Opinion
No. HDSP CVH-6523
December 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
This matter was originally filed in the Housing Session of the Superior Court by the plaintiff tenant claiming, among other things that the defendant landlord had illegally entered her apartment, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-16a, which statute sets forth the conditions under which a landlord may enter a tenant's dwelling unit without first obtaining the tenant's permission. Section 47a-18a of the General Statutes provides a remedy for violations of § 47a-16a; "actual damages not less than an amount equal to one month's rent and reasonable attorneys fees."
Plaintiff also claimed that defendant wrongfully failed to return her security deposit.
The case was tried to the court, A. Santos, J., who found for the plaintiff on her claim under § 47a-16a. On a postjudgment motion, the court awarded attorneys fees in the amount of $202.45, stating that this figure constituted 15% of the total amount awarded to the plaintiff as damages. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court on the attorneys fee award and remanded the case "for further proceedings to determine, consistent with this opinion, the reasonable amount of attorneys fees and damages that the plaintiffs may be entitled to." Rodriguez v. Ancona 88 Conn.App. 193, 203-04 (2005)
The issue of damages has not been raised by either party, and is therefore not addressed in this decision.
There are three issues which the court must resolve here: 1.) whether plaintiff should be awarded fees for her appeal; 2.) whether plaintiff is entitled to fees for time her attorneys spent defending the lawsuit defendant filed against her and her lawyer; and 3.) the reasonableness of the fees requested by plaintiff's counsel.
I. Attorneys Fees for the Appeal
The plaintiff is clearly entitled to a reasonable attorneys fee for her appeal to the Appellate Court. The purpose of the right to recover attorneys fees provided in § 47a-18a is to encourage people in the plaintiff's position to seek redress for abusive conduct by their landlords. Because the likelihood of a substantial monetary recovery in such cases is slim, and because many people who want to bring a wrongful entry action are not likely to be able to hire a lawyer, there is a right, under § 47a-18a, to recover attorneys fees. If the right to such fees did not extend to appeals and other, postjudgment proceedings, the purpose of the statute would obviously be thwarted; landlords unhappy with what happened at trial could appeal knowing that their adversaries would be much less likely to have assistance of counsel at the next level. As the Appellate Court observed in this case, albeit in a different context, statutes should not be interpreted so as to reach a result which would conflict with the reasons for their enactment. Rodriguez v. Ancona, supra, 88 Conn.App. 193 at 199.
II. The Ancona v. Rodriguez Lawsuit
Ms. Rodriguez filed suit against Mr. Ancona on or about June 6, 2000, with a return date of July 11, 2000. On August 3, 2000, Mr. Ancona filed a small claims action in the Hartford Housing Session, against Ms. Rodriguez and against Maryellen Griffin, the lawyer who was representing Ms. Rodriguez in the other case. Defendants filed a timely motion to transfer this case to the regular docket, and, after he hired a lawyer, plaintiff filed a substituted complaint dated August 3, 2001. The amended complaint is not a model of clarity; it alleges that defendant Rodriguez "caused the plaintiff" to serve notices to quit, file summary process actions against her and to incur various expenses in the course of litigating claims he brought against her; there is also a claim that Ms. Rodriguez damaged the apartment in question. Attorney Griffin is still listed as a defendant in the case, even though the trial court had already stricken the claims against her twice and specifically ordered Mr. Ancona to stop making further attempts to sue her over the alleged events in question. The two cases were later consolidated for trial and Mr. Ancona did not prevail on any of the claims which he asserted in this action; the trial court stated that "[t]he court finds no merit to the defendant Michael Ancona's claim for damages (CVH-6552)."
No. SCH-16466, Michael Ancona v. Maryellen Griffin et al., Judicial District of Hartford, Housing Session.
"Notice of Judgment or Disposition" in Rodriguez v. Ancona, A. Santos J., February 21, 2003.
There can be no serious doubt as to the reasons why Mr. Ancona sued Ms. Rodriguez and her attorney after the first suit was brought. He filed this suit as part of his overall defense strategy. Whether his specific motive was harassment, intimidation, or simply a decision to take the offensive, the second suit was clearly an integral part of what the plaintiff, Ms. Rodriguez, and her lawyers had to deal with in order to prevail in this case. Her lawyers are entitled to a reasonable fee for defending their client against these allegations.
III. The Attorneys Fees Requested
Defense counsel has not challenged the hourly rates at which counsel seek to be compensated. Defendant has challenged the validity of numerous billing entries, all of which are set forth in Attorney Stevenson's billing records.
There are indeed ten time entries which include absolutely no description of what work was performed. No fee is awarded for these entries, which total 1.1 hours.
Many of the challenged entries relate to the Ancona v. Rodriguez litigation. As stated above, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to a fee award for this work. That includes the entries involving Attorney Hurvitz, who was a co-defense counsel in that case.
Defendant has identified six billing entries which "name certain individuals but do not indicate the work performed by Mr. Stevenson on the case." The last three of these entries are too vague to allow the court to determine what work was done on the case and this 2.7 hours of time is also disallowed.
There is also a list of entries which defendant claims are "undecipherable or [which] appear unrelated to the case in question." The first four of these are related to the Ancona v. Rodriguez litigation and are allowed. The seventh entry is repeated from the previous paragraph of defendant's brief. Items 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 from this paragraph, which total 5.4 hours, are disallowed.
Finally, defendant lists five other objections to Attorney Stevenson's billing entries. The last two of these are addressed above. Attorney Stevenson's affidavit does indeed actually overstate the number of hours billed, but this will need to be recomputed anyway, as a result of this ruling. A lawyer may put time on a file to good use by "organizing it," but not to the extent of $787.50 in a relatively small case. The court will reduce this claimed amount by 50%. There are situations where conversations with court staff are necessary, value-adding events in the life of a case, so the court will allow a fee for these tasks.
The court has reviewed the affidavits submitted by Attorneys Griffin and Pels as well as their time records. Defendant has not specifically challenged them, and the court finds the time records to be in order.
The court has also reviewed the claim for attorneys fees under the "Eight Factor Test" approved by the Appellate Court. The fees, as modified above, are justified in view of the time and labor spent by the attorneys. While the issues involved were not particularly complicated, the case was strenuously defended, including the filing of a counter-suit which this court has found was filed solely for defensive purposes. The prosecution of the appeal also justified substantial additional labor and expense. The lawyers involved on behalf of the plaintiff have obvious, considerable expertise in handling housing matters.
More importantly, a significant fee award in this case would be consistent with the clear legislative mandate that tenants need legal protection from illegal entry of their homes. As the Appellate Court observed,
Our Supreme Court has recognized the disparity of power between landlords and tenants and has acknowledged that subjecting landlords to the payment of punitive damages materially increases the likelihood of deterring landlord abuses of power. The same reasoning is true for the award of reasonable attorneys fees. The award of reasonable attorneys fees may deter violations, encourage tenants to seek relief and ensure competent counsel for tenants who do litigate. [Citation omitted.]
Rodriguez v. Ancona, supra, 88 Conn.App. 193, 203.
The attorneys fees requested by Attorneys Pels ($12,705.00) and Griffin ($1,172.50) are awareded in full. Attorney Stevenson is awarded an attorneys fee of $23,238.25. The total fee awarded is $37,115.75.
This figure was arrived at after reducing the hours claimed for the reasons set forth above, which reduced the total hours to 135.04. The court then multiplied the hours allowed by $175.00 ($23,623.00) and then deducted $393.75 for the 50% reduction in time spent on file organization.
It is so ordered.