A councilman of an incorporated city is a public officer. Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 (2) ( 47 S.E.2d 739). The Chapter of the Criminal Code in which Code Ann. § 26-2302 has been placed is entitled, "Abuse of Governmental Office." Some of the sections in the chapter deal specifically with State officers, and some with officers of a political subdivision.

Equity will not interfere by injunction to determine the election of public officers or their title to public office, because the common law remedy of a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto is adequate. Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 (3) ( 47 S.E.2d 739); Coleman v. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458, 462 ( 30 S.E. 297). 3. The appellee Abernathy's acts as a member of the Haralson County Board of Education were those of a de facto officer, and his acts as such are those of an officer de jure. Hawkins v. Intendant c. of Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527. "The acts of a de-facto officer are valid in so far as they affect the rights of the public and of third persons having an interest in the acts performed by such officer."

" Davis v. Matthews, 169 Ga. 321, 322 ( 150 S.E. 158). "While injunction is a proper remedy to restrain public officers from acting illegally, or without authority, and in breach of trust, where irreparable injury is alleged, and a clear case is presented ..., yet where the basic and underlying purpose of a suit is really to declare a public office vacant ..., or to test the title to the office under which the parties purport to act, or the validity of their election ..., a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, under Code § 64-201, is adequate to determine the issue." Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 (3) ( 47 S.E.2d 739). Here the plaintiff contends the defendants are illegally holding office because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the section of the Georgia Constitution providing for the means of their selection.

The sole substantial issue made by the petition was the right and title of Mr. Murdock to the office of County School Superintendent. "Quo warranto affords an adequate remedy for the trial of title to a public office; and where title is the sole issue, all equitable jurisdiction is ousted." Stanford v. Lynch, 147 Ga. 518 (1) ( 94 S.E. 1001); Tupper v. Dart, 104 Ga. 179 ( 30 S.E. 624); Moore v. Dugas, 166 Ga. 493 ( 143 S.E. 591); Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555 (3) ( 146 S.E. 173); Davis v. Matthews, 169 Ga. 321 ( 150 S.E. 158); Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 (3) ( 47 S.E.2d 739). 2. It is my view that the action against the State Board of Education was an action against the State.

" It would seem that the first question which must be determined is, whether or not the trial court erred in adjudging the defendant mayor and councilmen to be de facto officers, and, as such, authorized to discharge the duties of such officers of the Town of Blairsville under its charter of 1908. If this were the only question presented, under the decision of this court in Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 ( 47 S.E.2d 739), the remedy of the plaintiffs would be by writ of quo warranto; but in the instant case the plaintiffs are also seeking injunctive relief against the issuance of a beer license, and against the collection of ad valorem taxes of one dollar per hundred dollars valuation sought to be imposed by the city, because under the charter of the Town of Blairsville of 1908 (Ga. L. 1908, p. 414), as amended by Ga. L. 1909, p. 565, the tax rate is limited to fifty cents on the hundred dollars. Thus there are other equitable questions here involved, and the writ of quo warranto would not afford adequate relief.

37 Am.Jur. Municipal Corporations, Sec. 222, p. 854; Capital Gas Co. v. Young, 109 Cal. 140, 41 P. 869, 29 L.R.A. 463; People v. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d 510, 248 P.2d 520. A city councilman is a public officer of the municipal corporation, State ex rel. Ralich v. Millsop, 138 W. Va. 599, 76 S.E.2d 737; Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654, 47 S.E.2d 739; Smith v. Reid, 60 S.D. 311, 244 N.W. 353. In the case of State ex rel. Scott v. Trousdale, 16 Nev. 357, the Nevada Court said: