No. 05-05-00222-CR
Opinion Filed October 18, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-50374-WQ. Affirm.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG-MIERS, and MAZZANT.
Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.
A jury convicted Jimmy DeWayne Rodriguez of possession of cocaine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, found one enhancement paragraph true, and assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Background
Several officers from the Interactive Community Policing Unit received complaints about a man, whose street name was "Ice Cream," dealing drugs from an apartment in North Oak Cliff. At about 2:00 p.m. on March 25, 2004, Jennifer Castleberg and three other officers went to an apartment located at 1015 Crawford. There were four townhouse apartments numbered A, B, C, and D. Each had two bedrooms upstairs. Castleberg and Rivera went to the front door of Unit D, while Pollard and Arman went to the rear door. After Castleberg knocked on the front door and announced "Dallas Police" several times, a woman, later identified as Dorothy Alejandro, opened the door. There were four people in the front room, two adults and two children. Alejandro identified herself as the lessee and gave the officers permission to search the premises. When Castleberg heard noises from above that sounded like someone running upstairs, she and Rivera went to investigate. As Castleberg stood at the top of the stairs, she saw appellant come out of a bedroom on the left. Appellant walked quickly toward Castleberg and yelled, "I don't live here. I don't live here. What are you doing here?" Castleberg testified that because appellant was belligerent and uncooperative, she handcuffed him and had an officer take him outside. The police did not find any drugs, weapons, money, or paraphernalia on appellant's person. After appellant was taken outside, Castleberg went into the bedroom on the left. The only furniture in the room was a dresser and a bed, and there was clothing on the floor. Castleberg saw an open shoe box sitting on the dresser. The box contained two large plastic bags that had twenty-one individual bags inside. Each individual bag contained one rock of crack cocaine. Later analysis showed the bags contained 3.8 grams of cocaine. Castleberg also found $250 in cash, unused plastic bags, rolling papers, and razor blades in the top drawer of the dresser. Castleberg testified no one but appellant was seen coming out of the bedroom where the cocaine was found, and the only access to the bedroom was from the stairs. Alejandro told the officers that appellant stayed in the bedroom on the left. While outside, appellant told an officer that the bedroom on the left was his, and he identified some of the clothing found on the floor as his. Felix Sandoval, the owner of the property at 1015 Crawford, testified he leased Unit D to a person named Dorothy Gonzales. The lease was month-to-month beginning in January 2004, and Gonzalez had paid the rent for March 2004. Sandoval testified he drove by the property about every two weeks. On at least two occasions, he had talked to Gonzalez about people hanging around the parking lot and Unit D. On March 25, 2004, Sandoval was driving by the property and saw several police cars. He also saw Gonzalez there with the officers. Sandoval did not know appellant. Applicable Law
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 418.115(a), (c) (Vernon 2003). To do so, the State had to prove appellant exercised care, control, or management over the cocaine and knew it was contraband. Guiton v. State, 742 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). If the accused did not have exclusive possession of the place where contraband was found, the State must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The link need not be so strong as to preclude every other reasonable explanation except the accused's guilt. Id. Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient because nothing affirmatively linked the drugs to appellant. Appellant contends he did not live in the apartment or the room where drugs were found, nor did he have any drugs, cash, or paraphernalia on his person when he was arrested. The State responds that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt because appellant was affirmatively linked to the drugs. We agree with the State. Appellant was the only person seen coming out of the bedroom where the drugs were found. Alejandro, the lessee, testified appellant stayed in the bedroom where the drugs were found; and Castleberg testified appellant told the officers the bedroom where the drugs were found was his bedroom. Castleberg found the drugs in plain view in an open shoe box in appellant's bedroom. An affirmative link can be established when the contraband is in plain view. See Hughes v. State, 612 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Moreover, appellant initially denied that he lived in the apartment as he walked out of the bedroom where the drugs were found and confronted the officers, indicating consciousness of guilt. See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830. Viewed under the proper standard, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's determination that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed the cocaine. See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.