Opinion
Case No. CV 21-00399-MWF (JCx)
08-25-2022
Dina RODRIGUEZ v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA et al.
Gabriel J. Pimentel, Yesenia L. Rodriguez, Pimentel Law PC, Pasadena, CA, for Dina Rodriguez. Kate G. Hummel, Christopher J. Kondon, Saman M. Rejali, Vanuhi Karapetian, K and L Gates LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Laboratory Corporation of America.
Gabriel J. Pimentel, Yesenia L. Rodriguez, Pimentel Law PC, Pasadena, CA, for Dina Rodriguez. Kate G. Hummel, Christopher J. Kondon, Saman M. Rejali, Vanuhi Karapetian, K and L Gates LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Laboratory Corporation of America. Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [39] MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America's ("LabCorp") Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"), filed on June 13, 2022. (Docket No. 39). Plaintiff Dina Rodriguez filed an Opposition on June 20, 2022. (Docket No. 40). LabCorp filed a Reply on June 27, 2022. (Docket No. 41).
The Court has read and considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion and held a hearing on July 11, 2022.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part . Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim for retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5 and Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages. The Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim for retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 6310 and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dina Rodriguez is a phlebotomist - i.e., she draws patients' blood for testing purposes. (Defendant's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("DSUF") ¶ 2 (Docket No. 39-1)). Defendant LabCorp operates a network of clinical laboratories that provide testing and diagnostic services. (Id. ¶ 1). On September 30, 2019, LabCorp hired Plaintiff as a "floater" phlebotomist. (Id. ¶ 2). But after less than eight months on the job, LabCorp terminated Plaintiff for bullying behavior in violation of LabCorp policies. (Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff claims that LabCorp's termination was unlawful because she was terminated in retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on safety and regulatory compliance issues. (See generally Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (Docket No. 19)). LabCorp argues that Plaintiff's employment was "at-will," and that Plaintiff was terminated for an independent, legitimate reason.
A. Plaintiff's Whistle Blowing
In the short time that Plaintiff was employed by LabCorp, she accumulated several complaints to her supervisors regarding workplace safety and operations. Plaintiff reported directly to Savannah Brooks and Zach Rankin. Notably, Rankin led the investigation that resulted in Plaintiff's termination.
1. Biohazard bags and sharps containers
Some time around March or April 2020, Plaintiff informed Brooks that the sharps containers, which hold biohazard material, were being allowed to overfill at various facilities, and that employees were engaged in other activities instead of changing the sharps containers. (Id. ¶ 33).
Plaintiff also spoke to Rankin about this issue in regard to the Redondo Beach facility. (Id. ¶ 35). She told Rankin that she had already spoken to the site coordinator about these issues, but the employees were not following the coordinator's directions. (Id. ¶ 35). Rankin responded that he would speak with the coordinator and remind her of her responsibilities. (Id.).
2. Disinfection logs
Disinfection logs are documents that provide LabCorp employees with guidance on specific surfaces that should be disinfected and provide a space for employees to initial that such disinfections have been completed. Maintaining disinfection logs is a LabCorp requirement. (Id. ¶ 37).
Plaintiff was trained on issues related to disinfection logs. (Id. ¶ 39). During the training, Plaintiff was told not to defer to "other people's bad habits of how they handled the disinfection logs." (Id.). Indeed, Rankin would frequently re-educate staff members on how to properly maintain disinfection logs. (Id. ¶ 40).
Plaintiff complained to Brooks that disinfection logs were not being kept in accordance with Rankin's requests, were not being initialed as they should be, and that people were falsifying disinfection logs. (SAC ¶ 10). At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she raised this issue in the context of unfairness towards her because Plaintiff found it unfair that Rankin was holding her accountable for disinfection logs when she was a floater phlebotomist and was not routinely at a specific location. (DSUF ¶ 38).
3. COVID-19 protocols
On May 19, 2020, a phlebotomist in the Inglewood facility notified Rankin that her daughter had tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 43). Rankin contacted his acting supervisor and asked for instructions on what to do next - he was told to send the Inglewood phlebotomist home and to ask Plaintiff to replace her at the Inglewood facility. (Id. ¶ 44).
When Plaintiff arrived, the phlebotomist had not yet left for home and informed Plaintiff about her daughter's positive test. (Id. ¶ 45). Plaintiff then called Rankin to say that the facility should have been closed one hour early and properly disinfected, and that she should not have been sent to the site and exposed to COVID-19. (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that Rankin was not following Center for Disease Control ("CDC") guidelines regarding quarantine when someone has been exposed to COVID-19. (Id.).
