Opinion
CV-20-01974-PHX-DLR
12-13-2024
Nicole M Roegner, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes Senior United States District Judge
On April 11, 2022, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration's nondisability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Docs. 18, 19.) On remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff's favor. (Doc. 22-2.) The Administration withheld 25% of Plaintiff's past-due benefits to pay any potential attorney fee award. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she agreed to pay her attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 22-4.) Plaintiff's counsel now moves, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $21,992.00 in fees, representing less than 25% of Plaintiff's past-due benefits. (Doc. 22 at 3.)
Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Id. at 1149-51. When assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. Id. at 1151.
Counsel's contingent-fee request is less than 25% of past-due benefits, there is no evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor Plaintiff have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 23.) Although the fee award reflects a relatively high effective hourly rate of $1,912.35, this rate is not outside the bounds of effective hourly rates approved by other courts when ruling on applications under § 406(b) (see Doc. 24 at 2-3 (collecting cases approving comparable effective hourly rates)), and the Court does not find that the fee award would result in a windfall in this case. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel's motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. Counsel's fees are approved in the amount of $21,992.00, payable from Plaintiff's past-due benefits in accordance with Administration policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the $2,511.14 in attorney fees previously awarded to counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 21.)