Opinion
Civil No. 02-1858 (JAG).
August 10, 2004
Nydia Gonzalez-Ortiz Rafael Elvira-Caballero, Santiago Gonzalez Law Office Rafael Elvira Caballero Law Office, Yauco, PR, Ponce, PR, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Juan C. Perez-Otero, Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Juan J. Casillas-Ayala Fiddler, Gonzalez Rodriguez, PSC, San Juan, PR, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On June 7, 2002, plaintiffs Josefina León Rodríguez and María Aurora Roiz Vidal filed an action for damages pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623, 626, as well as supplemental state law claims pursuant to Public Law No. 80, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185, Public Law No. 100, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146, and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Docket No. 1).
On February 18, 2003, defendant Banco Santander, plaintiffs' former employer, moved for summary judgment (Docket No. 25). Plaintiffs responded in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on March 13, 2003 (Docket No. 37).
For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the complaint (Docket No. 1) and the defendant's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 25).
Plaintiffs Josefina León Rodríguez ("León") and María Aurora Roiz Vidal ("Roiz") were employed by Banco Santander ("Santander") and its predecessor, Banco de Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño, for 39 and 46 years, respectively. At the time of their dismissal, both plaintiffs worked in Santander's Ponce Plaza branch. León served as the custodian of the bank tellers, and was primarily responsible for ensuring the secure handling of deposits. Roiz worked mainly in customer service, focusing upon the opening of new accounts. On or about August 29, 2000, each plaintiff received a letter informing her that, due to reorganization within the corporation, her position at Ponce Plaza would be eliminated and she would have to choose between transfer or dismissal. Because the alternative positions were located in or near the San Juan metropolitan area, both plaintiffs rejected the proffered transfers. On or about September 6, 2000, León and Roiz received letters of dismissal effective September 8.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, a motion for summary must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401. A "genuine" issue is one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989), would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975). A "material fact" is one that could potentially affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 47 U.S. at 248.
In the case of mixed questions of law and fact, summary judgment is appropriate if the facts "are formally stipulated to or constructively agreed upon by the parties" or if the gravamen of the dispute is legal rather than factual. See, Uhl v. Swanson, 79 F.3d 751, 754-55 (8th Cir. 1996) (summary judgment "particularly appropriate" if unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual). Summary judgment is also appropriate if factual issues in the case are established as a matter of law.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (if factual matters are clear because of strength of movant's evidence or weakness of nonmovant's evidence, purported factual dispute can be decided only one way as a matter of law and summary judgment may be granted; "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not signficantly probative, summary judgment may be granted").
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant Santander contends that the plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case of age discrimination and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the defendant's proffered explanation (Docket No. 25).
In an ADEA discrimination lawsuit, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that she would not have been fired but for her age. Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir. 1996). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, the Court uses the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Pagues-Cahue, 82 F.3d 533; Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1993);Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1992);Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991). Plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. Typically, a plaintiff does so by demonstrating that (1) plaintiff was within the protected group, i.e., over forty years of age; (2) plaintiff met her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) plaintiff suffered adverse employment action; and (4) the employer did not treat age neutrally or retained younger persons in the same position. Pagues-Cahue, 82 F.3d at 536.
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. However, the employer's burden is merely one of production; the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion at all times. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823. As the First Circuit noted in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1004, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979),
"the employer's burden to `articulate' a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is not a burden to persuade the trier that he was in fact motivated by that reason and not by a discriminatory one. Rather it is a burden of production i.e., a burden to articulate or state a valid reason, following which the complainant must show that the reason so articulated or stated is a mere pretext or `cover-up' for what was in truth a discriminatory purpose."
If the defendant produces a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the explanation advanced by the defendant is a pretext for age discrimination.Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823. Plaintiff must do more than cast doubt on the defendant's justification. Id.; Lawrence, 980 F.2d at 69. The First Circuit "has construed Fed.R.Civ.P. 56's requirement that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment demonstrate the existence of at least one material factual dispute as mandating that the non-moving party point to evidence which could raise an inference of a discriminatory motive underlying the pretextual explanation." Lawrence, 980 F.2d at 69.