4. Blood contamination
On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff informed Brooks that she saw a patient washing his arm at the Redondo Beach facility because he had placed his arm on an armrest that was contaminated with blood. (Id. ¶ 41). Two days later, Rankin sent an email to the phlebotomists he supervised, including Plaintiff, reminding the group that it is "imperative that we are frequently checking our workspace upon completion of any task for any spatter or other contamination." (Id. ¶ 42).
5. Hand soap and sanitizer
During the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff complained to Rankin that the Inglewood facility was not properly equipped with hand soap or sanitizer. (Id. ¶ 46).
B. Plaintiff's Termination
On May 21, 2020, Plaintiff was working at LabCorp's Redondo Beach facility with Stephanie Marquez, Sabrina Ayon, Kimberly Pangelinan, and Sandra Juarez. (Id. ¶ 5). Marquez had been on the job less than one year and had recently received a written warning for a blood sample labeling error. (Id. ¶ 7).
Marquez received a patient that day with a complex order containing multiple blood testing codes. (Id. ¶ 6). Marquez concluded that the order was too complicated for her to complete and she refused to go through with the blood draw. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff asked Marquez to wait while Plaintiff called Rankin so that Marquez could explain to Rankin why she was refusing to draw the patient. (Id. ¶ 10). In response, Marquez asked if Plaintiff was threatening her. (Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts ("PAMF" ¶ 58 (Docket No. 40-1)).
Marquez returned to the processing room to gather her belongings before leaving. (DSUF ¶ 12). As Marquez was leaving, Plaintiff stood near the doorway and again told Marquez to wait while they called Rankin together. (Id. ¶ 13). Marquez responded that she was off the clock and told Plaintiff to "move." (Id. ¶ 14). In response, Plaintiff told Marquez not to act childish. (Id. ¶ 15). Marquez continued her path to the exit and Plaintiff moved. (Id. ¶ 16). After she left, Plaintiff contacted Rankin and informed him of the dispute between herself and Marquez. (Id. ¶ 17).
Rankin investigated the incident by collecting statements from other LabCorp employees on site that day. Plaintiff disputes the investigation on grounds that Rankin failed to collect a statement from Sandra Juarez. (See Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Disputes ¶ 18). Rankin, with the oversight of LabCorp's Employee Relations department, concluded that Plaintiff acted improperly and in violation of LabCorp policy. (DSUF ¶ 28). Specifically, Plaintiff violated LabCorp's "Professionalism Guidelines," which state in part:
We will not tolerate certain behaviors in the workplace . . . Among other things, we will not tolerate: Employees being rude or exhibiting unprofessional behavior towards . . . anyone in the company . . . Employees being insubordinate, threatening, intimidating, disrespectful, or assaulting a manager/ supervisor, co-worker, customer or vendor . . . specific occurrences may result in higher levels of corrective action and even immediate termination depending on the circumstances.(Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff also violated LabCorp's "Conditions of Employment Policy," which states:
LabCorp employees are expected at all times . . . to interact with co-workers . . . in a professional manner . . . speaking in an abusive, demeaning, loud manner will not be tolerated.(Id. ¶ 31). As a result of Plaintiff's violations, she was terminated.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the Court applies Anderson, Celotex, and their Ninth Circuit progeny. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Ninth Circuit has defined the shifting burden of proof governing motions for summary judgment where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial:
The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. The non-moving party must do more than show there is some "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts at issue. In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor.Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1259 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010)).
"A motion for summary judgment may not be defeated, however, by evidence that is 'merely colorable' or 'is not significantly probative.' " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, 'it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.' " C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges four claims related to employee retaliation and wrongful termination: (1) retaliation in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5; (2) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5(b); (3) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 6310; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See generally SAC). Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. (Id.).
Both parties indicate that Plaintiff's first claim - violation of the California Health and Safety Code - has been dismissed by agreement.
A. California Labor Code section 1102.5(b)
California Labor Code section 1102.5(b) is "California's general whistleblower statute." Ward v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. E073567, 2022 WL 533828, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022). It provides:
An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties.Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5.
