The cases relied upon by the appellate court as warranting reversal of the trial court involved ordinances enacted by non-home-rule units of government. ( Springfield Park District v. Buckley (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 524 (ordinance adopted by the Springfield park district prohibiting motorcycles within any park in the park district); Rocking H. Stables, Inc. v. Village of Norridge (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 179 (Norridge ordinance forbidding any person to ride a horse on the public ways of the village); Salomone v. City of Canton (1961), 30 Ill. App.2d 474 (Canton ordinance prohibiting all parking along a two-mile section of Route 78).) In each of these cases the court held the ordinance invalid because it was not a reasonable exercise of the power delegated to a non-home-rule unit by the General Assembly.
Triple A Services, Inc. , 131 Ill. 2d at 230, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706. Notably, the court in Triple A Services, Inc. , also rejected plaintiff's attempt to rely on nonhome rule case law. Id. at 231, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706 (citing Rocking H. Stables, Inc. v. Village of Norridge , 106 Ill. App. 2d 179, 245 N.E.2d 601 (1969) ). Besides not addressing home rule, Chicago Title is also distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case sought to use a piece of real property.
The ordinance is grossly overly broad and arbitrary, and creates a classification which invalidly discriminates against mobile food vendor vehicles in the District. ( Rocking H. Stables, Inc. v. Village of Norridge (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 179, 245 N.E.2d 601.) The ordinance for these foregoing reasons is constitutionally invalid.