However, a criminal proceeding is never res judicata upon a civil action nor vice-versa, because the parties are different, the point being decided is different, the burden of proof is different and so are the rules of evidence. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Murphy (1936), 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604; Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Gunn (1932), 224 Ala. 444, 140 So. 410; Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Gunn (1933), 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491; Jay v. State (1916), 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137; Roden Son v. State (1941), 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Mobile Light R. Company v. Burch (1915), 12 Ala. App. 421, 68 So. 509; Austin v. Clark (1946), 247 Ala. 560, 25 So.2d 415. Cases from other jurisdictions and Courts hold that even though one was acquitted of criminal charges arising from the death of the insured, he still may not be able to recover the insurance proceeds for which he was the principal beneficiary. United States v. Burns (1952, D.C.Md.), 103 F. Supp. 690, aff'd, (C.A.4) 200 F.2d 106; Prather v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company (1878 Ind.), Fed.Cas. No. 11,368.
dsden v. Head, 429 So.2d 1005, 1007 (Ala.1983); Bredeson v. Croft, 295 Ala. 246, 326 So.2d 735, 736-737 (1976); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dowdle, 287 Ala. 201, 250 So.2d 579, 588 (1971); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 258 Ala. 141, 61 So.2d 19, 32 (1952); Balls v. Crump, 256 Ala. 512, 56 So.2d 108, 110 (1952); Austin v. Clark, 247 Ala. 560, 25 So.2d 415, 416 (1946); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604, 608 (1936); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491, 493 (1933); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387, 392-393 (1933); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Gunn, 224 Ala. 444, 140 So. 410, 413-414 (1932); Sellers v. Sellers, 212 Ala. 290, 102 So. 442, 444 (1924); M.L.E. v. K.B. ex rel. A.B., 794 So.2d 1143, 1147 (Ala.Civ. App.2000); Crummie v. Tuscaloosa County Civil Service Bd., 630 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala.Civ. App.1992); United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 40 Ala.App. 542, 115 So.2d 911, 916 (1959); Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala.App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421 (1941); Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Burch, 12 Ala.App. 421, 68 So. 509, 512 (1915). The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) requires bankruptcy courts, in dischargeability proceedings, to utilize a state's principles of collateral estoppel to determine the issue of preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a court of that state.
Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. "In Roden and Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: 'A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required.'
"However it is clearly settled by the doctrines of our cases that a judgment gained in a civil suit is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal prosecution growing out of the same transaction. Britton v. State, 77 Ala. 202. Conversely, verdicts in criminal cases are not admissible in civil cases arising out of the same transactions. Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. "In Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: 'A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required.' "In 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 50, the general rule, amply supported by authority, is stated as follows: '* * * it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution involving the same matter.'
Section 732, Code clearly provides for the assessment of a civil penalty by the State Department of revenue in this cause. State Tax Comm. v. Stanley, 234 Ala. 66, 173 So. 609; State v. Pollock, 251 Ala. 603, 38 So.2d 870, 7 A.L.R.2d 757; Ex parte State, 252 Ala. 149, 39 So.2d 669; Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Southern Car Foundry Co. v. Calhoun County, 141 Ala. 250, 37 So. 425; Curtis Companies v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 214 Wis. 85, 251 N.W. 497, 92 A.L.R. 1065; Campbell v. State, 242 Ala. 215, 5 So.2d 466, 471; Howell Graves v. Curry, 242 Ala. 122, 5 So.2d 105; Lone Star Cement Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 465, 175 So. 399. PER CURIAM.
It has been held in many cases that a judgment in a civil action is not res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917; Roden Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420; Watke v. State, 166 Wis. 41, 163 N.W. 258; State v. Wohlfort, 123 Kan. 62, 254 P. 317. While the cited and other like cases deal principally with the doctrine of res judicata, the principles applicable to that doctrine and to the election of remedies are of similar nature. Each, in some degree, is an application of the law of estoppel, and both are based on the maxim that a party shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 100, 67 L.Ed. 261.
However it is clearly settled by the doctrines of our cases that a judgment gained in a civil suit is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal prosecution growing out of the same transaction. Britton v. State, 77 Ala. 202. Conversely, verdicts in criminal cases are not admissible in civil cases arising out of the same transactions. Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L.R.A. 617. In Roden and Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So.2d 420, 421, Justice Simpson stated that: "A judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required." In 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 50, the general rule, amply supported by authority, is stated as follows: "* * * it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution involving the same matter."