Opinion
CV136036810S
01-19-2016
Karen Rodriguez v. Jeffrey Goodwin
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #169.20
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
On January 13, 2015, the plaintiff, Karen Rodriguez, filed a four-count amended complaint against Jeffrey Goodwin, a patrol officer for the city of New Haven, and Walsh Construction Company-PCL Joint Venture II. The plaintiff alleges the following facts in her amended complaint. On December 5, 2012, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the plaintiff was in her motor vehicle traveling south on Fulton Terrace in New Haven, Connecticut. At said time, Goodwin, while traveling eastbound in his motor vehicle on Kendall Street in New Haven, failed to stop at the intersection of Fulton Terrace and Kendall Street, and collided with the plaintiff's motor vehicle. As a result of Goodwin's carelessness and negligence causing the collision, the plaintiff suffered varying degrees of injuries. At the time of the collision, Goodwin was under the supervision, direction, and employ of the defendant.
Walsh Construction Company filed the subject motion for summary judgment and will be the only party subsequently referred to as " the defendant."
On September 21, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to count four of the plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that Goodwin was not an agent, servant, or employee of the defendant and could not have been acting within the scope of any employment at the time the accident occurred. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted a memorandum of law and the following evidence: (1) portions of Goodwin's certified deposition transcript; and (2) the signed and sworn affidavit of Eric Klupp, corporate counsel for the defendant. On October 27, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment and submitted the following evidence: (1) the police accident report; (2) the signed and sworn affidavit of the plaintiff; and (3) the signed and sworn affidavit of Denise Blanchard, the Assistant Chief for the Department of Police Services for the City of New Haven. Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on November 23, 2015.
A complete copy of the transcript from the deposition testimony of Goodwin was filed with the court on November 3, 2015. (#172.)
DISCUSSION
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). " The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 307 Conn. 706, 711, 59 A.3d 207 (2013). " In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). " A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
In the present case, the defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Goodwin was not an agent, servant, or employee of the defendant. Even if he could be found to be an employee of the defendant, Goodwin could not have been acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. At short calendar, the defendant brought to the court's attention that the court, Fischer J., already granted summary judgment for the defendant on the same facts in the consolidated case, finding that Goodwin was not acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. The plaintiff counters, arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Goodwin was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident because the court found in a prior decision that Goodwin was not acting within the scope of his employment with the city of New Haven, and therefore, he must have been acting within the scope of his employment for the defendant (Wilson, J., #115.10). The plaintiff also argues that Goodwin's deposition and Klupp's affidavit are self-serving and the jury should decide their credibility.
See Angulo v. Goodwin, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6051354-S, (November 6, 2015, Fischer, J.).
The court notes that the plaintiff makes the assertion that summary judgment procedure is generally not proper when dealing with a scope of employment claim as it is the function of the jury to determine from the facts whether a servant was acting within the scope of his employment. Our Supreme Court has stated, however, that " in determining whether or not a servant was acting in the scope of his employment, the test is to be found in the nature of the tortious act and its relation or nonrelation to that which the actor was employed to do . . . but . . . occasions might arise in which the servant is so clearly without the scope of his authority that the question is one of law." Bradlow v. American District Telegraph Co., 131 Conn. 192, 195, 38 A.2d 679 (1944). Accordingly, the court may consider whether the defendant here was acting clearly without the scope of his authority and move forward with the summary judgment procedure.
" [U]nder the common-law principle of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of the tortious conduct of his employee when that conduct occurs during the course of the employee's employment." (Emphasis omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 839, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). " [A] fundamental premise underlying the theory of vicarious liability is that an employer exerts control, fictional or not, over an employee acting within the scope of employment, and therefore may be held responsible for the wrongs of that employee . . . A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service . . . A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master . . . It is as a result of this control that the theory of vicarious liability allows employers to be subject to liability for the physical harm caused by the negligent conduct of their employees acting within the scope of employment." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 693 n.16, 849 A.2d 813 (2004).
" In determining whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment, courts look to whether the employee's conduct: (1) occurs primarily within the employer's authorized time and space limits; (2) is of the type that the employee is employed to perform; and (3) is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer." Harp v. King, 266 Conn. 747, 782-83, 835 A.2d 953 (2003). " A master is liable only for those torts of his servant which are done with a view of furthering his master's business within the field of his employment--for those which have for their purpose the execution of the master's orders or the doing of the work assigned to him to do." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bradlow v. American District Telegraph Co., 131 Conn. 192, 196, 38 A.2d 679 (1944). " 'In the course of his employment' means while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase 'during the period covered by his employment.'" Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, 156 Conn. 193, 198, 239 A.2d 490 (1968) (employee involved in automobile accident with his own vehicle while running personal errands to pay bills is not within the scope of his employment nor performing any services for his employer). Further, " an employer has no duty to control the conduct of an off-duty employee except when the complained-of conduct occurs on the employer's premises, utilizes a chattel of the employer's, and the employer knows or has reason to know that he can control the employee and recognizes the necessity of so doing." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cannizzaro v. Marinyak, 139 Conn.App. 722, 729, 57 A.3d 830 (2012), aff'd, 312 Conn. 361, 93 A.3d 584 (2014) (employer was not liable for car accident caused by their off-duty employee).
In the present action, Goodwin's deposition transcript shows that at the time of the accident he was employed as a New Haven police officer and, in that capacity, was performing extra duty work for the defendant by controlling pedestrian safety. In addition, Klupp's affidavit opined that Goodwin had never been an agent, servant, or employee of the defendant, that the defendant paid the City of New Haven, not Goodwin directly, for the benefit of the services provided by Goodwin, and that the defendant did not supervise Goodwin. Even if Goodwin could be found to be an agent, servant, or employee of the defendant, Goodwin testified that at the time of the accident, he was operating his personal vehicle and had left the defendant's site because his shift had ended. This testimony shows that: (1) the accident did not occur at the defendant's construction site; (2) Goodwin's driving home in his personal vehicle was not of the type of his employment which was to monitor pedestrian safety at the construction site; and (3) his actions were motivated by a personal desire to go home because his shift had ended, not to serve an employer. See Harp v. King, supra, 266 Conn. 782-83. Accordingly, the defendant has presented evidence showing that regardless of who his employer is, he was not acting within the scope of any employment or in furtherance of anyone's business at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff, however, fails to present any evidence to contradict the defendant's evidence and show that Goodwin was an agent, servant, or employee for the defendant acting within the scope of his employment. The plaintiff's argument that if Goodwin wasn't an employee of the city of New Haven at the time of the accident, then he must be an employee of the defendant, fails to consider that Goodwin wasn't within the scope of employment for any potential employer when the accident occurred. Further, Goodwin may have been in uniform and within the proximity of the construction site where he was working, but the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that shows his actions were of the type for which he was employed to do, and that such actions were in furtherance of his employment. Thus, the defendant has met its burden, but the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to present evidence of a disputed fact and, therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The plaintiff also argues that Goodwin's and Klupp's affidavits are self serving and that a jury should determine their credibility. It is the plaintiff's burden to present evidence that contradicts and calls into question the credibility of the defendant's evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, but as previously noted, the plaintiff fails to meet this burden.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.