Accordingly, he ordered that Blalack's judgment on the pleadings motion be denied and that Cotton States' motion for judgment on the pleadings "as regards the public policy question only," be granted. As this amounted to an interlocutory order (see Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758)), and as the subject cause remained pending, we conclude, under the above authority, that the trial judge subsequently considering the case did not err in his reconsideration of the prior ruling (by the first judge) after the end of the term. Our conclusion is further supported by Bradley v. Tattnall Bank, 170 Ga. App. 821, 824, supra, in which the court, citing Professor Moore, author of Moore's Federal Practice, states that it has been found that "`[t]here is no jurisdictional inhibition to reconsideration (of a prior ruling by a different judge), . . . and a trial judge should not court reversal because of the erroneous ruling of another judge any more than because of an erroneous ruling of his own.'

The appeal is therefore premature. Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758); Hobgood v. Mitchell, 119 Ga. App. 827 ( 169 S.E.2d 173); Levenson v. Barutio, 121 Ga. App. 747 ( 175 S.E.2d 162). Appeal dismissed. Evans and Stolz, JJ., concur.

The record shows a final judgment has been entered in the case. While an appellant is not prejudiced by the dismissal of a true interlocutory appeal ( Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758)), a dismissal such as the one here forever bars a subsequent appeal from the final judgment. Appellant contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Gibson v. Hodges, supra, was swept away by a 1968 amendment to the Appellate Practice Act. Code Ann. § 6-809 (d). I would agree; however, this court is bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Bonzheim and Benton, supra.

The notice of appeal having been filed more than 30 days subsequent to the entry of the judgment appealed from and there being no certificate of review as required by statute, the appeal must be dismissed. Alexander v. State, 122 Ga. App. 331 ( 176 S.E.2d 633); Teppenpaw v. Blalock, 121 Ga. App. 320 (1, 2) ( 173 S.E.2d 442); Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758); Rush v. State, 124 Ga. App. 547 ( 184 S.E.2d 515). Appeal dismissed.

Plaintiff in a contract action appeals from the order setting aside the default judgment it had obtained and reopening the case on the issue of damages only. The order in question is not a final judgment and the trial judge did not certify it for immediate review within ten days. Therefore the appeal is premature and must be dismissed. Code § 6-701; Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758); Consolidated Pecan Sales v. Savannah Bank c. Co., 121 Ga. App. 40 ( 172 S.E.2d 487). Appeal dismissed. Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., concur.

JORDAN, Presiding Judge. 1. "The judgment appealed from in the present case is a judgment granting a motion for new trial, and there being no certificate of the trial judge as required by the statute [Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 2], the appeal must be dismissed. Berg v. Berg, 118 Ga. App. 353 ( 163 S.E.2d 888); Nugent v. Willis, 118 Ga. App. 335 ( 163 S.E.2d 891); Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758)." Stewart v. Church, 119 Ga. App. 58 ( 166 S.E.2d 436).

The appeal being premature, the motion is granted. See Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758). On the question of interlocutory appeals see also Consolidated Pecan Sales Co. v. Savannah Bank c. Co., 121 Ga. App. 40 ( 172 S.E.2d 487); Reaves, Appellate Practice, 21 Mercer Law Rev. 257, 259 (1970). Appeal dismissed. Deen and Evans, JJ., concur.

The appeal is therefore premature and must be dismissed. See Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758). An able jurist, Justice Sam Erwin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, later elected to the United States Senate, equates the mandate of the Magna Carta, "To no one will we deny justice, to no one will we delay it" with the law's policy against piecemeal appellate review: "There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders."

See Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1074. A notice of appeal is filed with respect to the order of dismissal. Irrespective of the order of the trial court dismissing the appeal, the notice of appeal from the overruling of the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction would have been dismissed by this court as being premature in view of the fact that it contained no certificate of the trial judge authorizing the review of a judgment that was not final. Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758). Judgment affirmed. Jordan, P. J., and Whitman, J., concur.

Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1073. The appeal is therefore premature and must be dismissed. Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 ( 163 S.E.2d 758). An able jurist, Justice Sam Erwin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, later elected to the United States Senate, equates the mandate of the Magna Carta, "To no one will we deny justice, to no one will we delay it" with the law's policy against piecemeal appellate review: "There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders."