Opinion
Civil Action No. 9:13-CV-1106 (DNH/DEP)
07-28-2015
JOSE RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. D. ROCK, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF: JOSE RODRIGUEZ, Pro se 09-A-3150 Elmira Correctional Facility P.O. Box 500 Elmira, NY 14902 FOR DEFENDANT: HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General The Capitol Albany, NY 12224-0341 OF COUNSEL: CHRISTOPHER W. HALL, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General
APPEARANCES:
FOR PLAINTIFF:
JOSE RODRIGUEZ, Pro se
09-A-3150
Elmira Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 500
Elmira, NY 14902
FOR DEFENDANT:
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224-0341
OF COUNSEL:
CHRISTOPHER W. HALL, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Jose Rodriguez, a New York State prison inmate, has brought this action against several individuals employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., alleging that defendants violated both his First Amendment right to freely exercise his chosen religion and the RLUIPA when they denied him religious meals during Ramadan.
Now that discovery in the action is closed, defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were not personally involved in the alleged violations, and further that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend the motion be granted in part but otherwise denied. I. BACKGROUND
In light of the procedural posture of the case, the following recitation is derived from the record now before the court, with all inferences drawn and ambiguities resolved in plaintiff's favor. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff is a prison inmate currently being held in the custody of the DOCCS; and is a member of the Nation of Islam. See generally Dkt. No. 1. While he is now confined elsewhere, at the times relevant to the claims in this case, plaintiff was confined in the Upstate Correctional Facility ("Upstate") located in Malone, New York. Id. Each of the defendants named in plaintiff's complaint is employed at Upstate, including (1) David Rock, the Superintendent; (2) Michael Lira, the Deputy Superintendent of Programs; (3) Don Haug, the Food Service Administrator; (4) Timothy Debyah, a Block Sergeant; (5) Sean Patterson, a Corrections Officer; and (6) Lawrence LaBarge, also a Corrections Officer. Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 3-4; Dkt. No. 43-2 at 1; Dkt. No. 43-3 at 1; Dkt. No. 43-4 at 1; Dkt. No. 43-5 at 1; Dkt. No. 43-6 at 1; Dkt. No. 43-7 at 1.
Upstate is a maximum security prison comprised exclusively of special housing unit ("SHU") cells in which inmates are confined for twenty-three hours each day, primarily for disciplinary reasons. Samuels v. Selsky, No. 01-CV-8235, 2002 WL 31040370, at *4 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002).
A. Underlying Facts Regarding Claimed Denial of Religious Meals
Plaintiff was transferred from Great Meadow Correctional Facility into Upstate on August 3, 2012, during Ramadan, a religious period observed by members of the Nation of Islam. Dkt. No. 52 at 19-20. When an inmate is transferred to a new facility, a form that details basic information about him, including his religion, date of birth, and identifying marks or tattoos, is forwarded with him to the receiving facility. Id. at 23. According to plaintiff, when he was transferred to Upstate, the itinerary form that accompanied him noted that he was a member of the Nation of Islam. Id. at 25. Upon his arrival at Upstate, plaintiff informed an unidentified sergeant that he was a member of the Nation of Islam, and the sergeant promised that he would be given the proper meals in accordance with his religion. Id. at 24-28.
According to plaintiff, during Ramadan, members of the Nation of Islam refrain from eating food and drinking liquids between sunrise and sunset. Dkt. No. 52 at 28. Prisoners participating in Ramadan are given special meals that allow them to eat late at night and early in the morning. Id. at 28, 31-32. Specifically, a dinner tray is delivered to each Muslim inmate after sundown, along with a "sahoya bag" that contains food for the prisoner to eat early in the morning before sunrise. Id. at 31-32. Corrections officers deliver these meals to the prisoners. Dkt. No. 43-3 at 3.
