Rocke v. County of Cook

13 Citing cases

  1. Wheaton v. Jones

    2023 Ill. App. 3d 220287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

    This is in general agreement with earlier decisions which held the discretion vested in public officials will not be controlled by injunction unless fraud, corruption, oppression, or gross injustice is shown. Stewart v. Department of Public Works, 336 Ill. 513 (1929); Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill.2d 307 (1958). Rocke v. County of Cook, 60 Ill.App.3d 874, 875 (1978). We have already upheld the trial court's determination that Jones committed the ordinance violations.

  2. Village of Oak Brook v. County of Du Page

    527 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 3 times
    In Village of Oak Brook v. County of Du Page, 173 Ill. App.3d 490 (1988), we allowed the county to widen two county roads without obtaining a city permit, despite the fact that the roads passed through a floodplain and the city had ordinances regarding such construction.Village of Oak Brook, 173 Ill. App.3d at 494.

    The court then considered the application of section 5-408 in light of the structured State highway setup and concluded section 5-408 had no application because: (1) no highway was being completed or connected in view of the fact the roadway in question had been in existence since 1850; and (2) no county funds were being employed as required by section 5-408. Highland Park, 37 Ill. App.3d at 24, 344 N.E.2d at 672. The applicability of section 5-408 was also addressed in Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287. There, the court confined its analysis to whether the road improvement would connect or complete a county highway so as to render section 5-408 operative. Relying on Highland Park, the court concluded section 5-408 was inapplicable and no prior approval by the local municipality was required for the planned improvements.

  3. Sherman v. Bd. of Fire Police Comm'rs

    445 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 17 times
    In Sherman v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 1001, 445 N.E.2d 1, on which Burgess principally relies, the event which triggered the obligation to set a hearing date was the filing of charges with the board, and that case is thus factually inapposite to the present case.

    The overwhelming weight of case law is, as Frey and Earnhart concede, in Plaintiffs' favor. (See Rocke v. County of Cook, App., 18 Ill. Dec. 134, 377 N.E.2d 288 (19), [ sic] for example). Accordingly, this Court will follow precedent.

  4. Phoenix Bond and Indemnity Co. v. Pappas

    309 Ill. App. 3d 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 10 times

    Arnold v. Engelbrecht, 164 Ill. App.3d 704, 707, 518 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1987). There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the act of the public official is arbitrary or capricious (Arnold, 164 Ill. App.3d at 707, 518 N.E.2d at 239), when fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown (Arnold, 164 Ill. App.3d at 707, 518 N.E.2d at 239), or when the act is outside the official's authority or unlawful (Rocke v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875, 377 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1978)). We do not regard the actions of the collector as arbitrary or capricious.

  5. O'Hare Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago

    235 Ill. App. 3d 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    Distinguishing Hassert on similar grounds

    The City's further argument that cost-reimbursement compensation is only available through the RFP process is unconvincing. McNare Grant, Jr., the former first deputy of purchasing for the City, testified that cost reimbursement could be utilized in a sealed bid contract. • 4 The City correctly states that the court must defer to the discretion of municipal officials except where fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown. ( Arnold v. Engelbrecht (1987), 164 Ill. App.3d 704, 518 N.E.2d 237; Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287.) However, the presumption of discretion is diminished here in the face of the City's failure to supply the court with sufficient facts to support its actions. It is not apparent from the record how a shuttle bus service contract calls for the type of professional services defined as not adaptable to competitive bidding under section 8-10-4.

  6. Arnold v. Engelbrecht

    518 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    An exception to this rule arises in a case when the public official's acts are arbitrary and capricious and he thus abuses his discretion. ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287.) Additionally, injunctive relief will lie to control discretionary actions of public officials if fraud, corruption or gross injustice is shown. Houseknecht v. Zagel (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 284, 445 N.E.2d 402.

  7. Greer v. Ill. Housing Dev. Authority

    150 Ill. App. 3d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    In Greer, the neighbors alleged that they resided within 1,200 feet of the proposed development and that the development's violation of the Chicago zoning ordinance posed a substantial safety hazard.

    Where an administrative order is against the manifest weight of the evidence or where the agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously and has thereby abused the discretion vested in it, the courts should not hesitate to intervene." Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 207, 326 N.E.2d 406, 408; see also, e.g., Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875-76, 377 N.E.2d 287; Hall v. Board of Education (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 834, 841, 363 N.E.2d 116, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 630, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1056, 55 L.Ed.2d 757, 98 S.Ct. 1225. Whether the trial court should enter a mandatory injunction to specifically regulate or limit the manner in which IHDA reaches its financing decisions is, at most, only one of several remedies which the trial court could impose upon remand, assuming the neighbors prevail in their underlying causes of action and assuming they demonstrate that such relief would be appropriate.

  8. Lindsey v. Board of Education

    127 Ill. App. 3d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 26 times
    Differentiating between a "factual denial" or "factual defense" and a "conclusory" one

    Accordingly, the general rule is that injunctive relief will not be granted against public officials with respect to their official acts unless such acts are either outside their authority or unlawful. Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287. In the case at bar, plaintiff prayed for the trial court to generally enjoin defendants from continuing to violate the Open Meetings Act and to specifically enjoin them from continuing the July 25 meeting.

  9. Board of Education v. Board of Education

    445 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 5 times
    In Board of Education v. Board of Education (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 212, 445 N.E.2d 464, the court held that the bare allegation of "illegal" was insufficient to establish harm.

    Specifically, plaintiffs' allegation that they will be harmed because defendant's actions are illegal is nothing more than an ineffectual conclusion of law. While it is true that injunctive relief will lie to control the discretionary actions of public officials if fraud, corruption, oppression or gross injustice is shown ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875, 377 N.E.2d 287), a mere allegation of illegality such as plaintiffs' does not rise to the level of necessary demonstrative proof. Second, plaintiffs' allegation that defendant's policy will prejudice the Regional Board is pure speculation and conjecture.

  10. Houseknecht v. Zagel

    112 Ill. App. 3d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 16 times

    However, where the official has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and has thus abused his discretion a court of equity may act to prevent such abuse. ( Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287; Mullen v. Board of School Directors (1969), 436 Pa. 211, 259 A.2d 877; 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions sec. 176 (1969).) Thus our finding of sufficient allegations of the arbitrary abuse of discretion by appellant and its director to vest the court with jurisdiction also establishes a basis for the exercise of its equitable powers to prevent that abuse.