Rogers v. Denver

8 Citing cases

  1. Forks v. City of Warsaw

    273 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. 1971)   Cited 17 times

    The substantial nature of their interest and the immovability of the real estate justifies the classification. This general principle of law was recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court in Rogers v. City and County of Denver (1966), 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648. This case had a factual background stronger than that presented by the appellants in this case. In the Colorado case the appellant landowners had signed a petition to avoid annexation; however, a number of those signing were rejected by the City Council for the reason that they had purchased their land in the year 1964, and were, therefore, not liable for any property tax in the year of 1963, which was the year next preceding the year in which the petition was filed.

  2. Greenwood Village v. Pet. for Prop

    3 P.3d 427 (Colo. 2000)   Cited 126 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that Greenwood Village had a legally protected interest and alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to bring a retrospectivity challenge

    Accordingly, we have held that: (1) the legislature's power over the setting and changing of municipal boundaries is virtually unlimited, and (2) the legislature may place any requirement or condition thereon, subject only to constitutional restrictions.See Rogers v. City County of Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 74-75, 419 P.2d 648, 649 (1966). In 1980, through the adoption of Article II, section 30, of the Colorado Constitution, the people of the state provided that no unincorporated area may be annexed to a municipality unless: (1) the question has been submitted to the vote of the landowners and the registered electors in the area proposed to be annexed and the majority of such persons voting on the question have voted for the annexation; (2) the annexation petition has been signed by persons comprising more than fifty percent of the landowners in the area and owning more than fifty percent of the area, excluding public streets, alleys, and any land owned by the annexing municipality; or (3) the area is entirely surrounded by or is solely owned by the annexing municipality.

  3. Rogers v. City and County of Denver

    386 U.S. 480 (1967)

    Decided March 27, 1967.___ Colo. ___, 419 P.2d 648, appeal dismissed. Harry L. Arkin for appellants.

  4. Burritt and Safeway v. City of Butte

    508 P.2d 563 (Mont. 1973)   Cited 10 times

    A nonresident freeholder of the annexed area may constitutionally be excluded from those permitted to protest. Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, D.C., 308 F. Supp. 1397, aff'd 399 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 2197, 26 L.Ed.2d 555; Rogers v. City and County of Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648. There are governmental as well as economic reasons for the legislature to make annexations easier for larger cities.

  5. Pomponio v. Westminster

    496 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 11 times

    " Adams v. Colorado Springs, supra. See also Cline v. Boulder, supra; Rogers v. Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648 (1966). Judgment is affirmed.

  6. Ft. Col. Wtr. Dist. v. Ft. Collins

    174 Colo. 79 (Colo. 1971)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that when a complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction and could grant a motion to dismiss on either ground

    [1,2] The first fundamental precept in answer to the plaintiffs' contentions is that, in the absence of express constitutional provisions to the contrary, the general assembly has unlimited power over annexation of territory by municipalities; and even the legislative denial of the rights to notice and to vote upon annexation is not a denial of due process of law or the equal protection of the laws. Roger v. Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648. C. Rhyne, Municipal Law 37. [3,4] We find no specific constitutional limitation that bears upon the question of the form or type of procedure which must be employed to challenge an annexation, and this court has not yet exercised its rule-making power under Colo. Const. art VI, ยง 21. Previously, this court recognized that judicial review of annexations is a special statutory proceeding.

  7. Cline v. Boulder

    168 Colo. 112 (Colo. 1969)   Cited 23 times
    Reiterating the rule that a building permit by itself, without reliance, is not enough to create a vested property right

    Their argument in this respect seems to be more concerned with what the law ought to be rather than what the law is. In Rogers v. Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648, this court favorably cited general law as follows: "Consent of inhabitants.

  8. Jefferson Center v. N. Jeffco Metro

    844 P.2d 1321 (Colo. App. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    On the contrary, subject to possible equal protection or procedural due process objections, none of which are asserted here, the state's power over the boundaries of such subdivisions is plenary. Rogers v. Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648 (1966). See also Adams v. Colorado Springs, 178 Colo. 241, 244, 496 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1972) ("[T]he legislature may give to municipalities the power to annex upon any condition it chooses to impose.").