things are not the way she wants them to be then she becomes anxious. She becomes depressed and she becomes abusive and she becomes very angry.
He believed that Rogers' psychological problems predated her employment at Lear, and that "it was a life long pattern." Leaff also believed, "Ms. Rogers is badly in need of psychological counseling from my standpoint . . . ." He did not, however, believe that her need for counseling stemmed from the work environment. At most, Leaff admitted that if facts he received from Rogers were true, "having to report to unrestricted duty even though a doctor had recommended restrictions would cause stress." Even at that, Leaff firmly opined, "[Rogers] would have these problems with or without Lear."
Also testifying for Lear was Tracey Wilkerson, a labor market analyst and Charles Ruda, a human resource manager. Wilkerson did a labor market survey and testified that she found fifteen jobs in Roger's range, averaging $349.40 per week. Ruda testified that, while employed as a human resource manager at Lear, he had frequent contact with Rogers. After gratuitous digs about Rogers' interactions with co-workers, Ruda stated that in 1999, Rogers had a carpel tunnel syndrome claim that Lear disputed. He testified that in August 1999, Rogers came with restrictions for the carpel tunnel syndrome and other injuries. Ruda stated that, at that time, he told her that she "would not be able to return to work because we didn't deem this to be work related and at this time we weren't going to honor those restrictions." Further, he stated that in October 1999, Rogers had "originally brought in a slip for Sure-bond" and Ruda told her that "`if you're telling me you can only work Sure-bond that's a restriction and we'll not honor this as work related . . . we cannot honor those restrictions." Lear put Rogers in a full duty position. Ruda stated that Lear later "picked up" the claim and transferred Rogers to light duty work. Finally, regarding the May 2000 incident, Ruda stated that Rogers was terminated for "attendance and not calling in."
II.
Regarding Rogers' neck injury, the Board found that "evidence failed to establish that a work-related injury to [her] cervical spine has caused her to be totally disabled." Also, the Board held that because she claimed that "the cumulative stress" from working at Lear caused her injury, Rogers had to show "ordinary stress and strain" of working at Lear was the injury's "substantial cause." The Board found that medical testimony showed Rogers' neck injury was "not sufficiently severe to prevent her from obtaining employment." Thus, Rogers was not totally disabled.
For her stress claim, the Board concluded that Rogers failed to prove that doctors had "actually recommended restrictions when [Rogers] returned to work." It was Rogers' burden to show objectively that work conditions were stressful and a "substantial cause of her depression and anxiety." The Board noted that Rogers' return to work slips "purported to place [her] in a particular location in Lear's plant," but "simultaneously released her to work without restrictions." The Board found that the notes "failed to identify an employee's physical limitations," thus, "[Rogers'] doctors permitted her to return to unrestricted work." Further, the Board found that Rogers was "assigned to a light duty position for all but two weeks."
For Rogers' aggravation of pre-existing injuries claim, the Board found that she failed to prove any aggravation of injuries "incapacitated her from any type of work." No medical testimony established that any of Rogers' work assignments "were the substantial cause of any aggravation of medical problems." Medical testimony failed to show that "these problems prevented [Rogers] from any type of work." As with her stress claim, the Board found that Rogers failed to meet her burden to prove that "the ordinary stress and strain of employment was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." Finally the Board denied Rogers' petition for medical expenses.
III.
Now, Rogers essentially claims that she suffers "stress" and anxiety because Lear's supervisors made her work full duty, despite doctors' orders that she only work light duty. In her appellate brief, Rogers claims that the Board's June 20, 2001 decision has "many incorrect statements." She clarifies that she never alleged that, "[she] was physically incapable of working from November 1999 to February of 2000." A third of Rogers' brief covers her ordeals with the Board which happened before it issued a decision. A third of Rogers' brief details what she claims are the Board's many factual inaccuracies. She also alleges on appeal that Lear violated 19 Del. C. § 2365 by firing her in retaliation for her Workers' Compensation claims. Finally, she requests a hearing in this court.
19 Del. C. § 2365: It shall be unlawful for any employer or the duly authorized agent of any employer to discharge or to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against an employee as to the employee's employment because . . . [h e or she] . . . has claimed or attempted to claim workers' compensation benefits from such employer, because such employee reported an employer's noncompliance with a provision of this chapter . . . .
Lear maintains that the Board's decision is "supported by substantial and competent evidence and is free from legal error." It states that Rogers' brief "consist[s] of the same arguments forwarded before the [Board]." It also contends that "claimant is asking [the Court] to reconsider and reweigh the same evidence already considered by the Board."
IV.
The Court's authority on appeal is limited strictly by 29 Del. C. § 10142 and 10161(a)(8). It does not reexamine evidence, much less make its own factual findings. Under our system, the Board has primary authority to decide facts and apply the law. The Board's decision stands so long as there are no legal errors and substantial evidence supports its factual findings.
General Motors Corp. v. Jarrell, 493 A.2d 978 (Del.Super. 19 85).