The parties have offered conflicting accounts regarding the relevant events following plaintiff's transfer into Upstate. At plaintiff's deposition he testified that, upon arriving at Upstate, he was taken to his cell by defendant Patterson and another unidentified corrections officer. Dkt. No. 52 at 34-35. Plaintiff informed defendant Patterson and the unidentified corrections officer of his Ramadan fast and need for Ramadan meals. Id. at 36. When plaintiff arrived at his cell, he was strip-searched by defendant LaBarge, at which time plaintiff informed defendant LaBarge of his religious needs. Id. at 34, 37-38. Later that night, plaintiff informed defendant Debyah that he had not received his Ramadan meal; defendant Debyah responded by promising to look into the matter. Id. at 38-39. Over the next twelve days, plaintiff spoke to various DOCCS employees, including defendants Patterson, LaBarge, and Debyah, informing them that he was not receiving his Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 1, 6-41; Dkt. No. 52 at 43-44, 50, 63, 72-73. Plaintiff alleges that he did not eat any food, and drank only tap water, between August 3, 2012 and August 14, 2012. Dkt. No. 52 at 30-31, 72. Plaintiff was served his Ramadan meal and sahoya bag on the evening of August 15, 2012. Dkt. No.1 at 12; Dkt. No. 52 at 72. Ramadan ended on August 17, 2012, with a special meal, which plaintiff also received. Dkt. No. 52 at 90.
While defendants generally agree with plaintiff's recitation regarding the timing of his arrival at Upstate, defendants Patterson, Debyah, and LaBarge do not recall speaking to plaintiff about his religious meals. Dkt. No. 43-2 at 2; Dkt. No. 43-4 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 43-6 at 2. Defendant Patterson states that he was not working on August 3, 2012, when plaintiff arrived at the facility. Dkt. No. 43-6 at 2, 6-8. The only days on which defendant Patterson could have spoken to plaintiff were August 13, 2012 and August 14, 2012, because he did not work on plaintiff's block on any other day during the relevant period. Id. at 3. Both defendants Debyah and LaBarge do not recall having conversations with plaintiff regarding his Ramadan meals on the days between August 3, 2012, and August 14, 2012. Dkt. No. 43-2 at 2; Dkt. No. 43-4 at 2-3.
According to defendant Haug, when a Muslim inmate is transferred to Upstate, his name is placed on a list that notes his religion and the need for religious meals during Ramadan. Dkt. No. 43-3 at 2-3. The list is periodically generated from the prison chaplain's office and is attached to meal delivery carts. Id. Defendant Haug asserts that plaintiff's name appeared on the chaplain's list on August 3, 2012 and August 6, 2012, and defendant Haug "assume[d] that [plaintiff] received his Ramadan meals [between August 3, 2012, and August 17, 2012]." Id. at 3, 6-7.
B. Plaintiff's Complaints to Prison Officials
Plaintiff lodged complaints with various prison officials regarding the alleged failure to provide him with religious meals, both verbally and in the form of grievances and letters. Dkt. No. 52 at 39-85.
1. Defendant Haug
Plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Haug regarding his Ramadan meals on August 6, 2012. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4; Dkt. No. 52 at 44. Plaintiff received a letter dated August 15, 2012, from the prison chaplain stating that, "[p]er the Food Service Administrator," plaintiff's name was on the list of inmates to receive religious meals. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1; Dkt. No. 52 at 45. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that his only contact with defendant Haug was the letter he sent on August 6, 2012, and receipt of the letters from the chaplain "per [defendant Haug]." Dkt. No. 52 at 45. Defendant Haug contends that he did not know of plaintiff's grievance until October 26, 2012, long after Ramadan had ended. Dkt. No. 43-3 at 4. Defendant Haug does not recall receiving plaintiff's complaint from August 6, 2012, and does not recall speaking to plaintiff at any time. Id. at 3-4.
2. Defendant Lira
On August 6, 2012, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Lira, the Deputy Superintendent of Programs at Upstate, complaining that he had not received his Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5; Dkt. No. 52 at 86. Defendant Lira did not respond to plaintiff's letter. Dkt. No. 52 at 87. In his declaration in support of defendants' motion, defendant Lira states that, although he does not recall receiving plaintiff's letter, assuming he had received the letter, he would have forwarded it to the prison chaplain for resolution. Dkt. No. 43-5 at 2.
