As already noted, this does not affect a preexisting lien on the debtor's property. (See also Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 42, 43, 388 N.E.2d 436, 437-38; Avco Finance Co. v. Erickson (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 868, 870, 270 N.E.2d 111, 112.) There is nothing in the statute or case law requiring that a petition to revive a judgment be filed, or the judgment itself be revived, prior to expiration of the then existing seven-year period in which the judgment lien may still be enforced.

Neither case gives strong support to defendants' theory. Rather, we conclude the proper rule is that set forth in Farmers State Bank v. Hansen (1990), 196 Ill. App.3d 295, 553 N.E.2d 751, Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 42, 388 N.E.2d 436, and Avco Finance Co. v. Erickson (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 868, 270 N.E.2d 111. In Chamberlain, a suit was brought to revive a judgment against joint judgment debtors, one of whom had been discharged in bankruptcy.

( In re Marriage of Cesaretti (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 347, 561 N.E.2d 306.) A discharge in bankruptcy, being personal to the bankrupt, does not act as a release of liens or security interests in the property owned by him. Farmers State Bank v. Hansen (1990), 196 Ill. App.3d 295, 553 N.E.2d 751; Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 42, 388 N.E.2d 436. • 2 Applying the above principles, we find that the trial court could properly order Brian to pay a portion of the debt. It was undisputed that Sherry's real estate was nonmarital property and that the lien encumbering it was the result of a marital debt incurred during the marriage for the purpose of financing the parties' business.

• 2-4 Additionally, a discharge in bankruptcy, being personal to the bankrupt, does not act as a release of liens or security interests in property owned by him. ( Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 42.) Thus, a valid, prefiled lien is not extinguished by the discharge of debtors. Furthermore, a revival of a judgment is not the creation of a new judgment, but merely a continuation of the judgment revived.

Other jurisdictions are in accord with Olsen. See Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic, 70 Ill. App.3d 42, 43, 26 Ill.Dec. 721, 726, 388 N.E.2d 436, 438 (1979) (a discharge "does not preclude the enforcement of a lien under the judgment which is recognized as valid under state law and is not invalidated by the bankruptcy proceeding"); see also Albritton v. General Portland Cement Co., 344 So.2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1977) (nothing in statute authorizes the invalidation of liens which survive bankruptcy, to the extent there existed property subject to lien when the petition was filed); Ducker v. Standard Supply Co., 280 S.C. 157, 311 S.E.2d 728 (S.C. 1984). Even though Triangle's debt was listed among the unsecured creditors, Brua's discharge did not affect the enforce-ability of Triangle's lien obtained prior to the bankruptcy petition.

" ( Avco Finance Co. v. Erickson (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 868, 870, 270 N.E.2d 111, 112. Accord, Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 42, 388 N.E.2d 436.) This was precisely the procedure followed by the petitioner in the case at bar.