As to whether the act of the thirty-fourth general assembly was repealed by the act of the thirty-fifth general assembly see United States v. Musgrave, 160 F. 700; United States v. Ninety-nine Diamonds, 139 F. 961; Kunkalman v. Gibson, (Ind.) 84 N.E. 985. As to its construction and the legislative intent, see Elmer v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 90; Freeman v. People, (Ill.) 89 N.E. 667; People v. McCullough, 143 Ill. App. 112; Rockingham County v. Chase, (N.H.) 71 A. 634; Hampton v. Hickey, (Ark.) 114 S.W. 707; Thorton v. State, 63 S.E. 301; Buffalo v. Lewis, (N.Y.) 84 N.E. 809; Milligan v. Arnold, (Ind.) 98 N.E. 822; Pettiti v. State, 121 P. 278. As to repeal by reenactment, see Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 95; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88; 36 Cyc. 1077; Child v. Shower, 18 Iowa 272; Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa 90; Ogden v. Witherspoon, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 19461.
Cash bail also became an option in Maryland and New Hampshire, but it is unclear whether its basis was statutory. Outerbridge Horsey Co. v. Martin , 142 Md. 52, 120 A. 235, 235–36 (1923) ; Rockingham Cty. v. Chase , 75 N.H. 127, 71 A. 634, 635 (1908). The same was true for the then-Territory of Hawaii.
This is particularly true in cases involving a later penal statute that redefines an offense or prescribes a penalty different from the penalty specified in an earlier statute governing the same offense. See Rockingham County v. Chase, 75 N.H. 127, 71 A. 634 (1908) (automobile speed limits); State v. Otis, 42 N.H. 71 (1860) (public drunkenness). See also 1A A. SUTHERLAND, supra 23.26.
2. It is true that companies operating high-powered and capacious busses catering to long-distance transportation had not entered this field in 1921 and could not have been specifically in the legislative mind. It by no means follows, however, that the act does not include their regulation. It is a rule of statutory construction, recognized in this state, that legislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to persons, subjects and business within their general purview and scope existent at the time of the enactments and to those coming into existence subsequent to their passage. 25 R.C.L. 778; Rockingham County v. Chase, 75 N.H. 127, 128, 129; McMillan v. Noyes, 75 N.H. 258, 264; Bly v. Railway, 67 N.H. 474, 475; State v. Dunklee, 76 N.H. 439, 441. It seems clear that the language of the statute is sufficiently general to include the intrastate business conducted by the defendant between Nashua and Manchester which the order of court enjoins. The defendant, however, contends that the statute, being penal in character, must be strictly construed and that, so construed, the language "receiving and discharging passengers along or at the termini of a regular route" does not aptly describe the acts complained of so as to bring the defendant within the definition in s. 1, because one of the termini of its regular route is not within the state and there is no allegation that it receives and discharges passengers along a regular route between Manchester and Nashua. The fallacy of this position is in the assumed construction of the word "termini" as used in the statute.
The claim that the ordinance does not apply to the business of carrying passengers in taxicabs, because at the date of its passage (1894) such vehicles were not in use, cannot be sustained. Bly v. Railway, 67 N.H. 474; Rockingham County v. Chase, 75 N.H. 127. As already suggested, the kind of vehicle is not important upon a reasonable construction of the ordinance. It cannot be doubted that a taxicab is a vehicle; and when people are carried in it for hire, as they are in an ordinary hack, the proprietor must obtain the license required by the ordinance, in order to legitimately prosecute that business in the city of Concord. Whether the defendant was properly licensed to operate taxicabs under the state law need not be considered.