Summary
In Rodgers, pro se plaintiffs sued a local public housing agency for "tort and due process injuries" but cited "no particular statutory or constitutional provisions."
Summary of this case from Brown v. Harris Cnty. Hous. Auth.Opinion
Civil No. 3:01-CV-0477-H.
August 21, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss on behalf of Defendants Garland Housing Agency, Roma Lewis, Barbara Johnson, and Bridget Borens ("the Garland Defendants"), filed April 16, 2001; Plaintiffs' Response thereto, filed June 1, 2001; the Motion to Dismiss on behalf of Defendants TABAC Associates, Elizabeth O'Brien, and Connie Castelon ("the TABAC Defendants"), filed April 16, 2001; and Plaintiffs' Response thereto, filed June 1, 2001. Both groups of Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims against them, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 8(a). Upon consideration of the pleadings, the briefs of each group of Defendants, and the relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion that both Motions should be GRANTED, as set forth below.
Because of the interlocking nature of the claims and the motion pleadings in this case, the Court's analysis is organized around the various grounds for dismissal of Plaintiffs' cause of action. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). Considering the record as a whole, the Court applies the relevant Rule 12(b) principles to Plaintiffs' claims against all Defendants in this case, and herein rules together on both Motions to Dismiss.
I. Background
This case arises from a series of events culminating in the eviction of Plaintiffs from their apartment. In 1999, Mrs. Rodgers had applied for and received Section 8 housing assistance through the Garland Housing Agency ("GHA"), a department of the City of Garland. In May, 2000, Mrs. Rodgers sought to add her husband, from whom she had previously been separated, to her lease. GHA informed Mrs. Rodgers that Mr. Rodgers was not eligible to participate in the Section 8 program, based on information they had obtained during a routine criminal background check. The Rodgers's, through various letters and phone calls, expressed their desire to appeal this determination ( See Compl. Exs. F, J); after being rescheduled several times, the hearing available to them ultimately never took place. Plaintiffs maintain that they did not receive some of the correspondence sent to them by GHA, in which the agency informed them of their appeal rights, (re)scheduled hearings, gave them response deadlines, and eventually informed them of the termination of their Section 8 rent subsidy. ( See Compl. Ex. O). The Garland Defendants' position, as reflected in copies of correspondence attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint, is that Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to appear or respond and that, during one office visit with Plaintiffs, GHA contacted the local police due to Mr. Rodgers' allegedly threatening conduct. ( See Compl. Exs. E, K, P).
More specifically, Mrs. Rodgers received tenant-based assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, one of the Section 8 subprograms under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.
Based on that incident, combined with Plaintiffs' alleged failure to respond to GHA notices and Mr. Rodgers' alleged ineligibility for Section 8 participation, GHA ceased providing the Section 8 rent subsidy to Mrs. Rodgers as of November 1, 2000. Plaintiffs' landlord, the TABAC Defendants named in this case, successfully sued to evict them, in late December, 2000, for failure to pay rent. During the same timeframe that Plaintiffs were attempting to resolve their Section 8 eligibility with the Garland Defendants, Plaintiffs also apparently contacted local officials of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") on several occasions. Mr. Rodgers filed a housing discrimination complaint with HUD in October, 2000, in which he alleged that GHA discriminated against him on the basis of race, sex, and physical and mental handicap. (Compl. Ex. M). There is no record nor any allegation in Plaintiffs' Complaint regarding the resolution of any proceedings with HUD.
While Plaintiffs invoke no particular statutory or constitutional provisions underlying their various claims, they plead generally that Defendants: 1) failed to inform them of the termination of their lease and thereby caused their eviction; 2) denied Plaintiffs the opportunity for a hearing; 3) discriminated against Mr. Rodgers on the basis of his disabilities; 4) caused Plaintiffs undue mental anguish, pain, suffering and stress; 5) filed false police reports; 6) slandered Mr. Rodgers' character; and 7) [Defendant O'Brien] committed perjury during the eviction hearing. Plaintiffs seek a judgment for damages in the amount of $10 million. (Compl. p. 2).
II. Analysis
A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1)
Where a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should rule first on whether it has subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the sufficiency of the pleadings. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs in this case bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction. Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995). A district court properly grants a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs plead federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Compl. § II.), and it is apparent from the pleadings that diversity jurisdiction does not apply in this case. From the Complaint and from Plaintiffs' one-page Responses to each of the instant motions, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' allegations based on Defendants' administration of the Section 8 program and allegations of due process violations arguably involve questions of federal law, and proceeds to consider Defendants' Rule 12(b) grounds for dismissal.
Plaintiffs do not substantively respond to the various Rule 12(b) and Rule (8) dismissal grounds raised by the Garland Defendants and the TABAC Defendants. Rather, they simply state that "[w]e know that our constitutional and civil rights have been violated . . .," and cite several statutory provisions governing federal jurisdiction over civil rights actions.
The question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs' pleadings state a cause of action upon which any relief may be granted. "Dismissal [for want of subject matter jurisdiction] is proper only when it appears certain that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief." Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Saraw Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 1995)). In determining whether such jurisdiction exists, the Court may look to (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 904.