3. Defendant Rock
On August 10, 2012, plaintiff sent a complaint letter and a grievance to defendant Rock regarding his Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 6; Dkt. No. 52 at 55, 59. Defendant Rock does not recall receiving either of those written communications. Dkt. No. 43-7 at 3-4. In his declaration, defendant Rock states that, had his office received a complaint letter regarding religious meals, his secretary would have referred the letter to the deputy superintendent of programs, who would likely have contacted the chaplain's office. Id. at 3. With respect to the grievance plaintiff allegedly sent, defendant Rock states that, had his office received it, it would have been returned to plaintiff with an instruction to address his issues to the Inmate Grievance Program ("IGP") office in accordance with DOCCS Directive No. 4040. Id. at 4.
Directive No. 4040 requires an inmate to first submit any complaints to the IGP before writing to the prison superintendent. Dkt. No. 43-7 at 2, 11-13. According to defendant Rock, if he receives a grievance from an inmate that has not first been submitted to the IGP, it is his practice to return the grievance with a memorandum directing the inmate to follow procedures set forth in Directive No. 4040. Id. at 2. Due to the volume of mail that defendant Rock receives, his secretary opens letters and determines whether they should be directed to other offices or returned to the sender. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff also sent a letter to defendant Rock on September 10, 2012, asking for assistance in appealing a separate grievance that was also sent on August 10, 2012. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 11; Dkt. No. 43-7 at 4. The letter does not detail the nature of the grievance that plaintiff hoped to appeal. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 11. Because defendant Rock and the IGP office had no record of a grievance filed by plaintiff on August 10, 2012, defendant Rock returned the appeal letter and directed plaintiff to first address concerns to the IGP office. Dkt. No. 43-7 at 4.
4. Defendant Debyah
Plaintiff claims to have spoken with defendant Debyah regarding written grievances on August 9, 2012, and August 14, 2012. Dkt. No. 52 at 68, 72. Defendant Debyah does not recall those interactions with plaintiff. Dkt. No. 43-2 at 5.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 9, 2013, by the filing of a complaint and an accompanying application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. Following an initial review of plaintiff's submissions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), District Judge David N. Hurd issued an order on November 26, 2013, granting plaintiff's IFP application and dismissing two of the defendants named in plaintiff's complaint. Dkt. No. 7. Following the completion of discovery, defendants filed the pending motion seeking the entry of summary judgment on November 7, 2014. Dkt. No. 43. Defendants' motion, which plaintiff has opposed, Dkt. No. 46, has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3(c).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Patterson
As an initial matter, in his response to defendants' motion it appears plaintiff has consented to the dismissal of all claims against defendant Patterson. Dkt. No. 46-2 at 1 ("Plaintiff wishes to have Defendant Sean Patterson DISMISSED from the complaint entirely."). Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as against defendant Patterson based on plaintiff's stipulation. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394 (1990) ("Once the defendant has filed a summary judgment motion or answer, the plaintiff may dismiss the action only by stipulation or order of the court[.]" (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41)).
B. Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claim
Plaintiff has asserted RLUIPA and section 1983 claims against all defendants in their "individual and personal capacit[ies]" and seeks only monetary relief. Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4, 44-5. The RLUIPA, however, does not create a private cause of action against state officers sued in their individual capacities, nor does it allow for the award of monetary damages against state officers sued in their official capacities. Wash. v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Sossaman v. Tex., 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011)); accord, Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) ("RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their official or individual capacities."); Williams v. Leonard, No. 11-CV-1158, 2015 WL 3544879, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2015) (McAvoy, J.) ("[T]o the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the Defendants in their individual or official capacities under the RLUIPA, such damages are not available."). Because, in this case, plaintiff does not seek any relief aside from monetary damages, I recommend that defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted dismissing plaintiff's RLUIPA claim.
In relevant part, the RLUIPA states as follows:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution. . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Cutter v. Williams, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Copies of all unreported decisions cited in this document have been appended for the convenience of the pro se plaintiff.
Even assuming plaintiff's complaint included a request for declarative or injunctive relief, "[i]n this circuit, an inmate's transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility." Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989)); accord, Johnson v. Rock, No. 08-CV-1013, 2010 WL 3910153, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Sharpe, J.). Because plaintiff has been transferred to a different correctional facility since the incidents at issue occurred, any request for declaratory or injunctive relief would be dismissed as moot.
C. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment motions are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that provision, the entry of summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2004). A fact is "material" for purposes of this inquiry, if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). A material fact is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material fact to be decided with respect to any essential element of the claim in issue, and the failure to meet this burden warrants denial of the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.4; Sec. Ins. Co., 391 F.3d at 83. In the event this initial burden is met, the opposing party must show, through affidavits or otherwise, that there is a material dispute of fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve any ambiguities, and draw all inferences, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553.The entry of summary judgment is justified only in the event of a finding that no reasonable trier of fact could rule in favor of the non-moving party. Bldg. Trades Employers' Educ. Ass'n v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501, 507-08 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (finding summary judgment appropriate only when "there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict").
D. Personal Involvement
Defendants contend that plaintiff's remaining First Amendment claim should be dismissed because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that any of them were personally involved in denying plaintiff his religious meals between August 3, 2012, and August 15, 2012. Dkt. No. 43-8 at 7.
"Personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [42 U.S.C.] 1983." Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). As the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant may only be held accountable for his own actions under section 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009) ("[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic."). In order to prevail on a section 1983 cause of action against an individual, a plaintiff must show "a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). "To be sufficient before the law, a complaint must state precisely who did what and how such behavior is actionable under law." Hendrickson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 91-CV-8135, 1994 WL 23069, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994).
With respect to individuals who are sued in their capacities as supervisors, like defendants Lira, Haug, and Rock, it is well-established that they cannot be liable for damages under section 1983 solely by virtue of being a supervisor. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[L]iability . . . cannot rest on respondeat superior."); Wright, 21 F.3d at 501. To establish responsibility on the part of a supervisory official for a civil rights violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the individual (1) directly participated in the challenged conduct; (2) after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong; (3) created or allowed to continue a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred; (4) was grossly negligent in managing the subordinates who caused the unlawful event; or (5) failed to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2007), see also Richardson, 347 F.3d at 435; Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995); Wright, 21 F.3d at 501.
With these principles in mind, I will analyze the personal involvement of each of the defendants below.
1. Defendant Lira
Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter to defendant Lira complaining that he had not received Ramadan meals, but received no response to the letter. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5; Dkt. No. 52 at 86. Defendant Lira does not recall receiving plaintiff's letter. Dkt. No. 43-5 at 2. Even assuming plaintiff's allegations are true, it is well-established that a supervisor's failure to respond to a letter of complaint does not provide a sufficient basis to find that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation alleged. Smith v. Rosati, No. 10-CV-1502, 2013 WL 1500422, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (Peebles, M.J.), adopted by 2013 WL 1501022 (N.D.N.Y Apr. 10, 2013) (Hurd, J.); see also Jean-Laurent v. Lane, No. 11-CV-0186, 2013 WL 600213, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (Dancks, M.J.), adopted by 2013 WL 599893 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (Mordue, J.) ("[M]ere receipt of a report or complaint or request for an investigation by a prison official is insufficient to hold the official liable for the alleged constitutional violations."). For this reason, I recommend the dismissal of all claims asserted against defendant Lira.
2. Defendant Haug
Plaintiff also wrote a letter to defendant Haug, dated August 6, 2012, complaining that he was not receiving Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4; Dkt. No. 52 at 44-5. In response, plaintiff received a memorandum dated August 15, 2012, from the prison chaplain, Deacon Bashaw, stating, "[p]er the Food Service Administrator, your name is on the list as of this date." Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. In support of defendants' motion, defendant Haug has submitted a declaration stating that he does not recall receiving plaintiff's letter. Dkt. No 43-3 at 3. Because the record evidence reflects that defendant Haug referred plaintiff's letter to the prison chaplain, I find that defendant Haug was not sufficiently involved in the alleged denial of plaintiff's religious meals to support a finding of liability. See Eldridge v. Williams, No. 10-CV-0423, 2013 WL 4005499, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) (citing Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that forwarding a plaintiff's complaint to a "subordinate for investigation and response. . . does not establish personal involvement"); see also Reeder v. Hogan, No. 09-CV-0520, 2012 WL 4107822, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (Baxter, M.J.), adopted by 2012 WL 4106740 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2012) (Mordue, J.), ("Where a supervisor's involvement in a prisoner's complaint is limited to forwarding of correspondence to appropriate staff, the supervisor has insufficient personal involvement to sustain a Section 1983 cause of action." (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, I recommend that all claims against defendant Haug be dismissed.
