Opinion
No. 3:03-CV-1077-R
February 5, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE TUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature of the Case: This is a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by a state inmate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
B. Parties: Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Respondent is Douglas Dretke, Director of TDCJ-CID.
C. Procedural History: On August 18, 2000, petitioner was convicted of murder on a plea of guilty. (Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet.) at 2.). He did not appeal. ( See id. ¶¶ 8-9.) On January 16, 2003, he did, however, file a state petition seeking habeas relief. ( Id. ¶ 11.) On April 30, 2003, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition. ( Id.) On May 13, 2003,
Petitioner filed the instant petition on May 13, 2003, when he signed and placed it in the prison mail system. (Pet. at 9); see also, Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that prisoners file their federal pleadings when they place them in the prison mail system). Petitioner claims that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a hearing to suppress his confession allegedly given as a result of police misconduct. (Pet. at 7.)
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, on April 24, 1996. Title I of the Act applies to all federal petitions for habeas corpus filed on or after its effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). Because petitioner filed the instant petition after its effective date, the Act applies to his petition.
Title I of the Act substantially changed the way federal courts handle habeas corpus actions. One of the major changes is a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year period is calculated from the latest of either (A) the date on which the judgment of conviction became final; (B) the date on which an impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the Supreme Court initially recognizes a new constitutional right and makes the right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim became known or could have become known through the exercise of due diligence. See id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
Petitioner has alleged no state-created impediment under subparagraph (B) that prevented him from filing his federal petition. Nor does he base his petition on any new constitutional right under subparagraph (C). Thus, as § 2244(d)(1) relates to this case, the Court will calculate the one-year statute of limitations from the latest of (A) the date petitioner's conviction became final or (D) the date on which he knew or should have known with the exercise of due diligence the facts supporting his claims.
In this case, petitioner did not appeal his conviction. For purposes of § 2244(d), the state conviction thus becomes final thirty days after he was found guilty and sentenced. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a conviction becomes final under Texas law thirty days after the defendant pled guilty and failed to file an appeal); Ellis v. Johnson, 11 F. Supp.2d 695, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Petitioner's state judgment of conviction thus became final on September 17, 2000.
With regard to subparagraph (D), the Court determines that the facts supporting the claim raised in the instant petition for habeas relief also became known or could have become known prior to the date petitioner's state judgment of conviction became final on September 17, 2000. When petitioner pled guilty he knew or should have known the facts that form the basis for his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Because his claim is premised on conduct which occurred during or before trial, petitioner was clearly aware of the facts supporting his claims prior to September 17, 2000.
Because petitioner filed his petition more than one year after his conviction became final on September 17, 2000, a literal application of § 2244(d)(1) renders his May 13, 2003 filing untimely.
III. TOLLING
The clear language of § 2244(d)(2) and a prior holding of this Court mandate that petitioner's time calculation be tolled during the period in which his state habeas application was pending before the Texas state courts. See Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp.2d 650, 652 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that the filing of a state habeas application stops the one-year period until ruling on state application).The AEDPA expressly and unequivocally provides that" [t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). When petitioner filed his state petition on January 16, 2003, the statutory limitations period had already expired because his conviction became final on September 17, 2000. Thus, the statutory tolling provision does not save the May 13, 2003 federal petition. Further, nothing in the petition indicates that rare and exceptional circumstances warrant equitable tolling. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp.2d 650, 654 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (same). Petitioner's May 13, 2003, filing should therefore be deemed untimely.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court find the request for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 barred by statute of limitations and DENY it with prejudice.