Specific examples of cases where plaintiffs were held entitled to have the benefit of jury verdicts notwithstanding their own unfavorable testimony are, Connelly v. Conn. Co., 1928, 107 Conn. 236, 140 A. 121; and Kanopka v. Kanopka, 1931, 113 Conn. 30, 154 A. 144, 80 A.L.R. 619. The case of Kanopka v. Kanopka is especially similar on its facts to the case at bar; and, probably, if plaintiff in the instant case were suing in the State of Connecticut, she would be entitled to retain the benefit of the jury verdict returned in her favor. The annotation in 169 A.L.R. 798 cites the Tennessee case of Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 1937, 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513, which case is also cited in the brief of counsel for defendant Gwen Niven. It will be more fully discussed hereinafter. The principal Tennessee decision relied on by plaintiffs is Buice v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 37 Tenn. App. 556, 267 S.W.2d 119.
It is evident that the jury in reaching their verdict rejected the testimony of Ayers and accepted the evidence of the physical facts. See Roddy Manufacturing Co. v. Dixon, 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513. The petitioner relies on McCollum v. Guest, 207 Tenn. 651, 343 S.W.2d 359, but we are of opinion that this case does not control the case at bar.
Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn.App. at 725, 319 S.W.2d at 243. Claimant relies on Roddy Manufacturing Co. v. Dixon, 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513 (1936), to support her position. That case involved the loss of services of a 19 year old son impaired by tort injury and thus limited in his ability to perform farm labor on his father's farm. The son was 19 years of age at the time when the law provided that emancipation by attainment of majority did not occur until age 21. Chapter 162 of the Public Acts of 1971, codified in part in section 1-3-113(a) of the Tennessee Code, reduced the age at which one reached majority from age 21 to age 18.
So far as plaintiff's witnesses other than himself are concerned, their testimony to facts different from those alleged in plaintiff's declaration should certainly affect their credibility; and, so far as plaintiff, himself, is concerned, he should have been considered judicially estopped to testify contrary to the allegations of his declaration. Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 560, 97 S.W. 812; Johnston v. Cincinnati N.O. T.P.R. Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429; Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513; Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 37 Tenn. App. 556, 582, 267 S.W.2d 119. See also Annotations in 50 A.L.R. 980, 80 A.L.R. 619, and 169 A.L.R. 798.
In our opinion, these assignments of error must be overruled, both because the judge's charge, as given, was sufficient to cover the matters contained in the special requests refused, and also because of the rule that a trial judge cannot be put in error for refusing a special request not covered by the general charge, unless it is completely and technically accurate. See Atlantic Ice Coal Co. v. Cameron, 19 Tenn. App. 675, 94 S.W.2d 72; Llewellyn v. City of Knoxville, 33 Tenn. App. 632, 232 S.W. (2) 568; Richards v. Parks, 19 Tenn. App. 615, 93 S.W.2d 639; and Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513. In any event, we think the situation would be covered by the harmless error statute, Section 27-117, T.C.A.
tten by Judge DeWitt, it was said: "Issues as to contributory negligence of guests who gave no warning or remonstrance were held to be for the jury and verdicts excusing such guests for such failures were sustained where the emergencies came suddenly and the view was obstructed [Stem v. Nashville Interurban Ry., 142 Tenn. 494, 221 S.W. 192; Johnson, Adm'r Faucette v. Maury County Trust Co., 15 Tenn. App. 326; Tenn. Central Ry. Co. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S.W. 225; Knoxville Railway Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S.W. 1117, L.R.A. 1916A, 1111; Nashville, C. St. L. Railway v. White, 158 Tenn. 407, 15 S.W.2d 1; Louisville N.R. Co. v. Tracey, 12 Tenn. App. 167]; where there was a sudden collision not immediately to be anticipated [Claxton v. Claxton, 16 Tenn. App. 399, 64 S.W.2d 854; Woodfin v. Insel, 13 Tenn. App. 493] . . ." Subsequent cases include Gulf, M. O.R. Co. v. Underwood, 182 Tenn. 467, 187 S.W.2d 777; Edenton v. McKelvey, 186 Tenn. 655, 212 S.W.2d 616; Roddy Mfg. Co. et al. v. Dixon et al., 21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513; Chickasaw Wood Products Co. v. Lane, 22 Tenn. App. 596, 125 S.W.2d 164; Shook v. Simmons, 23 Tenn. App. 685, 137 S.W.2d 332. Gulf, M. O.R. Co. v. Underwood involved analogous circumstances.
These assignments of error are made but not discussed and not seriously insisted upon. The action of the trial judge in approving the verdicts, after being reduced by the respective remittiturs, is entitled to a great weight by this Court in considering the question as to whether the verdict is excessive. Brown Transfer Co. v. Gibson, 154 Tenn. 260, 290 S.W. 33; City of Nashville v. Brown, 25 Tenn. App. 340, 157 S.W.2d 612; East Tennessee Light Power Co. v. Gose, 23 Tenn. App. 280, 130 S.W.2d 984; Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 22 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513. These assignments of error are overruled. It results that all the assignments of error filed by the defendant Griffin are overruled, and judgments will be entered for the respective plaintiffs below, with accrued interest and Court costs.