3. Defendant Rock
Plaintiff sent defendant Rock both a letter and a grievance on August 10, 2012, complaining that he had not received his Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 1 at 10; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16-17; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 6; Dkt. No. 52 at 54-55, 59-60. While there is no record that defendant Rock responded to plaintiff's letter, defendant Rock did send a memorandum to plaintiff on September 10, 2012, in response to plaintiff's grievance. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 12; Dkt. No. 43-7 at 3; Dkt. No. 52 at 59. Defendant Rock advised plaintiff he was returning plaintiff's grievance to him because inmates are required to submit any grievance directly to the IGP office. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 12. Courts in this circuit have held that, under these circumstances, a supervisor in defendant Rock's position is not personally involved because, although he responded to plaintiff's grievance, he neither conducted an investigation nor acted on the grievance. See, e.g., Jones v. Fischer, No. 10-CV-1331, 2012 WL 1899004, at *11, (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (Baxter, M.J.), abrogated on other grounds by Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, 748 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2014), ("The memorandum from defendant Rock, telling plaintiff he needed to take his grievance through the proper channels is not sufficient to establish personal involvement." (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of all claims asserted against defendant Rock.
Plaintiff also submitted a correspondence to defendant Rock dated September 10, 2012, in which he requests assistance "with appealing [a grievance] to the next level." Dkt. No. 1-3 at 11. Although it is not clear from the record whether defendant Rock responded to this grievance, it is not relevant to the claims in this action because it contains no complaints from plaintiff about not receiving Ramadan meals. Id.
4. Defendants LaBarge and Debyah
Plaintiff spoke to defendant Debyah "exactly five times" between August 3, 2012, and August 15, 2012, regarding the failure of prison officials to serve him Ramadan meals. Dkt. No. 52 at 63-65, 68-71, 72. According to plaintiff, defendant Debyah told plaintiff he would check the list that notes inmates' religious needs to see if plaintiff's name had been added. Id. at 65. Although the record is not clear on how many occasions plaintiff spoke to defendant LaBarge, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he informed defendant LaBarge daily that he was not receiving his Ramadan meals. Id. at 52-53. According to plaintiff, each time he complained directly to defendant LaBarge, he was told that the relevant paperwork did not reflect that plaintiff was a member of the Nation of Islam and entitled to Ramadan meals. Id. at 53. In support of defendants' motion, defendants LaBarge and Debyah have submitted declarations, in which they state that they do not recall having any discussions with plaintiff regarding the allegations in his complaint. Dkt. No. 43-2 at 2; Dkt. No. 43-4 at 2-3. In light of the record evidence, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could conclude, if plaintiff's deposition testimony is credited, that defendants LaBarge and Debyah learned of plaintiff's complaints regarding his Ramadan meals and ignored the issue. I therefore recommend that defendants' motion, to the extent it seeks dismissal of plaintiff's claims against defendants LaBarge and Debyah for lack of personal involvement, be denied.
Because I have recommended dismissal of defendants Patterson, Lira, Haug, and Rock for reasons discussed above in parts III.A. and III.D. in this report, I have analyzed defendants' qualified immunity argument only with respect to defendants Debyah and LaBarge.
Defendants also seek dismissal of plaintiff's claims on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Dkt. No. 43-8 at 10-11. "Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Sudler v. City of N.Y., 689 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2012). The law of qualified immunity seeks to strike a balance between "the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. Government officials are shielded from liability by qualified immunity when making "reasonable mistakes" concerning the lawfulness of their conduct. Sudler, 689 F.3d at 174 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223)).
Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), the Supreme Court has "repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in the litigation," Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)).
When resolving whether an official is shielded by qualified immunity at summary judgment, the court must employ a "two-pronged inquiry." Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014). The first prong asks "whether the facts, '[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . show the officer's conduct violated a [federal] right [.]'" Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1865 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). The second prong asks "whether the right in question was 'clearly established' at the time of the violation." Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). The official will be shielded from liability "if their actions did not violate 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 739); see also Provost, 262 F.3d at160 ("In general, public officials are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate those rights . . . This forgiving standard protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowing violate the law.'") (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In this case, it is well-established that a prisoner has a right to receive meals that are consistent with his religious dietary principles. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.1975)); see also Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir.1992) ("The principle [Kahane] established was not placed in any reasonable doubt by intervening Supreme Court rulings[.]"). While defendants LaBarge and Debyah deny any recollection of speaking to plaintiff regarding his complaints that he was being denied Ramadan meals, the allegations in his complaint and testimony at his deposition describing the conversations he had with each of the defendants gives rise to a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants LaBarge and Debyah did, in fact, participate in denying plaintiff access to his religious meals. Because this question cannot be resolved on summary judgment, I cannot recommend that the court find the remaining two defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. In the event a reasonable factfinder credits plaintiff's testimony and version of the events, no reasonable officer in the position of defendants LaBarge and Debyah would believe that their alleged conduct - which essentially amounts to ignoring plaintiff's complaints - did not violate plaintiff's clearly established First Amendment rights. Accordingly, I recommend the court deny defendants' motion to the extent it requests dismissal of the claims asserted against defendants LaBarge and Debyah based on qualified immunity.
In their memorandum of law submitted in support of the pending motion, defendants contend as follows:
Officer[] . . . LaBarge could not have known if [he was] violating plaintiff's religious rights since [he was] only allowed to deliver meals based on the Ramadan lists generated by the Chaplain's office and posted on the food carts they used to deliver meals. In addition to the lists, Sergeant Debyah reasonably relied on the mess hall to tell him if an inmate was entitled to religious meals.Dkt. No. 43-8 at 11. I have not considered these contentions because they are not supported by any record evidence and, accordingly, amount only to attorney argument. In addition, even if the court was to consider the contentions, they are not specific to plaintiff in that they generally state that, in the ordinary course of their jobs, defendants LaBarge and Debyah rely on others to determine which inmates are entitled to religious meals. Significantly, they do not contend that, with respect to plaintiff's specific complaints, they consulted with anyone to determine whether plaintiff was entitled to Ramadan meals.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of plaintiff's agreement to dismiss his claims against defendant Patterson, I recommend that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed as against that defendant. In addition, because plaintiff only seeks money damages against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities and monetary relief against individual defendants is unavailable under the RLUIPA, his claim under that statutory provision is subject to dismissal. Although the record evidence contains genuine disputes of material fact with respect to whether defendants LaBarge and Debyah were personally involved in denying plaintiff his Ramadan meals, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendants Lira, Rock, or Haug were personally involved in the alleged deprivations. Finally, in light of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants LaBarge and Debyah ignored plaintiff's requests for Ramadan meals, I cannot recommend they be protected by qualified immunity at this procedural juncture.
Accordingly, it is hereby respectfully
RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion (Dkt. No. 43) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim asserted against all defendants should be dismissed;
(2) Plaintiff's claims asserted against defendant Patterson should be dismissed;
(3) Plaintiff's First Amendment claims asserted against defendants Lira, Haug, and Rock should be dismissed; and
(4) Plaintiff's First Amendment claims asserted against defendants LaBarge and Debyah should survive defendants' motion and be set down for trial.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections must be filed with the clerk of the court within FOURTEEN days of service of this report. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993).
It is hereby ORDERED that the clerk of the court serve a copy of this report and recommendation upon the parties in accordance with this court's local rules.
/s/_________
David E. Peebles
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated: July 28, 2015
Syracuse, New York