This is in general agreement with earlier decisions which held the discretion vested in public officials will not be controlled by injunction unless fraud, corruption, oppression, or gross injustice is shown. Stewart v. Department of Public Works, 336 Ill. 513 (1929); Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill.2d 307 (1958). Rocke v. County of Cook, 60 Ill.App.3d 874, 875 (1978). We have already upheld the trial court's determination that Jones committed the ordinance violations.
The court then considered the application of section 5-408 in light of the structured State highway setup and concluded section 5-408 had no application because: (1) no highway was being completed or connected in view of the fact the roadway in question had been in existence since 1850; and (2) no county funds were being employed as required by section 5-408. Highland Park, 37 Ill. App.3d at 24, 344 N.E.2d at 672. The applicability of section 5-408 was also addressed in Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287. There, the court confined its analysis to whether the road improvement would connect or complete a county highway so as to render section 5-408 operative. Relying on Highland Park, the court concluded section 5-408 was inapplicable and no prior approval by the local municipality was required for the planned improvements.
The overwhelming weight of case law is, as Frey and Earnhart concede, in Plaintiffs' favor. (See Rocke v. County of Cook, App., 18 Ill. Dec. 134, 377 N.E.2d 288 (19), [ sic] for example). Accordingly, this Court will follow precedent.
Arnold v. Engelbrecht, 164 Ill. App.3d 704, 707, 518 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1987). There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the act of the public official is arbitrary or capricious (Arnold, 164 Ill. App.3d at 707, 518 N.E.2d at 239), when fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown (Arnold, 164 Ill. App.3d at 707, 518 N.E.2d at 239), or when the act is outside the official's authority or unlawful (Rocke v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875, 377 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1978)). We do not regard the actions of the collector as arbitrary or capricious.
The City's further argument that cost-reimbursement compensation is only available through the RFP process is unconvincing. McNare Grant, Jr., the former first deputy of purchasing for the City, testified that cost reimbursement could be utilized in a sealed bid contract. • 4 The City correctly states that the court must defer to the discretion of municipal officials except where fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown. ( Arnold v. Engelbrecht (1987), 164 Ill. App.3d 704, 518 N.E.2d 237; Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287.) However, the presumption of discretion is diminished here in the face of the City's failure to supply the court with sufficient facts to support its actions. It is not apparent from the record how a shuttle bus service contract calls for the type of professional services defined as not adaptable to competitive bidding under section 8-10-4.
An exception to this rule arises in a case when the public official's acts are arbitrary and capricious and he thus abuses his discretion. ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287.) Additionally, injunctive relief will lie to control discretionary actions of public officials if fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown. Houseknecht v. Zagel (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 284, 445 N.E.2d 402.
Where an administrative order is against the manifest weight of the evidence or where the agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously and has thereby abused the discretion vested in it, the courts should not hesitate to intervene." Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 207, 326 N.E.2d 406, 408; see also, e.g., Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875-76, 377 N.E.2d 287; Hall v. Board of Education (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 834, 841, 363 N.E.2d 116, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 630, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1056, 55 L.Ed.2d 757, 98 S.Ct. 1225. Whether the trial court should enter a mandatory injunction to specifically regulate or limit the manner in which IHDA reaches its financing decisions is, at most, only one of several remedies which the trial court could impose upon remand, assuming the neighbors prevail in their underlying causes of action and assuming they demonstrate that such relief would be appropriate.
Accordingly, the general rule is that injunctive relief will not be granted against public officials with respect to their official acts unless such acts are either outside their authority or unlawful. Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287. In the case at bar, plaintiff prayed for the trial court to generally enjoin defendants from continuing to violate the Open Meetings Act and to specifically enjoin them from continuing the July 25 meeting.
Specifically, plaintiffs' allegation that they will be harmed because defendant's actions are illegal is nothing more than an ineffectual conclusion of law. While it is true that injunctive relief will lie to control the discretionary actions of public officials if fraud, corruption, oppression or gross injustice is shown ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875, 377 N.E.2d 287), a mere allegation of illegality such as plaintiffs' does not rise to the level of necessary demonstrative proof. Second, plaintiffs' allegation that defendant's policy will prejudice the Regional Board is pure speculation and conjecture.
However, where the official has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and has thus abused his discretion a court of equity may act to prevent such abuse. ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287; Mullen v. Board of School Directors (1969), 436 Pa. 211, 259 A.2d 877; 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions sec. 176 (1969).) Thus our finding of sufficient allegations of the arbitrary abuse of discretion by appellant and its director to vest the court with jurisdiction also establishes a basis for the exercise of its equitable powers to prevent that abuse.