Opinion
19-cv-02120 (NSR)
07-27-2021
DWAYNE RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF YONKERS, MOLINA, CLERIGO, CALLAHAN, JACKSON, GOMALLY, BLAKE, BELLUSCIO, CLAYTON, ALMONTE, COGAIALLO, BUCHANAN, COLLINS, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS D/B/A CCS, ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendants.
OPINION &ORDER
NELSON S. ROMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Dwayne Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the City of Yonkers, Yonkers Police Officers Dennis Molina, R. Clerigo, Callahan, Jackson, Gormally, Blake, Belluscio, Clayton, Almonte, Gogaiallo, Buchanan, Collins, Westchester County, Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”), and Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”). Presently before the Court are the unopposed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Westchester County and Aramark (ECF No. 48) and CCS (ECF No. 43). For the following reasons, their motions are GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed as against Aramark, Westchester County, and CCS without prejudice.
Aramark Correctional Services, LLC is improperly pleaded as Aramark. To the extent Plaintiff files an Amended Complaint, he should use Aramark's correct legal name.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016). As the instant motions were brought solely on behalf of Westchester County, Aramark, and CCS (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”), the Court primarily limits the following summary to those factual allegations relevant to the conduct of the Moving Defendants.
Sometime in or around May 2018, Plaintiff was arrested by the Yonkers Police Department and eventually charged in a felony complaint with burglary in the second degree before a New York state court. ((Complaint (“Compl.”) (ECF No. 2) at 4A.) Plaintiff asserts that the City of Yonkers, Yonkers Police Officers Dennis Molina, R. Clerigo, Callahan, Jackson, Gormally, Blake, Belluscio, Clayton, Almonte, Gogaiallo, Buchanan, Collins (the “Non-Moving Defendants”) violated Plaintiff's Constitutional rights in the course of arresting him and prosecuting him due to the absence of evidence that he engaged in criminal conduct and the presence of exculpatory evidence. (Id.) The Non-Moving Defendants have not submitted any motion to dismiss the Complaint and, accordingly, the Court need not address these claims.
The core factual allegations of the Complaint are not paragraphed and are instead featured on pages 4A, 4B, and 5. Citations to the Complaint refer to the page number on which the corresponding allegation may be found.
At all relevant times, for the purposes of allegations against Moving Defendants, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Westchester County Department of Corrections jail facility (“WCDOC”), and an individual suffering from soy intolerance. (Compl. at 4B.) Between May 20, 2018 until June 20, 2018, Plaintiff unwittingly consumed soy because Aramark and Westchester County allegedly served Plaintiff food containing soy alongside soy-free food in a non-conspicuous manner. (Id.) Plaintiff was served these products even though Aramark and Westchester County allegedly knew about his allergy. (Id.) After eating the food containing soy, Plaintiff claims that he became terribly ill between May and June of 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff does not directly state any allegation against CCS or explain what, if any, role CCS plays in the provision of food to inmates at WCDOC.
Plaintiff seeks, among other things, $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages against all Defendants.
STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Although for the purpose of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). It is not necessary for the complaint to assert “detailed factual allegations, ” but must allege “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S at 555. The facts in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.
“Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal.” Thomas v. Westchester, No. 12-CV-6718 (CS), 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013). In fact, courts must interpret the pro se plaintiff's pleading “to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). “However, even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil rights claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor, 709 F.Supp.2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal is justified, therefore, where “the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief, ” and therefore, the “duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations and alterations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1983Section 1983 provides that: “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” Castilla v. City of New York, 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2013); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Annis v. Westchester County, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 53 F.Supp.2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that Section 1983 “furnishes a cause of action for the violation of federal rights created by the Constitution”) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Liberally construed, Plaintiff attempts to allege a deliberate indifference claim pursuant to Section 1983 against Westchester County, Aramark, and CCS in connection with the food served to him at WCDOC. In their motion, Westchester County and Aramark argue, among other things, that Plaintiff's claims against Aramark and Westchester County fail because Plaintiff has not established a policy or custom in order to trigger Monell liability. (See Westchester County's and Aramark's Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss (“Westchester Mem.”) (ECF No. 49).) In its motion, CCS argues, among other things, that Plaintiff's claim against CCS fails because Plaintiff does not assert any allegations against CCS. (See CCS's Memorandum of Law in Support of it's Motion to Dismiss (“CCS Mem.”) (ECF No. 45).). The Court agrees with the Moving Defendants, and addresses their respective arguments in turn.
I. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Westchester County and Aramark
Westchester County and Aramark argue that Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed for failure to show a municipal policy or custom as required under Monell. (Westchester Mem. at 6-8.) The Court agrees with Westchester County and Aramark.
Municipalities or private actors engaged in governmental action, may not be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory solely because the municipality or private corporation engaged a tortfeasor. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, under Monell, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the municipality itself caused or is implicated in the constitutional violation.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). This generally requires a plaintiff to establish that “(1) an official custom or policy [ ] (2) subjected [him or her] to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Ferrari v. Cty. of Suffolk, 790 F.Supp.2d 34, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In order to prevail on a claim against a municipality under [S]ection 1983 based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.”). To establish an official custom or policy, a plaintiff must allege
Courts that have considered the issue have found that Aramark, in its capacity as a food provider at WCDOC, can be viewed a state actor for purposes of assessing Monell liability. See, e.g., Pagan v. Westchester Cty., No. 12 Civ. 7669(PAE)(JCF), 2014 WL 982876, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014). Indeed, this Court has previously explained that (1) “Aramark's ‘seemingly private' behavior can be treated as that of the state given that the challenged action, proper food service, flows directly from the obligations of the government entity and is performed under its supervision, ” and (2) “Aramark, by providing meals to inmates, performs a ‘public function' and therefore is a state actor.” Salgado v. DuBois, No. 17-cv-6040 (NSR), 2019 WL 1409808, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019). Regardless, the Court need not address this issue in depth here because Aramark has permitted the Court to treat it as a state actor for purpose of this motion only. (Westchester Mem. at 6.)
