Rockmiss v. N.J. Mfrs., c., Co.

24 Citing cases

  1. Maryland Casualty Company v. Emery

    163 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1958)   Cited 1 times

    We are of the opinion that the stipulated facts will not support a determination that the insured failed to comply with this condition of the policy. Rockmiss v. New Jersey Manufacturers' Ass'n Fire Ins. Co., 112 N.J.L. 136, 169 A. 663. Any failure of cooperation ascribable to the false statements was cured when the correct information was given the plaintiff at the time it was called upon to defend the damage suits. Ibid.

  2. West v. Farm Bureau Ins Co.

    402 Mich. 67 (Mich. 1977)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that "where an insurance policy provides that an insured's concealment, misrepresentation fraud or false swearing voids the policy, the insured must have actually intended to defraud the insurer."

    The summary judgment precluded recovery for a $27,000 loss because of the alleged misrepresentation regarding the $1,200 elevator. The Court quoted Rockmiss v New Jersey M'f'rs Ass'n Fire Ins Co, 112 N.J.L. 136, 139-140; 169 A 663 (1934): "`It is a firmly established rule of construction that policies of insurance will be liberally construed to uphold the contract, and conditions contained in them which create forfeitures will be construed most strongly against the insurer and will never be extended beyond the strict words of the policy.

  3. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Luquire Funeral Homes Ins. Co.

    194 So. 818 (Ala. 1940)   Cited 5 times

    They did not constitute a failure of cooperation. Rockmiss v. New Jersey Mfrs. Asso. Fire Ins. Co., 112 N.J.L. 136, 169 A. 663. FOSTER, Justice.

  4. State Farm Mut. c Ins. Co. v. Wendler

    154 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 9 times

    It alleged neither. While I agree with the majority that the case of National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Carmical, 99 Ga. App. 98 ( 107 S.E.2d 700) is different factually from the case before us, it is my opinion that some of the rulings therein contained, in discussing the law applicable to co-operation clauses generally, are appropriate, applicable, and controlling here. I quote from that case as follows, in discussing and quoting from the case of Rockmiss v. N. J. Mfrs. Ass'n. F. Ins. Co., 112 N. J. L. 136, 140 ( 169 A 663): "It was held that the fact that the insured gave conflicting statements to the insurer, the first of which exculpated the insured from blame, and the second tended to place liability upon him, was not a `failure to co-operate.' `The insured is not accused of collusion with respondent in an effort to impose a fraudulent claim upon the insurer. It is not claimed that his second statement is tainted with falsity.

  5. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Carmical

    99 Ga. App. 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 12 times

    "Even where the misstatement is persisted in until shortly before the trial of the action against the insured, no breach has been found, where the insurer failed to show that the delay in telling the truth had prejudiced it. United States. — For federal cases applying state law, see state headings infra. Illinois. — Norwich Union Indem. Co. v. Haas (1950, CA7th Ill) 179 F.2d 827; Michigan. — Bernadich v. Bernadich (1938) 287 Mich. 137, 283 NW 5; Missouri. — Cowell v. Employers' Indem. Corp. (1930) 326 Mo 1103, 34 S.W.2d 705; New Jersey. — Rockmiss v. New Jersey Mfrs. Asso. Fire Ins. Co. (1934) 112 NJL 136, 169 A 663; Rhode Island. — Marley v. Bankers' Indem. Ins. Co. (1933) 53 R.I. 289, 166 A. 350."

  6. Pearl Assur. Co., Ltd. v. Watts

    58 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1959)   Cited 12 times

    Hence, a deliberate falsehood to the insurance company by the insured, on a subject material to the assured's liability to a claimant as to the company's defense of such a claim, would constitute a breach of the cooperation clause. Despite early New Jersey authority to the contrary, see Rockmiss v. New Jersey Mfrs.' Ass'n Fire Ins. Co., 112 N.J.L. 136 ( E. A. 1934) and Petersen v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 114 N.J.L. 180 ( E. A. 1935), the present state of the law is to the effect that a breach of a cooperation clause relieves the insurer from policy liability regardless of whether actual prejudice to the insurer has ensued therefrom. Kindervater v. Motorists Casualty Ins. Co., supra; Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576 ( E. A. 1943); Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. A.E.A. Co., 32 N.J. Super. 471 ( App. Div. 1954); 8 Appleman, op. cit., § 4773, p. 158.

  7. State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York

    104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939)   Cited 57 times
    In State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730, at page 733, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit lays down the following rule: "It is well settled that, to relieve the insurer of liability on the ground of lack of cooperation, discrepancies in statements by the insured must be made in bad faith and must be material in nature and prejudicial in effect."

    The discrepancy in the statements made by insured himself was clearly not sufficient to establish lack of cooperation so conclusively as to justify direction of verdict for the company. Rockmiss v. New Jersey Mf'rs Fire Ins. Co., 112 N.J.L. 136, 169, A. 663; Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140 A. 905. It is well settled that, to relieve the insurer of liability on the ground of lack of cooperation, discrepancies in statements by the insured must be made in bad faith and must be material in nature and prejudicial in effect.

  8. Fid. Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy

    228 Md. 1 (Md. 1962)   Cited 36 times
    In Fid. Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, supra, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117, the issue was whether the insurer could disclaim for non-cooperation based on the insured's having given false information — that there were two eyewitnesses who would testify that the insured was driving properly and that the accident was the fault of the plaintiff — which led the insurer to reject a settlement offer from the plaintiff.

    Corp. v. Rinnert, 170 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.); State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, supra; Rowoldt v. Cook County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 26 N.E.2d 903 (App. Ct. Ill.); Rockmiss v. New Jersey Manufacturers' Ass'n F. Ins. Co., 169 A. 663 (N.J.). See also, for an interesting opinion, Kurz v. Collins, 95 N.W.2d 365 (Wis.).

  9. Jorgenson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    136 N.J.L. 148 (N.J. 1947)   Cited 24 times

    Forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored in the law and such policies will be liberally construed to uphold the contract. Hampton v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 65 N.J.L. 265; Rockmiss v. New Jersey Manufacturers, c., Co., 112 Id. 136. The insurer having in most cases drawn the particular policy, all doubt as to the construction of terms in an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured.

  10. Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp.

    33 A.2d 866 (N.J. 1943)   Cited 41 times
    Finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage

    These conditions are not, as urged, conditions subsequent. They do not fall into the class which is involved in such typical cases as, Center Garage Co. v. Columbia Insurance Co., 96 N.J.L. 456, 459; 115 Atl. Rep. 401; Kleinman v. Globe Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 111 N.J.L. 374, 378, et seq.;168 Atl. Rep. 648; Rockmiss v. New Jersey Manufacturers,c., Insurance Co., 112 N.J.L. 136; 169 Atl. Rep. 663, and Bosshardt v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 124 N.J.L. 54, 55; 11 Atl. Rep. (2 d) 49. In the case at bar the stated conditions by the very terms of the policy (Condition 10) are made conditions precedent.