Article 6899j is susceptible of at least three interpretations: (1) that marks and brands registered within six months of August 30, 1971 — but not those first recorded after that time — must be re-registered every ten years; (2) that all owners must re-register their marks and brands ten years from the date they originally recorded them and at subsequent ten-year intervals; or (3) that marks and brands recorded after August 30, 1971, but prior to August 30, 1981, must be re-registered within six months of the latter date, and that at subsequent ten-year intervals, all brands and marks then existing must be re-registered. Our objective in construing article 6899j is to determine which interpretation best reflects the legislature's intent. Rogers v. First National Bank, 448 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); A.M. Servicing Corp. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1964, no writ). The legislative history of article 6899j sheds little light upon what was intended.

We believe the broad language on plans for improving the health, education, and welfare of all children, and on providing them services must be read in connection with the specific purposes of article 695a and the 1969 amendments. See Rogers v. First National Bank, 448 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute must be viewed as a whole). The services to be provided are services for the dependent, neglected, and other children that article 695a seeks to assist.

We must therefore presume that the legislature had specific intent and purpose in mind when it used the phrase 'constituting as a whole one continuous territory.' It is of paramount importance that this court consider all of Section 19.231 and not just an isolated part to discover the true intent of the legislature. Peterson v. Calvert, 473 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1971, err. ref.); Rogers v. First National Bank of Midland, 448 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1969, writ ref., n.r.e.); West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District v. County Board of School Trustees of Orange County, 430 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1968, writ ref., n.r.e.). The obvious intent of the legislature in passing Section 19.231 was to establish a standard or criteria that certain school districts could use in determining if a consolidation was authorized under law.