The California Supreme Court recently clarified that claims brought under section 1102.5 follow a two-step burden-shifting process. See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 12 Cal. 5th 703, 718, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 503 P.3d 659 (2022). First, plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation for an employee's protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested employment action. Id. Second, and only if Plaintiff has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity. Id.
1. Plaintiff's Protected Activities
Plaintiff's alleged protected activities are her complaints regarding: (1) overfilled biohazard bags and sharps containers; (2) disinfection logs; (3) COVID-19 protocol; (4) blood contamination; and (5) a shortage of soap and sanitizer.
LabCorp argues that, under section 1102.5, these are not protected activities because they are either not a "disclosure"; not a disclosure of unlawful conduct; or not a disclosure to the right person. LabCorp also argues that Plaintiff's alleged activities were unprotected internal complaints.
a. A "disclosure" under section 1102.5
Section 1102.5 protects an employee for "disclosing information." "[T]he term 'disclosure' means to reveal something that was hidden and not known." Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 4th 832, 858, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259 (2012) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, "the report of publicly known or already known information does not constitute a protected disclosure under section 1102.5." Ward, 2022 WL 533828, at *7.
LabCorp argues that Plaintiff's complaints regarding biohazard bags, disinfection logs, and COVID-19 protocol are not protected disclosures because Plaintiff was "blowing the whistle" on information already known to Rankin and others at LabCorp. The Court agrees.
As to the overfilled biohazard bags and sharps containers, Rankin testified, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Rankin had to frequently address this issue during his visits to the facilities he supervised. (DSUF ¶ 36). Addressing this became part of Rankin's daily duties, and Rankin himself witnessed the overfilled containers and bags. (Id.).
Plaintiff rebuts this argument by asserting that the public disclosure rule was created to stop "me too" complaints that would give subsequent whistle blowers the same protection for one complaint. Plaintiff admits that Rankin may have been aware of the issue, but argues that there is no evidence he received any prior complaints about it. But this distinction is unpersuasive because it puts form over substance.
Whistle blowers are protected from retaliation when they "disclos[e] information ." Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5 (emphasis added). Put differently, a whistle blower does not receive protection for repeating information already known, whether the information was lodged as a complaint or not. See Mize-Kurzman, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 858, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 259.
The Court comes to the same conclusion for the disinfection logs. Plaintiff does not dispute that when she received her initial LabCorp training, she was instructed not to follow other people's bad habits in failing to properly complete disinfection logs. (DSUF ¶ 39). Nor does Plaintiff dispute that Rankin frequently re-educated staff members on how to properly maintain disinfection logs. (Id. ¶ 40). Therefore, Plaintiff's disinfection log complaints are not protected because the issue was publicly known.
Closely related to the issue of "public information" is the situation where a whistle blower complains to the alleged wrongdoer. If an employee complains to a supervisor about the supervisor's own wrongdoing, it "is not a 'disclosure' and is not protected whistleblowing activity, because the employer already knows about his or her wrongdoing." Mize-Kurzman, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 859, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 259.
Here, Plaintiff complained to Rankin about his own failure to follow CDC guidelines in connection with a COVID-19 exposure. Plaintiff argues that Rankin was not aware of his own wrongdoing because he was operating under a supervisor's instructions. However, as Defendant correctly argues, delivery of criticism to the wrongdoer himself is not a report to an individual in a position to act to remedy the complaint, as the plain language of section 1102.5 requires. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5 ("An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . .").
b. Internal matters
LabCorp argues that Plaintiff's alleged disclosures regarding blood contamination and sanitizing equipment are not protected because they are internal personnel matters and do not qualify for whistleblower protection. The Court agrees.
"California courts have made clear that discussions regarding personnel matters do not qualify for protection under section 1102.5." Ward, 2022 WL 533828, at *8 (citing Patten v. Grant Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1385, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 113 (2005) (finding that internal personnel matters involving a supervisor and her employee "do not amount to whistleblowing as a matter of law."); Carter v. Escondido Union High Sch. Dist., 148 Cal. App. 4th 922, 934, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (2007) (finding that a "routine internal personnel disclosure . . . cannot support a wrongful termination action.")).
"Because disclosure of an internal policy violation is not generally the type of disclosure protected under section 1102.5, the question of whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity turns on whether plaintiff held a reasonable belief that such a disclosure could reveal a violation of a statute, rule, or regulation." Id. With respect to Plaintiff's blood contamination complaint and reporting of a lack of soap and sanitation supplies, there is no such evidence that Plaintiff reasonably believed the disclosure could reveal a violation of law. Instead, it is apparent that these complaints were internal personnel matters.
