Opinion
5:22-cv-801 (MAD/TWD)
08-29-2023
MEGAN A. ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL BENEDICT, et al., Defendants.
MEGAN A. ROGERS Plaintiff, pro se.
MEGAN A. ROGERS Plaintiff, pro se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge.
On July 29, 2022, Megan A. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) commenced this pro se action against Michael Benedict, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Sohl, Sara Sohl, Spike Benedict/Deuce, Sohl, and Reedy Sohl (collectively, “Defendants”) by filing multiple form-complaints pursuant to: (1) “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended;” (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (4) “the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as amended;” and (5) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff submitted these complaints along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.)
By Order and Report-Recommendation issued October 4, 2022, (the “R&R”), the undersigned granted Plaintiff's IFP application for purposes of initial review, reviewed the sufficiency of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and recommended Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 7.) On April 12, 2023, the Hon. Mae A. D'Agostino, United States District Court Judge, adopted the R&R in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 10.)
On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seemingly reasserting claims against Michael Benedict, Rudy Sohl, and Sara Sohl. (Dkt. No. 11.) For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint without leave to amend.
I. IFP
Since the Court previously granted IFP for purposes of initial review (Dkt. No. 7), that determination applies to this initial review of Plaintiff's amended complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action if the Court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his pleadings “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, this “does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Moreover, federal courts have an “independent obligation” to consider the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Leopard Marine & Trading, Ltd. v. Easy Street, Ltd., 896 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 2012)). “If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary of the Amended Complaint
Plaintiff's disjointed amended complaint is devoid of pertinent details and full sentences. From what the Court can glean, Plaintiff alleges a supposed “Fraud Ring” has “destroyed” her life. (Dkt. No. 11 at 1.) She goes on to allege Michael Benedict (“Benedict”) jumped in front of her vehicle, but does not identify when or where this occurred. Id. At some point, he supposedly threatened her when she was in contact with her ex-boyfriend. Id. Plaintiff claims Benedict was “a huge suspect” when her house was vandalized on May 22, 2020. Id. Plaintiff further alleges Benedict stole her phone and obtained a key fob to her home by telling ADT he was Plaintiff's husband. Id. He also allegedly had a “dupe key” to Plaintiff's house and would break into it in the middle of the night. Id. Benedict's probation officer was supposedly notified of this. Id. Plaintiff also appears to allege Benedict and Sara Sohl were somehow involved with the 2005 disappearance of Larry Stackhouse. Id. at 1-2. Moreover, according to Plaintiff, Sara Sohl's family “engages in Insurance Fraud . . . use[s] the Slave Market, help[s] people fake their deaths, forced marriage and identity theft.” Id.
Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Larry Stackhouse, Jr. went missing on December 2, 2005, in Syracuse, NY and remains missing. 15 years since Larry Stackhouse, Jr. went missing, Localsyr.com (Dec. 2, 2020, 10:45 PM), https://www.localsyr.com/news/local-news/15-years-since-larry-stackhouse-jr-went-missing/.
Plaintiff claims “These individuals are a Fraud Ring” and “This scam ruined my business, my credit, driving and criminal record.” Id. It appears Plaintiff was charged with reckless endangerment, but she claims “The cops were obviously paid to lie, as the police report was ‘Altered' a year after the incident.” Id. It is unclear what the circumstances are surrounding the reckless endangerment charge or what “the incident” is. Id.
Plaintiff alleges she gave Rudy Sohl “the chance to write a statement against Sara & Michael” but the circumstances surrounding the statement and its contents are unclear. Id. Finally, Plaintiff asks for “an investigation of these individuals” and for $30,000 in restitution. Id.
B. Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint
Construing Plaintiff's entire amended complaint liberally, the undersigned concludes she has failed to state a claim for relief. See Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Moreover, many of Plaintiff's claims appear to be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The undersigned accordingly recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint in its entirety without leave to amend.
To begin, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff has failed to adequately set forth sufficient factual content to allow this Court to reasonably infer any of the Defendants are liable for the conduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. She has failed to set forth a short and plain statement outlining who did what to her, why they did it, and how she was injured. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Absent these basic details, Plaintiff's amended complaint has failed to give Defendants fair notice of what her claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Accepting the facts alleged in Plaintiff's amended complaint as true and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court is left with “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” See Hernandez, 18 F.3d at 136; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The undersigned accordingly recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to state a claim. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are also frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff advances no allegation any of the Defendants are federal or state actors. (See Dkt. No. 1); O'Donoghue v. United States Soc. Sec. Admin., 828 Fed.Appx. 784, 787 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants violated plaintiff's federal rights while acting under color of state law”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has also failed to allege any of the Defendants deprived her of federal or constitutional rights while acting under color of state or federal authority. (See Dkt. No. 11.) This dispositive defense appears on the face of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See id. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are accordingly frivolous. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims on the grounds that they are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
C. Failure to Comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Court also recommends dismissal because Plaintiff's complaint fails to provide sufficient information for the Court to review or for Defendants to have notice of the claims against them. (See generally Dkt. No. 11.) Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8's purpose “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 CIV. 4768 (JSR), 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances....Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Sandler v. Capanna, Civ.A. No. 924838, 1992 WL 392597, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1992) (citation omitted).
A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). “Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As detailed above, Plaintiff generally alleges Benedict jumped in front of her car, threatened her, stalked her, stole her phone, broke into her home, and was involved in the 2005 disappearance of Larry Stackhouse. (Dkt. No. 11 at 1-2.) She further alleges Benedict, Sara Sohl, and Rudy Sohl are a “Fraud Ring” and ruined her business, credit, driving record, and criminal record. Id. at 2. Plaintiff's haphazard collection of allegations does not provide any clear indication of the causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert and against whom.
The undersigned accordingly recommends dismissing all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Benedict, Sara Sohl, and Rudy Sohl without leave to amend on the grounds that they are inadequately pled and frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437; Walker v. Rivera, No. 1:22-CV-560 (DNH/TWD), 2022 WL 2341544, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-560, 2022 WL 2805477 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022).
The Court notes Plaintiff was issued a bar order on January 17, 2023, and she “is permanently enjoined from filing any pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) as a pro se plaintiff in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee (except pleadings or documents in a case that is open at the time of the issuance of the Court's Pre-Filing Order, until that case is closed).” In re Rogers, No. 5:22-PF-00004 (BKS), 2023 WL 197371 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2023).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's amended complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Plaintiff has fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).