Opinion
5:22-cv-801 (MAD/TWD)
10-04-2022
MEGAN A. ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL BENEDICT, et al., Defendants.
MEGAN A. ROGERS Plaintiff, pro se
MEGAN A. ROGERS Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”) filed by Megan A. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) Having reviewed Plaintiff's IFP Application, the undersigned GRANTS the application for purposes of this review. (See Dkt. No. 2.) The undersigned now considers the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 1.)
I. BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants Michael Benedict, Rudolph Sohl, Sara Sohl, Spike Benedict/Deuce, Sohl, and Reedy Sohl (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint consists of five different form complaints, which purport to assert actions under: (1) “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended;” (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (4) “the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as amended;” and (5) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). See id.
This is the fifth action Plaintiff has filed with this Court. See Rogers v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 5:21-CV-1351, 2022 WL 3226349, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend as frivolous); Rogers v. Pfizer et al., Case No. 5:21-cv-176-GLS-TWD (N.D.N.Y. 2021), Dkt. No. 16 (dismissing complaint without leave to amend for failure to state a claim); Rogers v. CPS, No. 5:20-CV-0075 (LEK) (ATB), 2020 WL 2059824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020) (dismissing several claims with prejudice, one claim without prejudice and leave to amend, and terminating several defendants); Rogers v. Clinton, No. 5:19-CV-175 (LEK) (ATB), 2019 WL 3454099, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019) (dismissing compliant without leave to amend for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Rogers v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 5:21-CV-1351 (DNH) (ML), 2022 WL 899771, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1184585 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2022) (cautioning Plaintiff “that her unwarranted litigiousness is bordering on vexatiousness,” and if she continues to “file meritless submissions, she will be directed to show cause as to why the Court should not issue an Order barring her from future filings without prior leave of the Court”); Rogers v. Child Protective Servs., No. 20-1725, 2020 WL 7040960, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 2020) (dismissing appeal because it lacked an arguable basis in either law or fact); Rogers v. Clinton, No. 19-2632, 2019 WL 6218814, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2019) (same). On September 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed her sixth action with this court. See Rogers v. McMahon, et al., Case No. 5:22-cv-994-BKS-TWD (N.D.N.Y. 2022).
Similar to the other actions initiated by Plaintiff in this Court, “[t]he ‘facts' of this action are stated in a cursory and random manner in various parts of the complaint, and there are few full sentences.” Rogers v. Clinton, No. 5:19-CV-175 (LEK) (ATB), 2019 WL 3469462, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3454099 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019). Through the first of her five form complaints, purportedly asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Plaintiff claims Michael Benedict, Sara Sohl, Rudolph Sohl, and Sohl committed an “insurance scam” and discriminated against her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) She accordingly asserts three causes of action-two for “Torts” and one for “Imprisonment.” See Id. at 3.
Through the second of her five form complaints, purportedly asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff claims Michael Benedict and Sara Sohl are liable for “Michael intentionally jump[ing] in front of [her] vehicle.” See Id. at 5. Plaintiff accordingly asserts three causes of action-the first for her “business plans,” the second for “[h]ome headquarters” and the third for “prison + restitution.” See Id. at 5-6.
Through the third of her five form complaints, purportedly asserted under Bivens, Plaintiff names Michael Benedict, Sara Sohl, Rudolph Sohl, Reedy Sohl, Spike Benedict/Deuce, and Sohl as defendants. See Id. at 7-9. Plaintiff asserts no facts and lists no causes of action under her Bivens complaint. See id.
Through the fourth of her five form complaints, purportedly asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Plaintiff names Michael Benedict, Sara Sohl, and Rudolph Sohl as defendants. See Id. at 10-13. Plaintiff advances no causes of action under her ADA complaint, but claims: (i) “the cops gave [her] a ticket for reckless endangerment; (ii) “Michael [Benedict] bodyslammed [her] windshield in order to obtain a personal injury check;” and (iii) Michael Benedict and Sara Sohl “had the secret of the disappearance of Larry Stackhouse missing since 2005.” Id. at 11.
