Rodriguez v. State

Full title: CESAR RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso

Date published: May 28, 2010

No. 08-08-00223-CR (Tex. App. May. 28, 2010)

Opinion

No. 08-08-00223-CR

May 28, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH.

Appeal from the 243rd District Court of El Paso County, Texas, (TC# 20080D00906).

Before CHEW, C.J., McCLURE, and RIVERA, JJ.

OPINION

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice.

A jury convicted Appellant, Cesar Rodriguez, of robbery, found his two prior felony convictions true, and assessed punishment at thirty-five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.¹ On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's admission of testimony at the punishment phase of the trial. Finding his complaint not preserved for our review, we affirm.

1 Although the judgment recites that Appellant only pled true to one enhancement, the indictment alleged two, Appellant pled to two at the beginning of the punishment phase, the court's punishment charge recited Appellant's plea of true to two enhancements, and the jury's verdict shows that Appellant pled true to two enhancements. Thus, we believe the trial court's judgment is merely a clerical error.

BACKGROUND

Sometime between 6:30 and 7 p.m., Gloria Olivas was walking to the store when Appellant, Fernando Lopez, and Fernando's little brother surrounded her and demanded that she "[f]ork over the fuck'n money." Scared that they might rape or beat her, Olivas turned out her pockets, telling them that she had no money. Appellant then told Fernando to "take [her] fuck'n ring," but despite Olivas' attempts to dislodge the ring, it would not come off of her finger. At that point, one of the men fell backwards, and Olivas took the opportunity to run to the store and call the police. Appellant and his accomplices were later caught, after initially absconding from police efforts to detain them, and Olivas identified the three men as her attackers.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellant asks us to reverse for a new punishment hearing, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay testimony in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 405 ² and article 37.07, § 3(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.³ The State responds that Appellant's issue is not preserved for our review and that, in the alternative, the testimony was admissible. Agreeing that Appellant's issue is not preserved for our review, we need not address the merits of his complaint.

Applicable Facts

During the punishment phase of the trial, Olivas testified that she has lived in Canutillo — the city where the robbery occurred — for six years. Olivas was aware of Appellant's reputation in the community and that it was bad. When the prosecutor asked Olivas what she meant, Olivas responded that "they are just going around trying to steal." At that point, Appellant objected:

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would object to the hearsay.

[The Court]: It's reputation. I'll overrule that objection.

Detective Jeff Gibson, an expert in gang recognition, knew Appellant from personal contact as a patrolman and as a gang officer. Gibson also knew Appellant was a "hard-core member of the Barrio Canutos" gang, that the Barrio Canutos gang was a very old Hispanic street gang, that the gang's purpose is to excite its members through the commission of criminal offenses without getting caught, and that Appellant's gang nick-name was "Cricket." When the prosecutor questioned whether he was familiar with Appellant's reputation within the gang, Gibson replied that Appellant was "respected within the gang, because he's — they call him `Crazy,' (Spanish). He pushes the envelope at all times. They respect that. He fights quite frequently." Again, Appellant objected:

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I'd like to object. I don't know if he's testifying from some hearsay or he's testifying from [h]is own personal observations.

[The Court]: Reputation testimony by definition is hearsay.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, then I object to the hearsay, Your Honor —

[The Court]: All right. That —

[Defense Counsel]: — and a limiting instruction on this and a mistrial.

[The Court]: That objection is overruled.

Preservation of Error

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must present his objection to the trial court with specificity, and obtain an adverse ruling thereon. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Even when an objection lacks specificity, so long as the trial court can determine the context therefrom, the complaint will be preserved. Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, the objection ruled on by the trial court must comport with that presented on appeal. Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh'g); Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If it does not, nothing is preserved for our review. Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Here, each time Appellant raised his hearsay objection, the trial court overruled the objections, noting that such reputation testimony, although hearsay, was not excluded under the rules. It is clear that the trial court understood Appellant's objection to be that hearsay evidence is not admissible under Rule 802, but the trial court properly recognized that reputation of a person's character among associates or in the community is not excluded by the hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 802 (hearsay is inadmissible); see also Tex. R. Evid. 803(21) (reputation testimony is not excluded by the hearsay rule). Appellant did not assert any other objections to the testimony or clarify before the trial court that his objection was made under other rules or statutes. On appeal, Appellant does not argue that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay but rather artfully asserts that such "hearsay" testimony constituted extraneous crimes or bad acts that should have been excluded under Rule 405 and article 37.07. However, those objections were never presented to the trial court. As Appellant's complaints on appeal do not comport with his objections at trial, we hold nothing is presented for our review and overrule his sole issue. See Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding hearsay and relevancy objections made at trial did not comport with claim of inadmissible extraneous offense evidence on appeal); Batiste v. State, 217 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("Here, as soon as Robinson testified that he found marihuana in the trunk of the car, Batiste's trial counsel objected as to relevancy. His trial counsel, however, never objected that the testimony should be excluded as extraneous offense evidence under Rule 404(b). Nothing in the record indicates that the correct ground of exclusion was obvious to the trial judge or opposing counsel. As in Camacho and Johnson, the proper legal basis for appellant's trial objection `should have been that the evidence was offered to prove an extraneous uncharged offense not within the permissible scope of Rule 404(b) and was offered to show that appellant was a criminal generally.' Since Batiste's objection did not address the correct evidentiary basis for exclusion, which in turn did not afford the trial judge an opportunity to rule on the issue, this argument has not been preserved for appeal.") (citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Having found nothing was presented for our review, we overruled Appellant's sole issue. We further reform the trial court's judgment to reflect a plea and finding of true to two enhancement allegations. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment as reformed.