A review of the SAC shows that Plaintiff's blood contamination complaint was an internal personnel matter involving a supervisor and her employee:
[Plaintiff] told Ms. Brooks that she asked Ms. Juarez why [the patient] was washing his arms and the patient informed her that he had placed his arms on the armrest that was contaminated with blood. Ms. Brooks asked, "Are you serious?!" and Plaintiff said "Yes." Plaintiff then said that "You do know that the Hepatitis virus can live on a surface up to five days?" and Ms. Brooks said, "Yeah, I do." Ms. Brooks then asked, " Do you know if Sandra reported it to Zach? " and Plaintiff said, "No, I don't know. I didn't ask her." Ms. Brooks then said that it was crucial for Ms. Juarez to report it to him just in case the patient has a skin reaction or the patient files a lawsuit so that they can have documentation that it was reported. Plaintiff then said she would ask Ms. Juarez if she reported it and if she hadn't, to suggest to her to report it to Supervisor Rankin.(SAC ¶ 43) (emphasis added). As is apparent, Plaintiff is not making a report concerning an alleged violation of law, even if she reasonably thinks it could somehow amount to one. The allegations depict a conversation between an employee and her supervisor where they discuss personnel matters, i.e., recommendations as to how Ms. Juarez should proceed after a blood contamination.
The same is true of Plaintiff's complaint concerning a lack of hand sanitizer and soap at the Inglewood facility. Plaintiff does not dispute that she complained the Inglewood site was not properly equipped with hand sanitizer or soap because a co-worker was not staying on top of her orders. (DSUF ¶ 46). This is not only a personnel issue, but also it is unconnected to any alleged violations of law.
At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel argued that an internal personnel matter and a protected whistleblower complaint are not mutually exclusive events. The Court does not disagree; however, Plaintiff's complaints described above are not both because neither complaint reasonably seeks to disclose a violation of law.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that she made a protected disclosure, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim for retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5.
B. California Labor Code section 6310
Labor Code section 6310 prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because the employee has made "any oral or written complaint to . . . his or her employer . . ." about unsafe working conditions or unsafe work practices . Cal. Lab. Code § 6310(a) (emphasis added).
In contrast to claims under Labor Code section 1102.5, "no parallel statute exists setting forth the respective parties' burdens for a whistleblower retaliation claim brought pursuant to section 6310, subdivision (b)." Ward, 2022 WL 533828, at *4. Accordingly, "this claim is analyzed under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework that applies generally to retaliation and whistleblower claims." Id. It is a three-step burden-shifting process, as follows:
[First], the plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a "protected activity," (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action. If the employee successfully establishes these elements and thereby shows a prima facie case exists, the burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence that there was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer produces evidence showing a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation drops out of the picture, and the burden shifts back to the employee to provide "substantial responsive evidence" that the employer's proffered reasons were untrue or pretextual.Id.
1. Prima facie case
First, Plaintiff must establish that she was engaged in a protected activity. In the Court's analysis above, it found that Plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity because, among other reasons, Plaintiff did not make a protected disclosure that would result in whistleblower protection under section 1102.5. Here, however, section 6310 makes no mention of an "information disclosure," which eliminated most Plaintiff's allegations under section 1102.5. Instead, Plaintiff's alleged activities are protected activities under section 6310 if she "complain[s] of unsafe working conditions or an unsafe workplace." Creighton v. City of Livingston, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
Plaintiff has met this element because her complaints related to overfilled biohazard bags, disinfection logs, and LabCorp's COVID-19 protocol all relate to unsafe working conditions and an unsafe workplace. LabCorp rebuts by arguing that Plaintiff's allegations are related to a public health risk and therefore do not relate to Plaintiff's work environment. See Creighton, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (holding that a complaint related to a public health risk was not a protected activity under section 6310). But this is simply not true. Although the general public may be subject to these hazards as patients, LabCorp employees are also exposed risks resulting from overfilled biohazard bags, fabricated disinfection logs, and employees not following COVID-19 protocol.
Second, Plaintiff must establish that she suffered an adverse employment action. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated, so this element is met.
