Plaintiff's allegations of defamation were vague and conclusional. The nature and factual context of the accusations of bribery are nowhere in the complaint, preventing the circuit court and this court from being able to determine whether the purported statement was "so obviously and inevitably hurtful that damage is presumed" (Rodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 190 Ill.App.3d 24, 30, 137 Ill.Dec. 218, 545 N.E.2d 979 (1989) (Rodriguez-Erdmann)). In addition, it cannot be determined from the face of the complaint whether the statement which allegedly injured plaintiff was true, whether a privilege might apply to its application, or whether the innocent construction rule has any application in light of the actual words and surrounding circumstances.
Generally, when a physician communicates facts to an insurance carrier regarding the advisability of coverage, such a statement is protected by a qualified privilege. SeeRodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 190 III. App.3d 24, 32, 545 N.E.2d 979, 984 (1st Dist. 1989). Such a privilege can be overcome by a showing that the defendant acted with an intent to harm the plaintiffs, as plaintiffs clearly allege here.
¶ 34 As support for its contention that the Act creates immunity from civil suits, MCDS cites Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 279 Ill.App.3d 108, 215 Ill.Dec. 870, 664 N.E.2d 267 (1996). (The defendants also cite two other cases for this proposition, Carson v. Northwest Community Hospital, 192 Ill.App.3d 118, 139 Ill.Dec. 194, 548 N.E.2d 579 (1989), and Rodriguez–Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 190 Ill.App.3d 24, 137 Ill.Dec. 218, 545 N.E.2d 979 (1989), but as those cases predate both Tabora and the supreme court's decision in Roach, we find them unpersuasive.) In Tabora, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff doctor's defamation claim on the ground that the statements made by the defendant physician about the plaintiff were privileged under the Act because they were made during the peer-review process, and therefore the statements could not serve as the basis for a claim for civil damages.
¶ 34 As support for its contention that the Act creates immunity from civil suits, MCDS cites Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 279 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996). (The defendants also cite two other cases for this proposition, Carson v. Northwest Community Hospital, 192 Ill. App. 3d 118 (1989), and Rodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 190 Ill. App. 3d 24 (1989), but as those cases predate both Tabora and the supreme court's decision in Roach, we find them unpersuasive.) In Tabora, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff doctor's defamation claim on the ground that the statements made by the defendant physician about the plaintiff were privileged under the Act because they were made during the peer-review process, and therefore the statements could not serve as the basis for a claim for civil damages.