Opinion
No. SC11–1401.
2012-10-17
Robert August Harper, Jr., discharged counsel for Jeremiah M. Rodgers, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court's order finding Rodgers competent to discharge his postconviction counsel and waive postconviction proceedings filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
After this Court affirmed Rodgers's death sentence on direct appeal, see Rodgers v. State, 3 So.3d 1127, 1135 (Fla.2009), Robert August Harper, Jr., was appointed as counsel for Rodgers. Rodgers refused to meet with counsel, and shortly thereafter, Rodgers filed a pro se letter with the circuit court seeking to discharge Harper as postconviction counsel and waive postconviction proceedings. After a Durocher hearing, the circuit court found Rodgers competent and issued an order discharging counsel and dismissing the proceedings. See Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1993) (requiring trial courts to evaluate defendants to determine if they understand the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (requiring a hearing to determine if an accused's unequivocal request for self-representation should be granted).
Regarding discharged counsel's request for this Court to recede from its cases holding that a trial court's decision regarding a defendant's competency and waiver of postconviction proceedings is reviewed for abuse of discretion, we decline to do so. See Trease v. State, 41 So.3d 119, 124 (Fla.2010); Alston v. State, 894 So.2d 46, 54, 57 (Fla.2004); Slawson v. State, 796 so.2d 491, 502 (Fla.2001); Castro v. State, 744 So.2d 986, 989 (Fla.1999).
As to discharged counsel's second claim that Rodgers is not competent, this claim is without merit. “Once a defendant has been deemed competent, the presumption of competence continues throughout all subsequent proceedings.” Dessaure v. State, 55 So.3d 478, 482–83 (Fla.2010). Rodgers was found competent to (1) plead guilty to the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death, and (2) waive his right to a penalty phase jury during his second penalty phase, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal. Rodgers v. State, 934 So.2d 1207, 1210 (Fla.2006); Rodgers v. State, 3 So.3d 1127, 1132–33 (Fla.2009). Furthermore, two mental health experts examined Rodgers in preparation for the Durocher hearing, and both determined that Rodgers was competent. Discharged counsel did not proffer expert testimony to combat the mental health experts' findings, but rather stipulated to the mental experts' reports. See Trease, 41 So.3d at 125 (“[T]he party challenging the defendant's waiver request bears the burden of proving that the defendant is incompetent.”).
As to discharged counsel's final claim that the colloquy conducted during the Durocher hearing was cursory and therefore Rodgers's waiver was not knowing and intelligent, this claim is without merit. The colloquy conducted during Rodgers's Durocher hearing follows the procedure outlined in this Court's decisions in Durocher and Trease. See Durocher, 623 So.2d at 485;Trease, 41 So.3d at 123–24. Rodgers was fully aware of and understood the consequences of waiving postconviction counsel and proceedings.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order finding Rodgers competent to discharge postconviction counsel and waive postconviction proceedings.
It is so ordered.