Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co.

9 Citing cases

  1. Lascom v. Lascom

    No. 23-P-678 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2024)

    Cormier, supra at 237. See Rochev.Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792 (1984) ("Although many of the findings are verbatim recitations of Mr. Roche's requests, the judge omitted many portions of his requests and in many instances added and condensed sentences").

  2. McMenimen v. Passatempo

    452 Mass. 178 (Mass. 2008)   Cited 60 times
    Describing discretionary relief under first paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3, as "extraordinary" and "reserved for exceptional circumstances where a litigant demonstrates a substantial claim of violation of his or her substantive rights"

    See, e.g., Brum v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 684, 686-688 (1999); Maddocks v. Richer, 403 Mass. 592, 596-601 (1988); Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 30-31 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 791-792 (1984); DiLuzio v. United Elec., Radio Mach. Workers, Local 274, 391 Mass. 211, 213-214 (1984); Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 778-785 (1979); Kent v. Commonwealth, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 31-34 (2001), S.C., 437 Mass. 312 (2002); Mayflower Dev. Corp. v. Dennis, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 630, 633-635 (1981). Contrast Elles v. ZoningBd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 672-674 (2008) (addressing plaintiffs' novel claims involving doctrine of present execution pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, only because plaintiffs had filed notice of appeal in trial court and attempted to pursue appeal to Appeals Court in regular course but were thwarted).

  3. Mulhern v. Roach

    398 Mass. 18 (Mass. 1986)   Cited 56 times
    In Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18 (1986), an attorney sought to recoup the reasonable value of his services to a client, which he argued was one-third of the client's total recovery.

    Accordingly, unless our review of the record leaves this court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, Building Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), or unless the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the relevant legal standards, we must affirm. See Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792-793 (1984). 2.

  4. Michelon v. Deschler

    96 Mass. App. Ct. 815 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    Id. at 238, 408 N.E.2d 860. See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 424 Mass. 430, 451, 677 N.E.2d 127 (1997) (findings evidenced by badge of personal analysis because judge rejected certain characterizations and heavily edited many findings); Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 465, 583 N.E.2d 806 (1991) (findings are product of judge's independent judgment where judge deleted specific language from counsel's submissions, incorporated some of opposing counsel's proposed findings, and drafted findings and conclusions of his own); Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792, 464 N.E.2d 1341 (1984) (where judge omitted many portions of counsel's submissions and added and condensed sentences, judge's findings had badge of personal analysis). Here, the judge adopted verbatim the father's proposed findings of fact, only updating the ages of the children.

  5. Kudarauskas v. Kudarauskas

    530 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    Nevertheless, the judge made significant additions, deletions, and revisions that indicate to us that her findings are the product of her personal analysis. See Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 237 (1980); Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792 (1984). Her findings on custody, for example, contained a significant introductory paragraph, not appearing in the proposed findings of either party, which capsulized the judge's view of the case after hearing the evidence.

  6. Marr v. Back Bay Architectural Commission

    505 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 14 times
    In Marr v. Back Bay Architectural Commn., 23 Mass. App. Ct. 679 (1987) (Marr I), this court provided a detailed road map for a trial court reviewing a decision of the Back Bay Architectural Commission (commission).

    This is the first time that either of our appellate courts has had occasion to consider the powers and duties of the Superior Court in reviewing decisions of the Back Bay Architectural Commission (St. 1966, c. 625, as amended). It is also the first time since the decision in Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 235-238 (1980), and Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 412, 414-418 (1980), that either appellate court has concluded that it must reject findings of fact and conclusions of law which a trial judge has copied almost verbatim from proposals submitted by counsel for one of the parties. See, e.g., Mailer v. Mailer, 390 Mass. 371, 375 (1983); Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517, 524 (1984); Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792 (1984); Lovett v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 444, 446-447 (1984); First Pa. Mortgage Trust v. Dorchester Sav. Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 622 n. 12 (1985); O'Hara v. Robbins, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 279, 285-286 (1982); Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 404-405 (1982); Abbott v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 522 (1984); Bottom Line Assocs. v. International Data Group, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 n. 1 (1984); Edinburg v. Cavers, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 218-220 (1986); Kent v. Kent, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 341 (1986). These are two appeals to the Superior Court from decisions of the commission by which it refused, in effect, to issue a certificate of appropriateness (St. 1966, c. 625, § 8, as amended by St. 1981, c. 624, § 4, and further amended by St. 1982, c. 624, § 8) with respect to the exterior architectural features (St. 1966, c. 625, § 3, as amended by St. 1981, c. 624, § 2) of a proposed garage and associated entrance driveway which

  7. Mulhern v. Roach

    20 Mass. App. Ct. 322 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    We think, however, that the trial judge gave inadequate consideration to the circumstances (a) that he was not setting a fee on a contingent basis; and (b) that Mr. Mulhern had not established the important element of the time expended by him. Beyond that, examination of the record leaves the panel "with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," see Marlow v. New Bedford, 369 Mass. 501, 508 (1976), and that the award was excessive beyond the range of any reasonable discretion. See Roche v. Boston Safe Dep. Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 793 (1984), where it was said that, in reviewing "a judge's ultimate findings and conclusions," it must be determined "whether they are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the relevant legal standards." It would be inappropriate for this court to set the amount of Mr. Mulhern's fee.

  8. Bottom Line Associates v. Int'l Data Group

    465 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 2 times

    Id. at 237. Also see Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785, 792 (1984). 1. The $7,500 additional fee. Paragraph 2(d) of the contract provided in part as follows: "By the nature of this project, it is important that the 13 [markets] be bought at appropriate stations at suitable times for broadcast beginning the week of April 4th.

  9. Leonard v. National Amusements, Inc.

    1996 Mass. App. Div. 175 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    189 (1976). When reviewing a trial judge's ultimate findings and conclusions, the reviewing court must determine whether they are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with relevant legal standards, Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 464 N.E.2d 1341 (1984). Given the facts of this case, the denial of defendant's above requests for rulings do not meet that standard and accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.