Opinion
2014-00954, Index No. 27134/10.
04-01-2015
Frankie RODRIGUEZ, appellant, v. 173–12 OPERATING CO., INC., et al., respondents.
Ferro, Kuba, Mangano, Skylar, P.C., Hauppauge, N.Y. (Rebecca J. Fortney of counsel), for appellant. Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey, Pender & Koehler, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Anton Piotroski of counsel), for respondents.
Ferro, Kuba, Mangano, Skylar, P.C., Hauppauge, N.Y. (Rebecca J. Fortney of counsel), for appellant.
Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey, Pender & Koehler, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Anton Piotroski of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JEFFREY A. COHEN and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Opinion In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siegal, J.), entered September 3, 2013, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell due to the negligence of the defendants' employees in applying “Armor All,” or a similar glaze-type substance, to the running boards of his vehicle in the course of “VIP” carwash. The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Armor All or a similar substance was not applied to the running boards of the plaintiff's vehicle. In this respect, the defendants submitted a transcript of the deposition testimony of their representative, who stated that, absent a specific request, Armor All, or any similar substance, was not applied to the running boards of any vehicle in the course of a VIP carwash (cf. Halloran v. Virginia Chems., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 391, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 361 N.E.2d 991 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. He merely asserted that the running board upon which he slipped was shiny and slippery, and speculated that such condition was caused by the defendants' improper application of Armor All or a similar substance (see Khaimova v. Osnat Corp., 21 A.D.3d 401, 799 N.Y.S.2d 779 ; Ventriglio v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 6 A.D.3d 525, 774 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; Tomol v. Sbarro, Inc., 306 A.D.2d 461, 761 N.Y.S.2d 845 ; Lee v. Rite Aid of N.Y., 261 A.D.2d 368, 689 N.Y.S.2d 199 ). Moreover, the opinion of the plaintiff's proposed expert was based on the assumption that Armor All, or a similar substance, was indeed applied to the running boards of the plaintiff's vehicle.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.