Third, Plaintiff must establish that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action. "The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer's knowledge that the employee engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision." Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff's complaints related to biohazard bags were made around March or April 2020, and Plaintiff's COVID-19 protocol complaint was made on May 19, 2020, just two days before the incident that led to her termination. Because Plaintiff's protected activities are sufficiently close in time to her termination, Plaintiff has demonstrated a casual link through circumstantial evidence.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that a prima facie case exists.
2. A legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Plaintiff's termination
Because Plaintiff has met her burden in demonstrating the existence of a prima facie case, LabCorp must provide evidence that there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination.
LabCorp meets its burden by showing that Plaintiff was terminated for bullying a co-worker in violation of LabCorp's policies. (See supra Part I.B.). Plaintiff does not dispute that she had an altercation with a fellow LabCorp employee. The evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff acted unprofessionally in violation of LabCorp's Professionalism Guidelines, a violation of which may result in "immediate termination depending on the circumstances."
3. Pretext
"In responding to an employer's showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, a plaintiff cannot show merely that the employer's decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise." Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 5th 384, 395, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849 (2019) (citation omitted). "Rather, the employee must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for a nondiscriminatory reason." Id. Plaintiff has met this burden by producing substantial evidence that the investigation was incomplete and led to inconsistent outcomes.
On May 21, 2020, the altercation between Plaintiff and Marquez took place in the presence of three witnesses: (1) Kimberly Pangilinan; (2) Sabrina Ayon; and (3) Sandra Juarez. According to LabCorp's report, which summarized the investigation, Rankin asked for a written statement from everyone except for Juarez, claiming that Juarez did not witness the altercation. The report concludes by recommending that Plaintiff be terminated and Marquez receive a verbal warning.
Juarez, however, testified at her deposition that she witnessed the entire event and she never told Rankin otherwise. (PAMF ¶ 56). Juarez claims that, at the time Marquez was refusing to draw the patient, Marquez was shouting and speaking angrily at Plaintiff, yet Plaintiff never raised her voice and spoke in a calm tone. (Id. ¶ 60). Juarez observed that Plaintiff was attempting to defuse Marquez's hostility and anger, and Plaintiff appeared to be trying to help Marquez. (Id. ¶ 61). Curiously, none of this testimony made its way into the LabCorp report. And during Rankin's deposition, he could not remember the specific incident that led to Plaintiff's termination. However, Rankin could remember that he was "extremely satisfied with [Plaintiff's] performance," and that Plaintiff was a "team player." (Id. ¶ 76).
Also, LabCorp's resulting actions were, at best, inconsistent. During the investigation, Plaintiff was the only one placed on administrative leave. (Id. ¶ 73). Moreover, Marquez - an employee with a prior written warning for poor performance and the person who started the altercation by refusing to do her job - was only issued a verbal warning. Whereas a rational jury could find that Plaintiff, a high performing employee, was terminated for trying to help LabCorp perform its patient care properly.
For these reasons, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether LabCorp's termination of Plaintiff was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim for retaliation under California Labor Code 6310.
C. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
The common law tort of wrongful termination is limited to those claims finding support in an important public policy based on a statutory or constitutional provision. Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 79, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046 (1998). Here, Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is premised upon her claims for retaliation under the California Labor Code. Defendant makes no argument as to why the California Labor Code would provide an insufficient basis for such a claim.
Because Plaintiff's claim under section 6310 survives, so does her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to this claim.
D. Punitive Damages
Under section 3294(b) of the California Civil Code, a corporate entity cannot be liable for punitive damages resulting from its employees' acts unless an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation: (1) had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others; (2) authorized or ratified the conduct giving rise to punitive damages; or (3) was personally guilty of such conduct. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b).
Plaintiff argues that she can demonstrate ratification because LabCorp was put on notice, through deposition testimony in this action, that Rankin deliberately concealed exculpatory information during the investigation, and that Rankin has not yet been disciplined for his misconduct. However, "[c]orporate ratification in the punitive damages context requires actual knowledge of the conduct and its outrageous nature." Coll. Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 4th 704, 726, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 882 P.2d 894 (1994), as modified (Nov. 23, 1994).
The Court rejects Plaintiff's theory that LabCorp can "ratify" Plaintiff's termination based on knowledge of Rankin's alleged misconduct that came from information shared in a deposition to a LabCorp representative years after the incident. In essence, Plaintiff is trying to apply the principles of respondeat superior to the issue of punitive damages, but Plaintiff cites no authority to support such a claim. As the Court explained at the hearing, if the bar to punitive damages was this low, most wrongful termination cases would qualify.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.