Opinion
No. 01-CV-2036 (JG).
August 5, 2004
EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, DIN: 98-R-2660, Mohawk Correctional Facility, Rome, New York, Petitioner Pro Se.
CHARLES J. HYNES, District Attorney, Kings County, Brooklyn, New York, By: Thomas Burka, Assistant District Attorney, Attorney for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Eddie Rodriguez petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction in state court. On June 17, 2004, I held oral argument, in which Rodriguez participated by telephone conference. The petition is denied for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
The government's evidence at trial established that, on November 25, 1997, at approximately 4:00 p.m., in the vicinity of South Third Street and Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, Eddie Rodriguez sold a quantity of cocaine to an undercover police officer in exchange for ten dollars. The undercover police officer then sent a radio transmission identifying Rodriguez to the arresting officer. Within five to seven minutes, a backup team arrived on the scene and arrested Rodriguez. Upon Rodriguez's arrest, the police recovered fourteen glassine packets of cocaine from him, as well as the prerecorded "buy money" used by the undercover officer to purchase the drugs.Rodriguez was charged with one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.
Rodriguez's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the glassine packets of cocaine and the prerecorded buy money. Counsel argued that the police did not have probable cause to arrest in light of an allegedly faulty description provided by the undercover officer. The court denied the motion, finding that the testimony of the arresting officer was "credible and reliable." (Resp't Appellate Br. at 7 (quoting Hr'g Tr. at 75).)
On March 9, 1998, Rodriguez entered a plea of guilty to one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in satisfaction of all charges in the indictment. Prior to the plea, Rodriguez signed an agreement waiving his right to appeal and agreeing to a sentence of six to twelve years.
On March 30, 1998, Rodriguez appeared for sentencing and made two pro se motions. He moved to relieve his counsel and to withdraw his plea on the grounds that counsel did not represent him "correctly" and that the sentence was unduly harsh. (Sent. Tr. at 3.) The court denied both motions, stating that Rodriguez's allegations were either "insufficient" or dealt only "in conclusions." (Id. at 4.) Rodriguez then received the six to twelve year sentence he had agreed to when he pled guilty.
On October 30, 1998, Rodriguez, through appellate counsel, filed a motion in the Appellate Division to reduce his sentence, arguing that it was excessive. Rodriguez then submitted a pro se supplemental brief as well, arguing that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to notify the court of Rodriguez's past mental trauma and failed to request a Wade hearing; (2) he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Along with his pro se supplemental brief, Rodriguez submitted psychological reports related to his 1993 conviction for attempted murder. Those reports stated that Rodriguez, who was sixteen years old at the time, may possibly have a posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of witnessing the murder of his mother and uncle at the age of ten.
The Appellate Division affirmed Rodriguez's conviction on January 18, 2000. People v. Rodriguez, 703 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 2000). The court ruled as follows:
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his application to withdraw his plea of guilty without a hearing. The court conducted a sufficient inquiry into, and properly rejected, his unsupported and conclusory claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant's corollary claim, that he was denied meaningful representation by counsel at the plea proceeding, is without merit.
The defendant's voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal all aspects of his case encompassed his right to review the denial of that branch of his motion which was to suppress evidence based upon lack of probable cause.
The defendant specifically reserved his right to appeal the excessiveness of his sentence. We find that the sentence imposed is neither harsh nor excessive.Id. (citations omitted). Rodriguez's application for leave to appeal was denied on March 13, 2000. People v. Rodriguez, 94 N.Y.2d 924 (2000) (Ciparick, J.).
On March 29, 2001, Rodriguez filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, on the same grounds he raised in his pro se submission on direct appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") has narrowed the scope of federal habeas review of state convictions where the state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the AEDPA standard, which applies to habeas petitions filed after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, the reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "clearly established Federal law" to mean "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case." Id. "In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a `governing legal principle' to `a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003)).
However, there is "force" to the argument "that if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the state-court decision"; "[§] 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2150-51 (2004). The Supreme Court has concluded, however, that while "the difference between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear," "[c]ertain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt."Id. at 2151.
Under the "unreasonable application" standard set forth inWilliams, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam) ("Where . . . the state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable."); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (same). Interpreting Williams, the Second Circuit has added that although "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
The Supreme Court recently explained that the specificity with which the rule of law at issue is defined may affect whether the state court's determination was "unreasonable":
[T]he range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case by case determinations.Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2149.
This standard of review applies whenever the state court has adjudicated the federal claim on the merits, regardless of whether it has alluded to federal law in its decision. As the Second Circuit stated in Sellan v. Kuhlman:
For the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim "on the merits," and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.
261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
In addition, a state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, and is unreasonable only where the petitioner meets the burden of "rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
However, "even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. . . . A federal court can disagree with a state court's credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence."Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003)).
B. Rodriguez's Claims
1. The Guilty Plea
Rodriguez argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He also asserts that the trial court erred in not granting him a hearing on the issue. The Appellate Division disagreed with these contentions, and so do I.
It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary. The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. That is so because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) ("A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is voluntary and intelligent." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Here, the transcript of the plea proceeding reveals that Rodriguez's plea of guilty was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent:
COURT: Do you understand the charges in the indictment and the meaning of what you are pleading to?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Has anyone, including the Court, the District Attorney, your lawyer, the police, or anyone else threatened you to compel you to plead guilty?
DEFENDANT: No.
COURT: You are entering this plea of your own free will? DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: The sentence which your attorney has asked about, the one imposed and agreed to by the Court is a minimum of six years, no less than six years to a maximum not to exceed twelve years.
Do you understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
* * *
COURT: Mr. Rodriguez, you said many things just now including statements dealing with absence of threats, and comments as to your satisfaction with your lawyer, a description of the way the crime was committed, and all other things stated under oath.
I trust you understand the importance of things under oath. And if someone said something under oath and later says a different thing about the same matters, he can be prosecuted for perjury.
Do you understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Because of that if you have said anything which is not true and anything or you would like to change, I will allow you to do so.
Do you understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
COURT: Is there anything you want to change or take back what you have said?
DEFENDANT: No.
COURT: Do you repeat or reaffirm all that you have said?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Plea Agreement Tr. ("Plea Tr.") at 14-16.)
Rodriguez's claim that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing regarding his motion to withdraw his guilty plea is also without merit. As just explained, Rodriguez's plea was knowing and voluntary. Thus, it was not error for the trial court to deny a hearing on this issue. Moreover, "[b]oth federal and state precedent have established that a defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea." Hines v. Miller, 318 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2003); see, e.g., id. ("[T]he Appellate Division's conclusion that the state court had conducted a `thorough inquiry . . . [and] properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea [where] [t]he record establishes that defendant made a voluntary plea and fails to substantiate his claims of coercion and innocence,' was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.").
In any event, as stated earlier, the Appellate Division rejected Rodriguez's argument on this issue, holding that "the [trial] court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his application to withdraw his plea of guilty without a hearing." Rodriguez, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 51. I cannot say that this decision was an unreasonable application of federal law.
Rodriguez also claims that he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal the excessiveness of his sentence. The Appellate Division did not disagree; indeed, it held that Rodriguez specifically reserved his right to appeal that issue. People v. Rodriguez, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The defect with Rodriguez's claim is not that he waived it, but that it has no merit. His sentence of six to twelve years in prison falls within the maximum sentence authorized by New York law for his crime, and therefore does not qualify for consideration as excessive under the Eighth Amendment. See White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992) ("No federal constitutional issue is presented where . . . the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law."). In any event, Rodriguez's sentence is not grossly disproportionate and is therefore not unconstitutional. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003).
2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Rodriguez claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform the trial court of Rodriguez's past mental trauma in connection with his plea. I disagree.
The Supreme Court has established the following standard for ineffective assistance claims:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Thus, to make out this type of claim, the petitioner must demonstrate both (1) that his attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and (2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,"id. at 694. In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance, "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and the court must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam) ("[C]ounsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client. . . .").
In assessing counsel's performance, I "must conduct an objective review . . . measured for `reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,' which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen `from counsel's perspective at the time.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citations omitted) (quotingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). The Supreme Court has "declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct" and has instead emphasized that "`the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'" Id. at 521 (quotingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
To establish the requisite effect of counsel's performance on the outcome of the proceeding, it is not sufficient if the petitioner shows merely that counsel's errors had "some conceivable effect" on the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. This determination, unlike the determination whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, may be made with the benefit of hindsight. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
When a habeas petitioner raises an ineffective assistance claim in relation to his plea, the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice. See Oyague v. Artuz, 274 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Whether or not [an involuntary plea] claim is couched in terms of a direct constitutional violation or in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any faulty advice rendered to him."). Here, Rodriguez argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform the court of Rodriguez's past mental trauma, specifically, that he witnessed the murder of his mother and uncle at the age of ten, resulting in posttraumatic stress disorder. Rodriguez does not claim, however, that he would not have pled guilty had his counsel informed the court of his mental trauma. This is fatal to his claim. Moreover, Rodriguez has not established that his purported condition of posttraumatic stress disorder would have rendered him unable to plead guilty in a knowing and intelligent manner, or, more importantly, if he even suffered from such a condition at the time of his plea. Indeed, the psychological report of posttraumatic stress disorder was written approximately five years before his guilty plea in the present case.
In short, review of the record reveals that Rodriguez's counsel was not ineffective. Counsel succeeded in obtaining a favorable sentence; the government had requested a sentence of seven to fourteen years, but counsel persuaded the court to settle on a sentence of six to twelve years instead, over the prosecution's objection. At the very least, the state court's rejection of the ineffective assistance claim cannot reasonably be characterized as an unreasonable application of Strickland.
To the extent that the ineffective assistance claim is based on trial counsel's failure to request a Wade hearing, that claim fails as well. It is unlikely that a Wade hearing regarding Rodriguez's prearrest identification would have resulted in a beneficial finding for Rodriguez. The undercover officer who purchased the drugs from Rodriguez provided the arresting officer with a detailed description of him. As such, defense counsel's failure to request a Wade hearing would not likely have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, Rodriguez's trial attorney was not ineffective under Strickland.
It is not entirely clear that Rodriguez raises this claim in his petition before this Court. He does not specifically mention his trial counsel's failure to request a Wade hearing in his petition. However, the government states in its affidavit in opposition that all of Rodriguez's claims raised on direct appeal are brought by him in this Court. Thus, in an abundance of caution, I address it here.
3. Fourth Amendment Claim
Rodriguez argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. The state court denied this claim on procedural grounds, i.e., it found that Rodriguez had waived it. Apart from that procedural default, which Rodriguez cannot overcome, Fourth Amendment claims cannot be raised on habeas review when an opportunity for "full and fair litigation" has been provided in state court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976) ("[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."). The Second Circuit has already determined that New York's procedure for litigating Fourth Amendment claims, embodied in New York Criminal Procedure Law § 710.10 et seq., is adequate. See Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Kuhlmann, 36 F. Supp. 2d 534, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Here, not only did Rodriguez have the opportunity to have his Fourth Amendment claim heard in the state court, but he actually litigated it when his attorney moved to suppress evidence. Thus, he cannot obtain relief on this score.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied. Because Rodriguez has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, no certificate of appealability shall issue.So Ordered.