Rogers v. Joughin

4 Citing cases

  1. Hagen v. Schluchter

    126 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1964)   Cited 11 times
    Stating reciprocal wills "wholly testamentary in character cannot be considered as a memorandum of an irrevocable contract to devise property in accordance with its terms"

    An agreement to devise real property is in effect a contract to sell real estate and is included within the scope of subsection 4, supra. 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of ยง 100, 597 et seq.; 49 Am.Jur. (Statute of Frauds, Sec. 215) 539; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469, 45 P.2d 198; Maloney v. Maloney, 258 Ky. 567, 80 S.W.2d 611; In re Wheeler's Estate, 164 Misc. 441, 299 N YS. 945; Kennly v. Kennly, 45 Ohio App. 249, 186 N.E. 853; Tillinghast v. Harrop, 63 R.I. 394, 9 A.2d 28; Rogers v. Joughin, 152 Wn. 448, 277 P. 988; In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wn. 391, 134 P. 1041; West v. Day Trust Co., 328 Mass. 381, 103 N.E.2d 813, 29 A.L.R.2d 1224. A memorandum, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, must contain all of the essential or material conditions and terms of the contract.

  2. Miller v. Greene

    104 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1958)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that quantum meruit recovery is proper where one furnishes services to another, which are of benefit to the recipient, under an invalid or unenforceable contract

    Among the authorities which support the view we have adopted herein is 1 Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 192, wherein it is said that any contract for which marriage or a promise of marriage is the consideration, in whole or in part, is within the Statute. Also see 2 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 426; 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 486 (Rev. ed. 1936) which says this rule applies in the case of indivisible contracts; Stevens v. Niblack's Adm'r, 1934, 256 Ky. 255, 75 S.W.2d 770; Terry v. Terry, 1936, 264 Ky. 625, 95 S.W.2d 282; Henry v. Henry, 1875, 27 Ohio St. 121; Rogers v. Joughin, 1929, 152 Wn. 448, 277 P. 988, which case recognizes no distinction between contracts made "in contemplation" and those made "in consideration" of marriage. Also see 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of ยง 230, which states that where one of the considerations for payment of money or transfer of property is a promise of marriage, the contract is within the Statute and the whole contract must fail, but that it is otherwise where the promise to marry is separable from the agreement to pay money or transfer property.

  3. First Natl. Bank v. Friednash

    302 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1956)   Cited 5 times
    In First Natl. Bank v. Friednash, 72 Nev. 237, 302 P.2d 281 (1956), we were asked to interpret the joint will of a married couple.

    An agreement to leave such an estate in a certain manner amounts to a contract to devise real property. Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757, 1035, 76 Am.St.Rep. 580. A contract to devise real property falls within the statute of frauds as a contract for sale of lands. Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S.W.2d 985; Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408, 4 Am.Rep. 573; Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S.E. 739; Rogers v. Joughin, 152 Wn. 448, 277 P. 988; Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927, 43 A.L.R. 1010; 2 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, 1404, sec. 488; Restatement of the Law, Contracts, sec. 193; Anno. 102 Am.St.Rep. 240, sec. VIIIa. Our statute of frauds provides: (sec. 1529 N.C.L. 1929) "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing, and be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made." We are then left with the instrument itself.

  4. In re Estate of Verbeek

    2 Wn. App. 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 32 times

    It is also true that under the law of this state, the status of real property as distinguished from personal property; e.g., earnings, cannot be changed by mere oral agreement of the spouses. Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wn.2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947); Rogers v. Joughin, 152 Wn. 448, 277 P. 988 (1929); Graves v. Graves, 48 Wn. 664, 94 P. 481 (1908). The necessity for a writing changing the separate status of real property has been said to arise because of the statute requiring all conveyances of real estate or an interest therein and all contracts creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon real estate to be by deed or written contract.