In this case, the Court has before it the factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, which it must take as true. Saraw Partnership, 67 F.3d at 569. The Court has also reviewed the various exhibits attached to the Complaint, which consist principally of the correspondence exchanged between Plaintiffs and the Garland Defendants. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and are apparently untrained as legal practitioners. They have therefore been afforded some latitude in pursuing their case, including extensions totaling an additional four weeks within which to respond to the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See Orders filed April 30, 2001 and May 21, 2001.
Based on the pleadings, it appears that Plaintiffs' factual allegations and legal claims are primarily directed at the Garland Defendants in this case. Moreover, Plaintiffs' interaction with these Defendants, and the events and actions of which Plaintiffs complain, wholly arise from the Garland Defendants' various determinations regarding the Rodgers's continued eligibility for a rent subsidy under Section 8. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; 24 C.F.R. Part 982. The Court, therefore, must first consider whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action against GHA, the local public housing agency that administers the Section 8 voucher program for HUD, and its employees. Plaintiffs have cited no authority, and this Court's own research has unearthed none, in support of the proposition that a Section 8 tenant may sue a public housing agency in federal court, much less seek compensatory damages, for the types of tort and due process injuries alleged in this case. The reported cases reflect that the private right of action analysis may turn on the particular housing program and/or type of violation at issue; however, numerous decisions support the conclusion that the United States Housing Act of 1937 does not permit an implied private right of action under Section 8 programs. See, e.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hill v. Group Three Housing Dev. Corp., 799 F.2d 385, 394 (8th Cir. 1986); Perry v. Housing Authority of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir. 1981); Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 119 F. Supp.2d 636, 638 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
The Court's analysis is further guided by the relevant provisions of the federal regulations implementing the Section 8 program in which Mrs. Rodgers participated. It is clear that Section 8 tenants are not considered third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce any provision of the housing assistance payment contract between GHA and TABAC, Plaintiffs' landlord. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.456 (2000). Moreover, from the Court's review of Subpart L, which governs the termination of assistance by the public housing authority, it does not appear that Plaintiffs were entitled to any judicial review beyond the administrative process set forth therein. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552, 982.555 (2000). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs' claims are directed at the Garland Defendants on the basis of their administration of the Section 8 program under the United States Housing Act of 1937 and its implementing regulations, they must be DISMISSED.
The Court does not reach the question of whether Plaintiffs' apparent claim of housing discrimination by GHA should be dismissed on Rule 12(b) or Rule 8(a) grounds. As stated above, it appears that Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to this claim. Thus, even if Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded discrimination in their Complaint, such a claim is not properly before the Court at this time.
The same authorities similarly compel the conclusion that Plaintiffs have established no private right of action against the TABAC Defendants based on GHA's administration and termination of Plaintiffs' Section 8 eligibility. Plaintiffs' only relationship with the TABAC Defendants is that of landlord and tenant, and Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would support a cause of action under federal law against the TABAC Defendants. Considering the entirety of the Complaint, moreover, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any justiciable case or controversy against the TABAC Defendants. The only alleged action or injury which could be attributed to TABAC Associates or its two employees is Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant O'Brien perjured herself during the judicial proceeding which resulted in their eviction. The Court concludes, however, that any such claim (and all other matters related to TABAC's eviction of the Rodgers family) has been finally adjudicated by the County Court at Law of Dallas County, Texas. (TABAC Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1). For the reasons stated, all of Plaintiffs' claims, to the extent they are directed at the TABAC Defendants, are DISMISSED.
B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
The Court next considers whether Plaintiffs have adequately shown any other type of claim against the Garland Defendants. In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true the non-movant's well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff "must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will not accept as true any conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact. The complaint must contain either direct allegations or allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn, on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on the claim. Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). While pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a plaintiff must nonetheless satisfy the basic pleading principles stated above. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 8(e)(1).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is not favored by the law. Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff's complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). However, "there are times when a court should exercise its power to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Mahone, 836 F.2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
The only constitutional violation even arguably pleaded by Plaintiffs in this case is a procedural due process claim, namely Plaintiffs' reference to having been denied an opportunity for a hearing on their continued Section 8 eligibility. Upon careful review of the Complaint, and without attempting to interpret the capacity(s) in which the various Defendants are sued, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs have utterly failed to demonstrate any Fourteenth Amendment violation against the Garland Defendants. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Plaintiffs have also failed to show any deprivation of a federal statutory right actionable under § 1983. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987). Therefore, Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' claims against the Garland Defendants are DISMISSED.
The Court does not reach whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded state law causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, or any other tort. Lacking original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such state law claims, which are therefore DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have no private right of action against any of the Defendants under the United States Housing Act of 1937 and the relevant implementing regulations, and that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any other cause of action legally cognizable under federal law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' cause is DISMISSED in its entirety. All costs are taxed to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants' respective requests for attorney's fees are DENIED. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
The Clerk is directed to immediately fax this Order to counsel and to immediately mail the same to the pro se Plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.