This instruction was excepted to by the plaintiff and is assigned as error, but is not briefed and is consequently waived or abandoned and the effect of the instruction is final and it is not here an issue. Roff Oil Cotton Co. v. King, 46 Okla. 31, 148 P. 90. The trial court, upon the request of the city and in keeping with the provisions of 12 O.S. 1951 § 579[ 12-579], ordered the jurors to view the premises and the jury subsequently returned a verdict in behalf of the city.
It gives us the quotation from Thompson on Corporations (3rd Ed.) vol. 4, p. 784, which we have hereinabove quoted. In addition it cites Roff Oil Cotton Co. v. King, 46 Okla. 31, 148 P. 90, as supporting its view. We recognize nothing in defendant's citations of authorities contrary to the decisions in the McLeod and Snyder Cases, supra.
It is a well-settled general rule that, in the absence of a contractual obligation, the master is not bound to provide medical aid for a sick or injured employee. Baker v. Whitten, 1 Okla. 160, 30 P. 491; Roff Oil Cotton Co. v. King. 46 Okla. 31, 148 P. 90; Sevier v. Birmingham S. T. R. R. Co., 92 Ala. 258, 9 So. 405; Carey v. Davis 190 Iowa 720, 180 N.W. 889, 12 A. L. R. 904. That part of instruction No. 5 given by the court and excepted to by defendant reads as follows:
If plaintiff, at the time of entering into the contract of insurance, paid the agent the first premium for the insurance as a part of such contract, and defendant, with notice of the nature of the terms and manner of the contract, and of the fact of plaintiff's injuries, has kept the money, or permitted the agent to keep it, and failed, after such knowledge, to return or repay him such sum, the defendant is liable on the contract. United States Fidelity G. Co. v. Shirk, 20 Okla. 576, 95 P. 218; Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Humphrey, 27 Okla. 694, 117 P. 203; American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 53 Okla. 11, 154 P. 44; Roff Oil Cotton Co. v. King, 46 Okla. 31, 148 P. 90; J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Lyons Co., 40 Okla. 356, 138 P. 167; Whitcomb v. Oller, 41 Okla. 331, 137 P. 709. Though the powers of an agent may be limited by definite restrictions on his authority and by the nature of his agency, the determination of his powers and consequently the rights of the insured must rest in the first instance on the general principle that the powers of an agent are prima-facie coextensive with the business intrusted to his care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the person with whom he deals.