León and Roiz clearly satisfy the first and third prongs of the prima facie case, as both women were over forty and were dismissed by Santander (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). Moreover, the plaintiffs have presented letters suggesting that their work was more than sufficient to meet their employer's expectations (Docket No. 37, Exh. IV-VI); nor does defendant dispute that both León and Roiz performed their work capably. The fourth prong, however, is problematic. Plaintiffs' former coworkers assert that neither León nor Roiz were replaced (Docket No. 25, Exh. III at 20-24, Exh. IV at 16; Docket No. 37, Exh. XIX at 18), and plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence to the contrary (Docket No. 25, Exh. I at 46-47, Exh. II at 28-29). However, the dismissal of Santander's two eldest employees in the Ponce Plaza branch following a lengthy period of tension surrounding a proposed retirement package is arguably sufficient to suggest that Santander failed to treat age neutrally.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs satisfy the prima facie case, Santander has produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the plaintiffs' dismissal, pointing to a corporate reorganization that led to the elimination of one hundred jobs throughout Puerto Rico (Docket No. 25, Exh. V). Thus the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs. They must provide "sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder reasonably to conclude that the reasons proffered for [their] dismissal[s] are pretextual and are intended to disguise an unlawful, age-based animus." Perez Ortiz v. Supermercados Amigo, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 607, 612 (D.P.R. 1997).
Plaintiffs allege — and defendant Santander does not deny — that León and Roiz were the only two workers dismissed from the Ponce Plaza branch during the reorganization and that they were the oldest workers at that branch. However, Ponce Plaza's workforce was composed largely of employees over forty years old. Santander notes that the plaintiffs' coworkers included Minerva Santiago, 66, Elizabeth Morales, 59, and Manuela Arzola, 65. Plaintiffs' witnesses Marciano Rodriguez and Carlos Fombellida were also members of the age group protected under the ADEA (Docket No. 37, Exh. XVII at 3; Docket No. 29 at 5). Thus a reorganization that eliminated workers of plaintiffs' status at the Ponce Plaza branch necessarily affected employees over forty. Nor have plaintiffs provided evidence to suggest that Santander did not in fact undergo reorganization, or that the reorganization was mere pretext for the elimination of defendant's older employees. Courts generally afford corporations broad discretion with respect to their business decisions. Rossy v. Roche Products, 880 F.2d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Our role is not to second-guess the business decisions of an employer, imposing our subjective judgments of which person would best fulfill the responsibilities of a certain job"); Keyes v. Sec'y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988).
The bank tellers, who worked under plaintiff León's supervision before Santander decided that camera supervision was sufficient, are younger. However, as these employees are of a different status than plaintiffs, their retention during the reorganization has no implications for plaintiffs' ADEA claim. As is emphasized in the framework of the prima facie case, the focus in an ADEA analysis is upon younger employees retained in the same position.
León and Roiz point to several other circumstances surrounding their dismissal as establishing age-based animus. Plaintiffs emphasize their requests for an early retirement window, and particularly letters to members of bank management, suggesting that the plaintiffs were strategically eliminated to preclude the need to pay them retirement (Docket No. 32 at 9). However, plaintiffs were among five Ponce Plaza employees over the age of forty who signed those letters, yet none of the other employees were eliminated during reorganization (Docket No. 37 at 14, 21-22). This inconsistency undermines plaintiffs' allegations of retaliatory dismissal.
Plaintiffs also allege that Santander's offer to transfer them to offices near San Juan was calculated to elicit their resignations. In the case of a reorganization, however, Santander has no duty to offer employees transfers in lieu of dismissing them. Soto v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 73 F. Supp.2d 116, (noting that, when employee's position was eliminated and his duties reassigned to another employee, defendant corporation had no duty to transfer or relocate dismissed employee to another position within the organization); Pages-Cague, 82 F.3d at 538, citingRidenour v. Lawson Co., 791 F.2d 52, 57 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Where an employer reduces his workforce for economic reasons, it incurs no duty to transfer an employee to another position within the company"); LeBlanc v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1993); Holt v. Gamwell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986). The intention behind the proffered transfers therefore has no implications for this ADEA claim.
Plaintiffs also complain of ageist jokes made by bank employees and auditors (Docket No. 25, Exh. I at 37-40, 56, Exh. II at 42-44). However, as noted by the defendants, none of these comments were made by decisionmakers. The First Circuit has established that discriminatory comments made by non-decisionmakers do not suffice to demonstrate that a dismissal is motivated by age-based animus. Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Cir. 1996); Perez Ortiz, 964 F. Supp. 607.
Finally, plaintiffs are unable to provide evidence that Santander exercised age-based animus in dismissing them. Although it is surely unfortunate that León and Roiz are unable to reap the benefits of a retirement plan which Santander's elder employees so long anticipated, the defendant's treatment of its employees in this case does not violate the ADEA. As noted by the First Circuit in Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988), the "ADEA does not stop a company from discharging an employee for any reason (fair or unfair) or for no reason, so long as the decision to fire does not stem from the person's age."
C. Dismissal of pendent state law claims.
The Court will therefore dismiss the remaining state claims without prejudice in accordance with federal court discretion regarding the assertion of pendent jurisdiction over state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 25). The pendent state law claims should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.