Substantial evidence, to a reasonable mind, is adequate to support a conclusion. Moreover, a medical expert's opinion "constitutes substantial evidence to support the Board's finding." When the Board relies on an expert's opinion that is backed by substantive evidence, the Court will not disturb the Board's decision. The Court only determines whether there is satisfactory proof to support a factual finding. The Court's determination is limited to the record. Witness credibility, testimony weight and any reasonable inferences to be drawn are the Board's determination, not the court's as it sits in its appellate role. If the Board's decision is supported by the evidence and there is no mistake in law, the Board's decision stands. In her briefs, Rogers misapprehends the court's limited role, suggesting that it can rehear the evidence and override the Board's fact-finding.
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
Lohr v. ACME Mkts., Del. Super., C.A. No. 98A-05-020, Cooch, J. (Feb. 24, 1999) Order at *2 (citing DiSabatino v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102, 10 6 (Del.Super. 19 82)), aff'd, 734 A.2d 641 (Del. 1999).
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del.Super. 1975); Abex Corp. v. Todd, 235 A.2d 271, 293 (Del. 1967).
Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976).
Coleman v. Dep't. of Labor, 288 A.2d 285, 287 (Del.Super. 1972).
Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del.Super. 1971), aff'd, 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972).
V.
The Board correctly held that in any claim for work related mental disorders or aggravation of existing injury, the claimant must show that the injury or aggravation of injury was substantially caused by the ordinary stress and strain of employment. In its decision, the Board states that Rogers failed to do that. The Board found that the doctors "released [Rogers] to work without restrictions" even though several notes merely released her to unrestricted work in Lear's Sure-bond area. The Board states,
Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Del. 1989); State v. Steen 719 A.2d 930 (Del. 1998) (aggravation of existing injury).
[i]f there were some physical incapacity that prevented Claimant from performing certain functions, these doctors, following the standard practice would have enumerated specific activities that were inadvisable for Claimant to do. . . . Claimant's doctor's did not, however, enumerate specific, prohibited activities in 1999. Moreover, when Lear questioned the "restriction" to Sure-bond, Dr. Phillips removed it. At that point, had he intended the "Sure-Bond" restriction to limit Claimant's activities, he could have revised the note to specify the activities he recommended against.
As mentioned, at the hearing Dr. Case's deposition was read into testimony by Dr. Falco. And Case apparently recommended restrictions for Rogers' return to work based on the August 1999 injuries. During his live testimony, Dr. Case admitted the same when cross-examined by Rogers:
Rogers: You recommended when I returned to work that I would return with restrictions?
Case: Yes.
The Board nevertheless rejected Rogers' stress claim for alternative reasons. First, it concluded that in effect, Rogers was not forced to go back to work, despite doctors' restrictions, as she claims. And so, she could not demonstrate an objective basis for stress. Alternatively, the Board concluded that even if Lear forced Rogers to come back to work despite doctors' restrictions, that situation only lasted for two weeks. After that brief interval, Rogers worked light duty. Thus, the Board held that she failed to establish a basis for a compensation award.
In affirming the Board's decision, the court does not accept its reasoning entirely. The Court appreciates the Board's point that a doctor's restriction without specifics is "unhelpful." But, it goes too far to conclude that "[g]iven the absence of specific physical limitations in the notes, . . . Claimant's doctors permitted her to return to unrestricted work." Clearly, the doctors' intended restrictions and the fact that their notes were inadequate or inconsistent does not mean that they agreed that Rogers could do full duty work.
But despite its rejecting a part of the Board's rationale, the court cannot ignore the Board's alternative conclusion that Rogers failed to make out a claim for compensation. The record does support the finding that Dr. Phillips eventually lifted Rogers' restrictions. Moreover, the record supports the alternative finding that even if Lear ignored Rogers' restrictions, such as they were, for two weeks and even if that were stressful, Rogers nevertheless failed to prove that she was entitled to compensation.
No expert testified that if it were stressful for two weeks, Lear's conduct proximately caused injury to Rogers. Rogers, herself, never testified. She called her daughter as a witness and Rogers alluded generally to damages in her examination of witnesses and in her arguments to the Board. But she never explained precisely how the stress affected her and what damage it caused. The actual description of how Rogers' restricted and unrestricted duties varied was, at best, vague. Rogers did present some evidence from which the Board could have concluded that Lear caused her additional stress for approximately two weeks. She failed, however, to address how that stress compared with the stress she was under from non-work related causes. She did not demonstrate how stress caused by Lear, as opposed to other stress, was significant enough to affect her earning capacity or otherwise cause compensable damage.
In rejecting Rogers' neck claim, the Board found that the "uncontroverted medical testimony established that the injury to Claimant's neck is not sufficiently severe to prevent her from obtaining employment." Also, in rejecting Rogers' aggravation of existing knee, back and wrist injuries claim, there was no medical testimony "that work assignments following [Rogers'] return to work in October 1999 were the substantial cause of any aggravation of medical problems to [the pre-existing injuries]." Without that medical testimony, the Board correctly concluded that Rogers' failed to establish her neck and aggravation claims. The Court sees no principled reason to disturb the Board's findings.
VI.
In closing, the court is not insensitive to the importance Ms. Rogers places on this decision and to her condition. She has called and written chambers several times while her appeal has been pending. While the court regrets that its decision likely will shake further her faith in the system and aggravate her problems, as presented above, the court's role on appeal is highly regulated and it cannot decide the case based on sympathy. The Board held an extensive hearing under challenging circumstances and it rendered a detailed decision, which basically is solid.
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, the Board's June 20, 2001 decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.