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.White v. Westchester Cty., No. 18-CV-730 (KMK), 2018 WL 6726555, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018) (quoting Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F.Supp.2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
Monell liability premised upon an unofficial policy or custom, can only survive a motion to dismiss if the practice, custom, or usage is so widespread and persistent that it has the force of law. Goode v. Westchester Cty., No. 18-cv-2963 (NSR), 2019 WL 2250278, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2019). Although a plaintiff is not required to identify an express rule or regulation to establish a Monell claim, proof of “a single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy.” DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the end, therefore, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury.” Hayes, 853 F.Supp.2d at 439 (quoting Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege “any facts suggesting the existence of an official policy or custom under any of the above four factors, or any facts suggesting an official policy or custom” caused Westchester County or Aramark to serve him with food containing soy. Hoffstead v. Aramark Corr. Servs., LLC, No. 18 CV 2381 (VB), 2019 WL 1331634, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019). Indeed, he has not even alleged that a policy or custom exists. Therefore, the Complaint does not include a facially plausible Monell claim against Defendants Westchester County or Aramark on the basis of an official or unofficial policy or custom.
Likewise, Plaintiff fails to premise his Monell claim based upon improper training, hiring, or supervision. Where municipal liability is based on a failure to train employees, the inadequate training must “reflect[ ] deliberate indifference to . . . constitutional rights.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). It is appropriate to dismiss a Monell claim where a plaintiff fails to allege “any facts for this Court to conclude that . . . any individual defendant acted due to a failure by [Municipality] to provide adequate training or supervision .” Edwards v. Orange Cty., No. 17-CV-10116 (NSR), 2020 WL 635528, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2020) (emphasis added). At best, Plaintiff names one of his causes of action “failure to properly hire, train, and supervise” (Compl. at 2.) Even if the Court liberally construes this to assert that Aramark and Westchester County failed to properly train their employees, it would still be insufficient to state a claim because “conclusory allegations that a municipality failed to train and supervise its employees is insufficient to state a Monell claim.” Davis v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-1395(RPP), 2008 WL 2511734, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Westchester County and Aramark are dismissed without prejudice.
II. Claims against CCS
CCS argues that Plaintiff's claim against it should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to mention CCS outside of the case caption, much less describe what conduct CCS engaged in that purportedly gave rise to a cause of action. (CCS Mem. at 3.) The Court agrees with CCS.
In this circuit “it is well-settled that where the complaint names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted.” Dove v. O'Hare, 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000); see Calvin v. Schmitt, 2017 WL 4280683, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2017) (dismissing claim against a defendant who was named in the caption but not otherwise mentioned in the complaint). Though Plaintiff names CCS a defendant in the caption, the Complaint does not reference CCS outside of the caption, much less assert any allegations as to how CCS purportedly violated Plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against CCS are dismissed without prejudice.
III. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that courts “should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.” Liberal application of Rule 15(a) is warranted with respect to pro se litigants, who “should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that [they have] a valid claim.” Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). District courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
However, the Court may properly deny leave to amend for “futility of amendment.” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This is true even when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Terry v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d at 112). “An amendment to a pleading is futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6).” Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Here, because Plaintiff has not previously amended his complaint, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint and replead his Monell claims against CCS, Aramark, and Westchester County to the extent he can do so clearly, concisely, truthfully, and plausibly.
To the greatest extent possible, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must address the deficiencies identified in this Opinion and Order and must:
1. describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff's case including what each defendant did or failed to do;
2. include any details he may provide regarding why he believes Aramark, CCS, Westchester County, or any of their employees gave him food containing soy;
3. include any facts regarding the existence of an official Aramark, CCS, or Westchester County policy or custom that caused the deprivation of a constitutional right;
4. describe any facts regarding a failure to appropriately hire, train, or supervise including which individuals were inappropriately hired, trained, or supervised and which entities were responsible for those individual's hiring, training, or supervision;
5. give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event; and
6. describe how each defendant's acts or omissions violated Plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered as a result of those acts or omissions.
Essentially, the body of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; what facts show that his federally protected rights were violated; when such violation occurred; where such violation occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Finally, the Amended Complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the existing complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff must include in the Amended Complaint all information necessary for his claims. However, Plaintiff is directed to include in his Amended Complaint only those facts and documents he believes plausibly support a violation of his constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions are GRANTED, Plaintiff's claims against CCS, Westchester County, and Aramark are dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint in accordance with this Opinion. Plaintiff is directed to file an Amended Complaint on or before August 31, 2021. An amended prisoner complaint form is attached to this Opinion. If no amendment is made by August 31, 2021, or Plaintiff fails to move for an extension to that deadline, the Complaint may be dismissed with prejudice as against CCS, Westchester County, and Aramark without further notice. If Plaintiff elects to file an Amended Complaint, then Defendants shall have until 30 days from the date of Plaintiff's filing to answer the Amended Complaint or seek leave to file a non-frivolous and non-repetitive motion to dismiss.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 48 and ECF No. 43 and to mail a copy of this Opinion to pro se Plaintiff at the address listed on ECF and show service on the Docket.
SO ORDERED.