Roden Son v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Bredeson v. Croft

    295 Ala. 246 (Ala. 1976)   Cited 5 times

    However, a criminal proceeding is never res judicata upon a civil action nor vice-versa, because the parties are different, the point being decided is different, the burden of proof is different and so are the rules of evidence. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Murphy (1936), 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604; Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Gunn (1932), 224 Ala. 444, 140 So. 410; Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Gunn (1933), 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491; Jay v. State (1916), 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137; Roden Son v. State (1941), 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Mobile Light R. Company v. Burch (1915), 12 Ala. App. 421, 68 So. 509; Austin v. Clark (1946), 247 Ala. 560, 25 So.2d 415. Cases from other jurisdictions and Courts hold that even though one was acquitted of criminal charges arising from the death of the insured, he still may not be able to recover the insurance proceeds for which he was the principal beneficiary. United States v. Burns (1952, D.C.Md.), 103 F. Supp. 690, aff'd, (C.A.4) 200 F.2d 106; Prather v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company (1878 Ind.), Fed.Cas. No. 11,368.

  2. In re Blankenship

    408 B.R. 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Declining to abstain from hearing dischargeability issue because "[t]here are no parties other than the plaintiff and the defendant therefore . . . no considerations respecting possible prejudice to non-debtor parties or involuntarily removed parties."

    dsden v. Head, 429 So.2d 1005, 1007 (Ala.1983); Bredeson v. Croft, 295 Ala. 246, 326 So.2d 735, 736-737 (1976); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dowdle, 287 Ala. 201, 250 So.2d 579, 588 (1971); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 258 Ala. 141, 61 So.2d 19, 32 (1952); Balls v. Crump, 256 Ala. 512, 56 So.2d 108, 110 (1952); Austin v. Clark, 247 Ala. 560, 25 So.2d 415, 416 (1946); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604, 608 (1936); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491, 493 (1933); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387, 392-393 (1933); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Gunn, 224 Ala. 444, 140 So. 410, 413-414 (1932); Sellers v. Sellers, 212 Ala. 290, 102 So. 442, 444 (1924); M.L.E. v. K.B. ex rel. A.B., 794 So.2d 1143, 1147 (Ala.Civ. App.2000); Crummie v. Tuscaloosa County Civil Service Bd., 630 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala.Civ. App.1992); United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 40 Ala.App. 542, 115 So.2d 911, 916 (1959); Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala.App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421 (1941); Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Burch, 12 Ala.App. 421, 68 So. 509, 512 (1915). The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) requires bankruptcy courts, in dischargeability proceedings, to utilize a state's principles of collateral estoppel to determine the issue of preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a court of that state.

  3. McKinney v. State

    292 Ala. 484 (Ala. 1974)   Cited 5 times

    Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. "In Roden and Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: 'A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required.'

  4. Morrison v. State

    267 Ala. 1 (Ala. 1957)   Cited 16 times

    "However it is clearly settled by the doctrines of our cases that a judgment gained in a civil suit is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal prosecution growing out of the same transaction. Britton v. State, 77 Ala. 202. Conversely, verdicts in criminal cases are not admissible in civil cases arising out of the same transactions. Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. "In Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: 'A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required.' "In 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 50, the general rule, amply supported by authority, is stated as follows: '* * * it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution involving the same matter.'

  5. Snow v. State

    259 Ala. 579 (Ala. 1953)   Cited 5 times
    Considering a prior version of § 40-25-2 and concluding that, "when that statute imposes a license or privilege tax on a person who ‘sells or stores or receives for the purpose of distribution,’ it means as to the storage as well as to the receipt of the cigarettes, that it must be for distribution, such as a sale"

    Section 732, Code clearly provides for the assessment of a civil penalty by the State Department of revenue in this cause. State Tax Comm. v. Stanley, 234 Ala. 66, 173 So. 609; State v. Pollock, 251 Ala. 603, 38 So.2d 870, 7 A.L.R.2d 757; Ex parte State, 252 Ala. 149, 39 So.2d 669; Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Southern Car Foundry Co. v. Calhoun County, 141 Ala. 250, 37 So. 425; Curtis Companies v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 214 Wis. 85, 251 N.W. 497, 92 A.L.R. 1065; Campbell v. State, 242 Ala. 215, 5 So.2d 466, 471; Howell Graves v. Curry, 242 Ala. 122, 5 So.2d 105; Lone Star Cement Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 465, 175 So. 399. PER CURIAM.

  6. Greggo v. Greggo

    194 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 1963)   Cited 2 times

    It has been held in many cases that a judgment in a civil action is not res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917; Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Watke v. State, 166 Wis. 41, 163 N.W. 258; State v. Wohlfort, 123 Kan. 62, 254 P. 317. While the cited and other like cases deal principally with the doctrine of res judicata, the principles applicable to that doctrine and to the election of remedies are of similar nature. Each, in some degree, is an application of the law of estoppel, and both are based on the maxim that a party shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 100, 67 L.Ed. 261.

  7. Helms v. State

    45 So. 2d 170 (Ala. Crim. App. 1950)   Cited 12 times

    However it is clearly settled by the doctrines of our cases that a judgment gained in a civil suit is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal prosecution growing out of the same transaction. Britton v. State, 77 Ala. 202. Conversely, verdicts in criminal cases are not admissible in civil cases arising out of the same transactions. Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. In Roden and Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: "A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required." In 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 50, the general rule, amply supported by authority, is stated as follows: "* * * it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution involving the same matter."