Rodriguez v. Annucci

7 Citing cases

  1. Gordon v. Morris

    144 A.D.3d 1338 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 7 times

    Initially, it is well settled that an inmate's participation in a family reunion program is a privilege, not a right (see Matter of Scott v. Richey, 141 A.D.3d 1058, 1058, 35 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2016] ; Matter of Mays v. Morris, 133 A.D.3d 1050, 1051, 21 N.Y.S.3d 728 [2015] ). The decision of whether to allow an inmate to participate is “heavily discretionary” and will not be disturbed as long as it has a rational basis (Matter of Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 56, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 518 N.E.2d 536 [1987], cert. denied 488 U.S. 879, 109 S.Ct. 196, 102 L.Ed.2d 166 [1988] ; see Matter of Rodriguez v. Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 12 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2015] ). Notably, “[p]rior participation in the program does not guarantee that a future application will be approved” (Matter of Garcia v. Morris, 140 A.D.3d 1441, 1441, 35 N.Y.S.3d 506 [2016], lv. denied ––– N.Y.3d ––––, 2016 WL 6273223 [Oct. 27, 2016] ).

  2. Bowens v. Fernandez

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 1720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    In view of the foregoing, and in light of the egregious nature of petitioner's crimes, his history of domestic violence and the legitimate safety concerns raised by such history, we find that the denial of petitioner's application had a rational basis (see 7 NYCRR 220.4 [c] [1] [iii], [vii]; Matter of Loucks v Annucci, 175 A.D.3d 775, 776-777 [3d Dept 2019]; Matter of Marshall v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 167 A.D.3d 1115, 1116-1117 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 901 [2019]; Matter of Rodriguez v Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418 [3d Dept 2015]).

  3. Marshall v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

    167 A.D.3d 1115 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 7 times

    In this regard, the record reflects that petitioner has a history of domestic violence and other threatening behaviors, as well as substantial mental health and substance abuse issues. These factors, combined with the undeniably heinous and brutal nature of petitioner's crimes and the perceived security risk that he posed to program participants, provide a rational basis for respondent's denial of petitioner's request to participate in the family reunion program (see e.g. Matter of Rodriguez v. Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 12 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2015] ). Petitioner's remaining arguments, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

  4. Garcia v. Morris

    140 A.D.3d 1441 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 7 times

    am does not guarantee that a future application will be approved and, contrary to petitioner's claim, his application requesting the addition of a new family member over the age of 12 required that his application be subjected to full-cycle review with the final determination made by the Deputy Commissioner of Program Services (or a designee) after reviewing recommendations from facility staff (see 7 NYCRR 220.4, 220.5, 220.6 ; Dept of Corr & Community Supervision Directive No. 4500 § VI[A][4]–[7] ). Here, given petitioner's history of domestic violence, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision properly considered the “entire case record,” including the violent nature of his crimes which [it] found reflects “a lack of regard for human life,” and his prior convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping; also appropriately considered were his appeal statements placing blame on the victim (7 NYCRR 220.2 [c][1]; Matter of Mays v. Morris, 133 A.D.3d at 1051, 21 N.Y.S.3d 728 ; Matter of Rodriguez v. Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 12 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2015] ). We do not agree with petitioner's argument that the full review of his application should have been limited to evaluating the new family member, as this interpretation is not supported by the language of the governing regulations or any other authority.

  5. Garcia v. Morris

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 4767 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    articipation in the program does not guarantee that a future application will be approved and, contrary to petitioner's claim, his application requesting the addition of a new family member over the age of 12 required that his application be subjected to full-cycle review with the final determination made by the Deputy Commissioner of Program Services (or a designee) after reviewing recommendations from facility staff ( see 7 NYCRR 220.4, 220.5, 220.6; Dept of Corr & Community Supervision Directive No. 4500 § VI at 4-7). Here, given petitioner's history of domestic violence, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision properly considered the "entire case record," including the violent nature of his crimes which [it] found reflects "a lack of regard for human life," and his prior convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping; also appropriately considered were his appeal statements placing blame on the victim (7 NYCRR 220.2 [c] [1]; Matter of Mays v Morris, 133 AD3d at 1051; Matter of Rodriguez v Annucci, 129 AD3d 1417, 1418 [2015]). We do not agree with petitioner's argument that the full review of his application should have been limited to evaluating the new family member, as this interpretation is not supported by the language of the governing regulations or any other authority.

  6. Campbell v. Morris

    139 A.D.3d 1278 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 5 times

    Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued. It is well settled that an inmate's participation in the FRP is a privilege and not a right (see Matter of Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 55, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 518 N.E.2d 536 [1987], cert. denied 488 U.S. 879, 109 S.Ct. 196, 102 L.Ed.2d 166 [1988] ; Matter of Rodriguez v. Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 12 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2015] ). The determination of whether an inmate may participate is “heavily discretionary” and will not be disturbed if it has a rational basis (Matter of Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 56, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 518 N.E.2d 536 ; see Matter of Mays v. Morris, 133 A.D.3d 1050, 1051, 21 N.Y.S.3d 728 [2015] ; Matter of Stacione v. Baker, 24 A.D.3d 843, 843, 804 N.Y.S.2d 278 [2005] ). Significantly, the goal of the FRP is “to preserve, enhance and strengthen family ties that have been disrupted as a result of incarceration” (7 NYCRR 220.1 ; see Matter of Williamson v. Nuttall, 35 A.D.3d 926, 927, 825 N.Y.S.2d 802 [2006] ).

  7. Mays v. Morris

    133 A.D.3d 1050 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    Petitioner now appeals. Initially, it is well settled that participation in the FRP is a privilege and not a right (see Matter of Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 55, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 518 N.E.2d 536 [1987], cert. denied 488 U.S. 879, 109 S.Ct. 196, 102 L.Ed.2d 166 [1988] ; Matter of Rodriguez v. Annucci, 129 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 12 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2015] ). The determination of whether an inmate may participate is "heavily discretionary" and will be upheld if it has a rational basis (Matter of Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 56, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 518 N.E.2d 536 ; see Matter of Philips v. Commissioner of Correctional Servs., 65 A.D.3d 1407, 1408, 885 N.Y.S.2d 138 [2009] ).