Through her fifth and final form complaint, purportedly asserted under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Plaintiff claims Michael Benedict retaliated against her. See Id. at 14-20. Plaintiff appears to advance two causes of action under her ADEA complaint-one for “torts” and the other for “$60,000.” See Id. at 15.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When conducting this review, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021). The Court must accordingly construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
“An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
III.SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
Construing Plaintiff's entire Complaint liberally, Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, the undersigned concludes she has failed to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Moreover, many of Plaintiff's claims appear to be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety with leave to amend.
First, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff has failed to adequately set forth sufficient factual content to allow this Court to reasonably infer that any of the Defendants are liable for the conduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. She has failed to set forth a short and plain statement stating who did what to her, whey they did it, and how she was injured. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Absent these basic details, Plaintiff's Complaint has failed to give Defendants fair notice of what her claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accepting the facts alleged in Plaintiff's entire Complaint as true and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Hernandez, 18 F.3d at136, the Court is left with “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Second, Plaintiff has failed to state causes of action in conjunction with her Bivens and ADA form complaints. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 7-13.) Plaintiff's third form complaint, apparently asserting a Bivens claim, only includes the names of the Defendants. See Id. at 7-9. It advances no factual allegations, and names no causes of action. See Id. Similarly, Plaintiff's fourth form complaint, apparently asserting an ADA claim, does not name a single cause of action against Defendants. See Id. at 10-13. Rather, it names Defendants and advances the following allegations: (i) “the cops gave [her] a ticket for reckless endangerment; (ii) “Michael [Benedict] bodyslammed [her] windshield in order to obtain a personal injury check;” and (iii) Michael Benedict and Sara Sohl “had the secret of the disappearance of Larry Stackhouse missing since 2005.” See Id. Plaintiff has accordingly failed to state a claim for relief through her third and fourth form complaints. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's third and fourth form complaints for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Third, Plaintiff's Bivens and Section 1983 claims are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff advances no allegation that any of the Defendants are federal or state actors. (See Dkt. No. 1.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants violated plaintiff's federal rights while acting under color of state law.” O'Donoghue v. United States Soc. Sec. Admin., 828 Fed.Appx. 784, 787 (2d Cir. 2020). Similarly, “to state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege that he has been deprived of a constitutional right by a federal agent acting under color of federal authority and must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.” Id. Plaintiff has failed to allege any of the Defendants deprived her of federal or constitutional rights while acting under color of state or federal authority. (See Dkt. No. 1.) This dispositive defense appears on the face of Plaintiff's Complaint. See Id. Plaintiff's Bivens and Section 1983 claims are accordingly frivolous. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.”). The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Bivens and Section 1983 claims on the grounds that they are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim for relief, and her Bivens and Section 1983 claims are frivolous. (See Dkt. No. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).) Because this appears to be the fifth meritless action Plaintiff has initiated in this Court, the undersigned recommends that the Court consider imposing a bar Order under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (“If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.”); see, e.g., Rogers, 2022 WL 899771, at *6 (cautioning Plaintiff she may be subject to a future bar Order if she continued to file meritless actions).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety with leave to amend, and consider imposing a bar Order under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's IFP Application is granted for purposes of this review. (Dkt. No. 2.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEGAN ROGERS, Plaintiff, v.
PFIZER et al., Defendants.
5:21-cv-176 (GLS/TWD)
ORDER
The above-captioned matter comes to this court following an Order and Report-Recommendation (R&R) by Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks, duly filed June 9, 2021. (Dkt. No. 14.) Following fourteen days from the service thereof, the Clerk has sent the file, including any and all objections filed by the parties herein.
Plaintiff pro se Megan Rogers filed a document in response to the R&R. (Dkt. No. 15.) But that document, much like the amended complaint, is not cogent, and it makes no specific objection to the R&R. The court has reviewed the R&R for clear error, see Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. Civ. 904CV484, 2006 WL 149049, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006), and finds none. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Order and Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 14) is ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs amended complaint (Dkt. No. 13) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Order to plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
July 14, 2021
GARY L. SHARPE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE