Rodriguez v. State

Full title: JOSE VENANCIO RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso

Date published: Nov 10, 2004

No. 08-04-00203-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2004)

Opinion

No. 08-04-00203-CR

November 10, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.

Appeal from the 179th District Court of Harris County, Texas, (Tc#967799).

Before Panel No. 1 LARSEN, McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice.

Pending before the Court is Appellant's request for the appointment of appellate counsel. For the reasons that follow, we will grant the request.

Background

The trial court filed a certification of Appellant's right of appeal, stating that this is a plea bargain case and Appellant has no right to appeal. Therefore, in accordance with the established procedures of this Court, the Clerk of Court requested that Appellant's counsel file a letter brief addressing whether Appellant has the right to appeal. See Stowe v. State, 124 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.). Subsequently, we were notified that Appellant had not retained an attorney to represent him on appeal, and Appellant filed a request for appointment of counsel. Noting these facts, we issued an order, stating:

It is therefore ORDERED that the trial judge conduct a hearing to determine whether [A]ppellant is indigent and entitled to appointment of new counsel, and to make appropriate findings and recommendations. The trial judge shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective assistance of counsel, which may include appointment of new counsel. The record of such hearing, including any orders and/or findings of the trial judge, shall be prepared, certified and forwarded to this office on or before September 12, 2004. (Emphasis added.)

In response to our order, we received a letter from the Honorable J. Michael Wilkinson, Judge of the 179th District Court of Harris County, stating, "This is in reference to your letter [sic] requesting [sic] a hearing to give [Appellant] an appeal attorney. The court is not going to give him an attorney because he waived his right to an appeal. You have a copy of that document in your file." Because Judge Wilkinson's letter exhibited an obvious misunderstanding of the duties entrusted to him by our order, this Court instructed its Chief Deputy Clerk to make a courtesy call to the trial court, explaining that our order required a hearing to be conducted. A series of communications between the trial court coordinator and the Chief Deputy Clerk ensued. On September 16, 2004 — four days after the date specified in our order — we received a supplemental clerk's record containing a docket sheet with a handwritten notation stating that although Judge Wilkinson found Appellant to be indigent, he did not appoint an attorney. On September 30, 2004 — more than two weeks after the date specified in our order — we received a transcription of the hearing. At the hearing, Judge Wilkinson noted, "The Eighth Court, in their [sic] infinite wisdom, is ordering me to hold a hearing. . . ." And at the conclusion of the hearing, he stated:

Well, I am finding that the appellant is indeed indigent. I am also finding that the defendant does not, repeat, not have a Right of Appeal. So, once again, we're going to send it back to the Eighth District Court; and again, in their infinite wisdom, if they should order me to appoint counsel to represent this defendant so that counsel could file an Anders Brief so that Harris County can spend some more money for court-appointed counsel on a case where very clearly everybody is aware it was a plea bargain case — I followed the recommendation and there were Trial Court certifications [sic] that the defendant had no Right of Appeal — if they want me to appoint counsel, I'll do so when they order me to do so.

While we hardly think our wisdom is infinite, given the tenor of Judge Wilkinson's remarks, it appears necessary to set forth the law that is applicable in this situation.

Discussion

This Court has the authority to determine whether a defendant has the right to appeal. Although the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require a trial judge to issue a certification of the defendant's right of appeal, we have expressly held that we have the authority to inquire into the accuracy of a trial court certification and to require the trial court to correct the certification if it is wrong. See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); Stowe, 124 S.W.3d at 233, 236.¹ We also have the authority to determine the validity of any waiver of the right to appeal. See id. at 235-36. Stowe is in keeping with well-established precedent that an appellate court has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction. As one of our sister appellate courts has stated, "Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is an issue for this court to determine. . . . [T]he trial court has no authority to deny the right to appeal in its entirety." Ex parte Zigmond, 933 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Both of the Houston appellate courts have ruled similarly. See Perez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ("This Court, not any other, retains the power to determine the existence and limits of its jurisdiction. . . ."); Campos v. State, 818 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), pet. ref'd, 821 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) ("[T]he trial court had no authority to deny appellant his right to give notice of appeal. If appellant has waived his right to appeal certain matters, it is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to decide and not within the jurisdiction of the trial court to decide."). Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him in his first appeal as of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 815-17, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (providing for the appointment of counsel for an appeal to the court of appeals). In Douglas, the state appellate court refused the indigent defendants' request for counsel because it "had `gone through' the record and had come to the conclusion that `no good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel.'" 372 U.S. at 354-55, 83 S.Ct. at 815. The Supreme Court held that this procedure denied indigent defendants the right to equal protection under the law. Id. at 355-57, 83 S.Ct. at 815-16. Thus, it is apparent that regardless of how fervently the trial judge believes that Appellant has no right to appeal, Appellant is nevertheless entitled to the appointment of counsel in this, his first appeal as of right. It is therefore ORDERED that Appellant's request for appointment of counsel is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent Appellant in this appeal and that the trial court clerk shall file in this Court a supplemental clerk's record containing the order of appointment. The supplemental clerk's record is due within fifteen days from the date of this opinion.